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Abstract
To remain abreast of ongoing rapid transformations in the industry, incumbent au-
tomotive manufacturers have been establishing so-called corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries in prominent innovation clusters, such as Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv, and
Beijing, since the mid- to late 1990s. This study is concerned with the transfer of
knowledge from these innovation subsidiaries into their respective headquarters.
Reviewing previous work in the field of international business, particularly the topics
of internationalisation, transfer of knowledge, and subsidiary-headquarters relations,
shows a clear gap in the literature: a lack of a holistic approach to reverse, intra-firm
knowledge transfer, considering factors not in isolation, but on an aggregate level,
including interactions between them. To address this gap, an initial conceptual
framework is developed, providing an integrated overview of the factors a↵ecting
knowledge transfer. This framework is modified through two phases of in-depth
qualitative case studies of automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries.
Results reveal that, while the conceptual framework developed from the literature is
highly applicable to the research context, there appear to be deeper, underlying is-
sues at work that pose a fundamental obstacle to knowledge transfer from innovation
subsidiaries to their headquarters:
• Knowledge transfer is not linear as previously suggested by the literature;
• Roles of actors are less clear-cut than previously suggested;
• Considering global networks of subsidiaries brings added complexities.
This study makes two contributions. Firstly, a holistic conceptual framework for
knowledge transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries to their headquarters is
developed, illustrating the various factors a↵ecting this transfer, as well as their
interconnections. Secondly, by considering not only the dyadic knowledge transfer
between a single corporate innovation subsidiary and its headquarters, but by dis-
cussing global networks of such subsidiaries, this study contributes to the literature
on global innovation (manufacturing, engineering, and R&D) networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Context
The automotive industry is currently facing an era of extreme volatility and trans-
formation. Contemporary issues, such as rapid technological advancement, climate
change, and the market entrance of new, less traditional players, such as Tesla,
Apple, and Google, have thrown the automotive industry into a state of change
that incumbent Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are struggling to re-
main abreast of (Butler and Martin, 2016; Diehlmann and Ha¨cker, 2013; Holweg
and Oliver, 2016). One strategy for keeping informed about potentially disruptive
trends involves establishing a corporate innovation subsidiary in a prominent inno-
vation cluster, such as Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv, Beijing, or others (Lazzarotti et al.,
2013). Indeed, the first automotive OEMs started establishing such innovation sub-
sidiaries in Silicon Valley in the mid- to late 1990s (Berger and Brem, 2017; Butler
and Martin, 2016; Nelson, 2014). Since then, a total of 15 automotive OEMs and
Tier 1 suppliers from around the globe have established a presence in Silicon Valley,
many of whom have also set up similar subsidiaries in other innovation clusters,
including Tel Aviv, Beijing, Berlin, and Seoul.
Colloquially, these subsidiaries are often known as innovation outposts, hubs, labs,
think tanks, or similar, but, for consistency, the term corporate innovation subsidiary
will continue to be used throughout this thesis. Research has shown that corporate
innovation subsidiaries are usually established with a predominantly exploratory
purpose, enabling the company to gain insights into the technologies that may be
harvested from a region (Berger and Brem, 2016, 2017). Over time, many of these
subsidiaries grow in size and scope to enable more prototyping work to be carried
out with a wider range of external partners, such as start-ups and universities, thus
providing a valuable source of innovation for the parent company (Berger and Brem,
2016, 2017).
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Corporate innovation subsidiaries are generally distant from their respective com-
pany headquarters, both in terms of purpose (innovation and knowledge creation,
often in collaboration with external partners), and in terms of distance (on the
periphery of the organisation, often in a foreign country). Ideally, this should al-
low the organisation to e↵ectively source knowledge from an innovation cluster, as
the subsidiaries have access to the resources of a multinational automotive OEM,
coupled with the agile, risk-embracing mindset of a start-up company. However,
initial observations show that, in practice, these subsidiaries struggle with trans-
ferring knowledge sourced in their local environment to their respective company
headquarters.
Note that, when referring to “knowledge transfer”, this thesis considers technological
knowledge embedded in projects conducted at the subsidiaries. Thus, the transfer
of knowledge is, in this context, synonymous to the transfer of projects, often in
the form of proofs of concept (POCs) or prototypes, from the subsidiaries to their
respective headquarters. Additionally, in discussing the transfer of knowledge, this
thesis does not place focus on the transfer outcome. Instead, the process of transfer
is examined, with particular emphasis on obstacles that impede, as well as measures
that help, the process. This focus is chosen for multiple reasons. Firstly, success of
knowledge transfer and, more broadly speaking, the value of a corporate innovation
subsidiary, are multi-faceted and complex. Does success imply that a project must
achieve market success? Is success solely financially driven? Does achieving a shift
in employee mindset qualify as value? If so, how can it be measured? Secondly,
initial interviews revealed that the case companies are reluctant to discuss examples
of specific projects and the outcome of their attempted transfer to headquarters.
To avoid this ambiguous and confidential topic, this thesis examines the process
of knowledge transfer and why corporate innovation subsidiaries struggle with it,
rather than emphasising examples of knowledge transfer successes and failures.
Why these automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries continue to have di culties
with the transfer of knowledge to headquarters, despite many of them having over
20 years of experience, poses an interesting issue that warrants further investigation,
thus calling for the following research question:
How is knowledge transferred from a corporate innovation subsidiary located in an
innovation cluster to its company headquarters?
In the interest of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the factors a↵ecting this
knowledge transfer, as well as reasons for why knowledge is not easily transferred
3from the corporate innovation subsidiaries in question to their respective headquar-
ters, and how these challenges are dealt with in practice, the following sub-questions
provide additional scope to this study:
1. What are the obstacles impeding the knowledge transfer from a corporate
innovation subsidiary located in an innovation cluster to its headquarters?
2. How are these obstacles managed in practice?
1.2 Research Objectives
To answer the above questions and make a contribution to knowledge, one must
first understand the research context more broadly, thus leading to the following
research objective:
1. Understanding what a corporate innovation subsidiary is and what it does.
Subsequently, a further, more specific research objective helps focus the data collec-
tion necessary for answering the research sub-questions:
2. Identifying critical obstacles to the knowledge transfer from a corporate inno-
vation subsidiary to its headquarters, as well as the measures that have been
put in place to facilitate the process.
Finally, to direct data analysis and illustration, this thesis aims to develop a holis-
tic conceptual framework that considers factors a↵ecting knowledge transfer not in
isolation, but on an aggregate level, including interactions between them. Thus, a
third research objective is identified:
3. Developing a framework that conceptualises the knowledge transfer process
from a corporate innovation subsidiary to its headquarters.
Achieving these research objectives contributes to the field of international busi-
ness from both a theoretical and a practical perspective, as will become evident
throughout this thesis.
1.3 Research Approach
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on international business,
particularly the topics of internationalisation, transfer of knowledge, and subsidiary-
headquarters relations, by developing a framework that conceptualises the knowl-
edge transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters
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to their headquarters. Consequently, the nature of this research is exploratory and
applies an abductive research strategy, i.e., following an iterative loop between the-
ory and empirical data (theory matching or systematic combining), to guide the
researcher to her conclusions (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). As will be elaborated
upon further in Chapter 3, following an abductive, rather than an inductive ap-
proach, is favourable to this particular research context, given that the complex
social situation of multinational automotive OEMs having innovation subsidiaries
located in innovation clusters calls for a preliminary framework and structure based
on existing literature, in order to bring an initial order to the problem. The resulting
preconceptions of the researcher rule out the use of pure inductive grounded theory
as laid out by Glaser and Strauss (1967), and point instead towards an iterative
theory matching process.
Following recommendations of Yin (2003) and Baxter and Jack (2008), this research
adopts the case study approach as the most appropriate method. The study has
been conducted in two distinct phases, which guide the structure of this thesis:
Phase 1: Eight in-depth case studies of automotive corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries located in Silicon Valley (and their respective headquarters);
Phase 2: Further in-depth case studies of the global network of corporate inno-
vation subsidiaries of case Companies A, B, and C.
After developing an initial conceptual framework based on the knowledge transfer
literature, findings from the case studies in Phases 1 and 2 are used to modify this
initial framework. In keeping with the abductive approach of theory matching, this
thesis culminates in a discussion of how the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 matches
the data collected in Phases 1 and 2. It is found that, while the conceptual frame-
work developed from the literature certainly applies to the research context, there
appear to be deeper, underlying issues at work that pose a fundamental obstacle to
knowledge transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries to their respective head-
quarters.
Thus, the thesis provides two main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, a concep-
tual framework for the knowledge transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries
located in innovation clusters to their respective headquarters is developed and re-
fined through multiple phases of in-depth case studies. Developing this framework
addresses the identified literature gap of a lack of holistic approaches to reverse,
intra-firm knowledge transfer. Furthermore, by considering not only the dyadic re-
lationship and knowledge transfer between a single corporate innovation subsidiary
5and its headquarters, but by also discussing the challenges that arise when trying to
manage knowledge transfer across a global network of such subsidiaries, this study
contributes to the literature on global innovation (i.e., manufacturing, engineering,
and research and development (R&D)) networks.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of six main chapters, and a section of appendices, as illustrated
in Figure 1.1. The first three chapters provide an overview of the research back-
ground, including this introduction, a literature review of multinational subsidiaries
and knowledge transfer (culminating in the initial conceptual framework), and a
discussion of the research approach, including theory on research philosophy and
methodology. Chapters 4 and 5 present the data collected from the two phases of
empirical research, resulting in cross-case conclusions and modifications of the con-
ceptual framework. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the research findings
and culminates in a discussion of the study’s implications for practice, as well as its
limitations and resulting avenues for potential future research.
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Research Approach
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Phase 1
Case Studies
(Silicon Valley)
Chapter 4 presents the data collected from eight case
studies of corporate innovation subsidiaries located in
Silicon Valley, modifying the conceptual framework.
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Phase 2
Case Studies
(Other Clusters)
Chapter 5 presents the data collected from the global
network of corporate innovation subsidiaries of Cases
A, B, and C, modifying the conceptual framework.
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Discussion and
Conclusion
Chapter 6 summarises research findings and discusses
implications for theory and practice, as well as various
limitations of this study and ideas for future research.
Appendices
The appendices provide supporting material concern-
ing the methodology, as well as summary tables of the
case study data.
Figure 1.1: Structure of this thesis
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation for this thesis.
In order to contextualise and conceptualise the topic of corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries located globally in innovation clusters1, the international business literature
is reviewed. In an e↵ort to characterise the field, Werner (2002) and Werner and
Brouthers (2002) review studies in the top international management journals and
categorise them into three broad areas:
1. Pure international management studies, concerning the management of cor-
porations in a multinational context;
2. Comparative management studies, consisting of cross-cultural and cross-national
studies;
3. Foreign domestic studies, focussing on management within a nation outside of
North America (given that much research has a North American bias).
Focussing more narrowly on the first category, pure international management, 12
distinct topics emerge from Werner’s (2002) review: global business environment;
internationalisation; entry mode decisions; international joint ventures; foreign
direct investment; international exchange; transfer of knowledge; strategic al-
liances and networks; multinational enterprises; subsidiary-headquarters rela-
tions; multinational team management; and expatriate management.
1Note that an innovation cluster refers to a geographical region that “favours the creation and
development of high potential entrepreneurial ventures and is characterised by heightened mobility
of resources, including people, capital and information” (Engel and del Palacio, 2011, p.27). While
the literature on innovation clusters and their dynamics is extensive, it is not reviewed further
in this thesis, given the importance of the concept of innovation clusters as a contextual, rather
than an analytical factor. Furthermore, the term innovation cluster is often considered to be
synonymous with the term innovation ecosystem. Indeed, multiple interviewees make references to
the Silicon Valley ecosystem, as will become evident in Chapter 4. In these instances, the Silicon
Valley ecosystem refers to the Silicon Valley regional cluster.
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To conceptualise the research context of this thesis (knowledge transfer from multi-
nationals’ corporate innovation subsidiaries to company headquarters), the topics
of internationalisation, transfer of knowledge, and subsidiary-headquarters relations
(highlighted in bold in the above list) are particularly relevant and will thus be in-
vestigated in more detail.
This chapter culminates in the identification of a research gap, as well as in the
development of a conceptual framework that integrates relevant concepts from the
reviewed literature. This framework is used throughout the thesis to analyse the case
studies in Phases 1 and 2 and is modified according to key findings, thus allowing
the researcher to answer the research questions.
2.1 Multinational Subsidiaries
Much has been written on the global structure, strategy, and organisation of the
Multinational Corporation (MNC), which is defined as “an economic organisation
that evolves from its national origins to spanning across borders” (Kogut and Zander,
1993, p.625), i.e., it has operations in at least one other country besides its national
origin. In particular, focus has been placed on foreign subsidiaries of MNCs and how
these subsidiaries fit into the organisation as a whole (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986;
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998, 2000, 2001; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991, 1994),
where a subsidiary has been broadly defined as “a value-adding entity in a host
country [which can] perform a single activity (e.g., manufacturing) or an entire
value chain of activities” (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998, p.774). The sections below
review the literature on the phenomenon of multinational subsidiaries.
2.1.1 Definition and Typologies
The traditional view of an MNC involves the headquarters of the organisation, lo-
cated at its national origin, as the organisation’s primary focus (Dunning, 1981;
Vernon, 1966). This view also suggests that competitive advantages for the firm are
developed at headquarters and then leveraged globally by transferring technology
to the firm’s network of subsidiaries (Dunning, 1981; Vernon, 1966). However, the
literature on this topic has shifted to acknowledge that foreign subsidiaries have
since grown in size and capabilities and often play critical roles for the strategy of
the MNC (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Lagerstro¨m
et al., 2019; Vrontis and Christofi, 2019). To understand and illustrate how multi-
national subsidiaries can help realise firm strategy, multiple authors have developed
subsidiary role typologies, some of which are outlined in Table 2.1.
9Authors
(year)
Variables used Typology of multinational subsidiary roles
Bartlett and
Ghoshal
(1986)
Strategic importance of local environ-
ment vs. competence of local organisa-
tion
Strategic leader (high strategic importance of local environment and high competence of
local organisation); black hole (high strategic importance of local environment and low
competence of local organisation); contributor (low strategic importance of local environ-
ment and high competence of local organisation); implementer (low strategic importance
of local environment and low competence of local organisation)
Birkinshaw
and
Morrison
(1995)
Based on previously published typologies
(largely also included in this table)
Local implementer, specialised contributor, world mandate
Gupta and
Govindara-
jan (1991,
1994)
Outflow of knowledge from subsidiary to
rest of MNC vs. inflow of knowledge from
MNC to subsidiary
Global innovator (high outflow, low inflow); integrated player (high outflow, high in-
flow); local innovator (low outflow, low inflow); implementer (low outflow, high inflow)
Jarillo and
Mart´ınez
(1990)
Degree of integration of the subsidiary
with the home organisation (low degree
of integration = high degree of autonomy)
vs. degree of localisation (how much work
the subsidiary carries out locally)
Autonomous subsidiary (low degree of integration and high degree of localisation);
active subsidiary (high degree of integration and high degree of localisation); receptive
subsidiary (high degree of integration and low degree of localisation)
Rugman
et al. (2011)
The four subsidiary roles developed by
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) vs. value
chain activities
Four by four matrix contrasting the subsidiary roles developed by Bartlett and Ghoshal
(1986) (black hole, implementer, strategic leader, and contributor) against four main value
chain activities (innovation, production, sales, and administrative support)
White and
Poynter
(1984)
Product scope of subsidiary (limited or
unconstrained) vs. market scope of sub-
sidiary (global or local) vs. value-added
scope of activities carried out by sub-
sidiary (narrow or broad)
Product specialist (global market scope and limited product scope); strategic inde-
pendent (global market scope and unconstrained product scope); miniature replica
(adopter/adapter/innovator) (local market scope, limited, medium, and unconstrained
product scope, and narrow, medium, and broad value-add scope for adopter, adapter, and
innovator, respectively); rationalised manufacturer (global market scope and narrow
value-add scope); marketing satellite (local market scope and narrow value-add scope)
Table 2.1: Di↵erent typologies of multinational subsidiary roles
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While Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) mention that “the organisational competence
of a particular subsidiary can, of course, be in technology, production, marketing,
or any other area” (p.90), most subsidiary typologies acknowledge only aggregate
subsidiary roles, rather than distinguishing between activities along the value chain.
This is a common shortcoming of multinational subsidiary typologies, leading to
theory in the field being developed for subsidiaries generally, rather than for specific
types of subsidiaries, for example, innovation-specific subsidiaries. The focus of this
thesis on corporate innovation subsidiaries suggests reviewing a further aspect of the
international business literature: internationalisation, including global innovation
(i.e., manufacturing, engineering, and research and development (R&D)) networks.
2.2 Global Innovation Networks
A network is a concept that describes a set of units, or nodes, as well as the in-
terrelationship between them (Fombrun, 1982). In the context of organisations,
networks have been researched both on an intra-organisational, as well as on an
inter-organisational level. Previous studies on intra-organisational networks, partic-
ularly global intra-organisational innovation (i.e. manufacturing, engineering, and
R&D) networks, are highly relevant to this thesis and are thus reviewed in the
following sections.
2.2.1 International Manufacturing Networks
International manufacturing networks (IMN) have been studied increasingly, given
the trends of higher global competition and access to lower cost resources and im-
proved knowledge bases across the global economy (Ferdows, 1997a,b; Koren, 2010;
Shi and Gregory, 1998). In a review of IMN, Cheng et al. (2015) categorise the lit-
erature in this field into two main focus areas: studies addressing the configuration
of the network (i.e., size, location, scope, and specialisation of units in the network),
and studies concerning the coordination of the network (i.e., degree of centralisation,
policies, incentives, controls, and knowledge sharing across units of the network).
For instance, Shi and Gregory (1998) develop a map of IMN configurations, split
according to the degree of geographic dispersion of the network (domestic, regional,
multinational, and worldwide dispersion) and the level of coordination between
nodes in the network (multidomestic orientation versus global orientation). Ac-
cordingly, the authors suggest four key categories of capabilities required in IMN:
strategic targets accessibility, thriftiness ability, manufacturing mobility, and learn-
ing ability. The latter, learning ability, is particularly relevant to this study, given
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that it relates to knowledge sharing across the network, which becomes more di -
cult as the complexity of the network increases. Thus, a more complex dispersed
network requires improved levels of coordination to enhance learning ability across
the network.
Multiple authors pick up on the importance of knowledge flows across IMN (Noruzi
et al., 2018; Sza´sz et al., 2019; Vereecke et al., 2006). For instance, Sza´sz et al.
(2019) propose that manufacturing plants within an IMN tend to be positioned
along a continuum of being net knowledge receivers or net knowledge senders. The
authors find that knowledge sending is improved via three key elements: having an
organisational culture across the network that fosters knowledge sharing, introducing
incentive systems and structures that reward knowledge sharing, as well as the level
of interaction between humans across the network (Sza´sz et al., 2019). Similarly,
Vereecke et al. (2006) develop a typology of plants in IMN, based on the innovation
and people flow between them. Depending on whether a plant has high or low levels
of innovation- and people in- and outflow, plants are categorised either as being
isolated, receivers, hosting networks players, or active network players. The latter
two types exhibit the highest levels of knowledge sharing.
2.2.2 Global Engineering Networks
Intra-organisational networks have further been studied on an engineering level,
commonly labelled global engineering networks (GEN), particularly as companies
increasingly disperse their engineering activities across the globe to improve e -
ciency and access to resources (Zhang et al., 2007). For instance, Zhang et al. (2008)
develop a framework of GEN, based on the dimensions of network configuration and
network performance (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Framework of GEN, adapted from Zhang et al. (2008)
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As shown, Zhang et al. (2008) suggest two main types of network configuration
(integrated GEN versus autonomous GEN), that vary along four dimensions (net-
work structure, coordination mechanism, governance system, and support system).
Where integrated GEN exhibit concentrated engineering centres, formal collabora-
tive mechanisms, operational governance, and standardised support systems, au-
tonomous GEN are characterised by dispersed and independent engineering centres,
informal competitive mechanisms, strategic governance, and customised support sys-
tems (Zhang et al., 2008). This complicates their management but also highlights
their importance to innovation within the company. In terms of network perfor-
mance, the authors propose the categories of e↵ective versus e cient GEN, where
e↵ective GEN are quick, flexible, and focus on customer-driven innovation, while
e cient GEN focus on economies of scale and scope, and reuse existing knowledge
and solutions rather than innovate (Zhang et al., 2008).
Studies on GEN span all parts of the engineering value chain, from idea generation
and selection, through design and development, production and delivery, service
and support, to disposal and recycle (Zhang et al., 2007; Zhang and Gregory, 2011).
However, given the focus of this thesis, the first two stages of the engineering value
chain, idea generation and selection, and design and development, are particularly
relevant. Indeed, in a recent review of the literature on the internationalisation
of R&D and innovation by multinational enterprises, Papanastassiou et al. (2019)
find that scholarly research in this area is increasingly focussing on the network-like
characteristics of internationalised R&D activities. Thus, the following section will
delve into further studies on international R&D networks.
2.2.3 International R&D Networks
Since MNCs have shifted from mainly using foreign subsidiaries to exploit knowl-
edge and innovation developed in the home country, to using these subsidiaries as
actual sources of competitive advantage, scholars have been focussing increasingly
on cross-border knowledge creation resulting from the decentralisation and inter-
nationalisation of R&D activities (Frost, 2001; Hegde and Hicks, 2008; Lagerstro¨m
et al., 2019; Vrontis and Christofi, 2019).
Many of these studies suggest that the product life cycle model by Vernon (1966),
which maintains that coordinating international R&D is too costly across interna-
tional borders and so foreign subsidiaries mainly exist to adapt and di↵use centrally
developed innovation, is insu cient for explaining the extent and increase of foreign
innovative activities of firms, especially given that a lot of foreign R&D centres are
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not co-located with manufacturing sites. Instead, other factors have emerged for
why innovative activity is located globally, rather than kept centralised. It should
be noted that, though the literature stream on this topic has overarchingly used the
term internationalising R&D, decentralising R&D by locating an R&D unit in an
innovation cluster does not necessarily mean that this has to be done in a di↵erent
country. For example, U.S. MNCs may choose to locate an innovation subsidiary in
Silicon Valley, despite it not being in a foreign country, to access resources, knowl-
edge, and skills in that region.
Definition and Typologies
Since the pioneering studies of Ronstadt (1978) and Behrman and Fischer (1980)
on the internationalisation of corporate R&D, much has been written on di↵erent
taxonomies of how MNCs carry out decentralised R&D. Though di↵erent authors
have classified di↵erent types of international R&D networks in di↵erent ways, the
taxonomies all seem to have parallels and are briefly outlined in Table 2.2.
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Authors
(year)
Typology of international R&D networks
Archibugi and
Michie (1995)
Three categories of the globalisation of innovation: global exploitation of technology (cross-border commercialisation of
national technology; may or may not involve setting up foreign R&D sites); global technological collaboration (development
of knowledge and innovations with strategic partners, such universities, research centres, or other firms, in multiple countries);
global generation of technology (R&D and innovative activities both in the home and the host countries; can include the
concept of a listening post2)
Behrman and
Fischer (1980)
Three types of market orientation: home market orientation (MNC tends to invest abroad for the purposes of importing
materials and components, rather than for R&D activities); host market orientation (MNC focusses on the markets in the
places where units are located; R&D carried out abroad if the host country requires adaptation of the technology); world market
orientation (MNC is interested in benefiting from skills and talent found in various locations across the globe)
Dunning and
Narula (1995)
Four main types of foreign R&D facilities: product, material, or process adaptations (intended to improve and adapt
products and/or processes to local markets); basic materials or product search (substantial product improvements for local
markets, often because research inputs are immobile in the host country location); rationalised R&D (similar process to Type
2, though R&D aims to make use of economies of scale and scope and R&D outputs can be exploited globally); strategic asset-
seeking R&D (obtaining a competitive advantage by accessing local technical and scientific skills and talent, and by benefiting
from knowledge spillovers from other firms in the same location; can include the concept of a listening post)
Gassmann and
von Zedtwitz
(1999)
Five types of R&D organisation in MNCs: ethnocentric centralised R&D (R&D activities are concentrated in the home
country, usually when the home country is technologically superior to the countries in which subsidiaries are located); geocentric
centralised R&D (R&D is centralised in the home country, but R&D personnel takes on a more internationally-minded focus by
collaborating with international manufacturing or sales sites); polycentric decentralised R&D (R&D is carried out in multiple
di↵erent locations, with no distinct centre, to cater to di↵erent regional markets); R&D hub model (R&D activities are spread
across di↵erent locations but are controlled and coordinated tightly from the central home base); integrated R&D network
(R&D in the home base no longer controls and coordinates global R&D activities; multiple R&D centres are connected closely
and collaborate tightly; no distinct centre)
2A listening post is an element of a company’s decentralised R&D structure, which serves the strategic purpose of allowing the company to stay abreast of
scientific and technological developments in the location of the listening post (Gassmann and Gaso, 2004, 2005)
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Ronstadt (1978) Four types of R&D investments abroad: transfer technology units (TTUs) (established to transfer technology from the
parent company to the foreign market, to adapt the technology to the market and provide local customer service); indigenous
technology units (ITUs) (established to develop products for the foreign market specifically); global technology units
(GTUs) (established to develop products for the world market); corporate technology units (CTUs) (established for long-
term, exploratory purposes, to provide new knowledge and technology; CTUs include the concept of listening posts)
von Zedtwitz
and Gassmann
(2002)
Four trends in the internationalisation of R&D activities, when separating the concept of research from that of development: only
research is internationalised (a research unit is usually located in a centre of excellence for that field); only development is
internationalised (usually occurs for the purpose of adapting products to local markets); development follows research (if a
foreign research o ce performs well and enables new opportunities for development); research follows development (if foreign
development o ces require extra research capabilities).
Four archetypes of R&D internationalisation, based on these trends; national treasure R&D (research and development are
both based in the home country); technology-driven R&D (research is dispersed; development is domestic); market-driven
R&D (research is based in the home country; development is dispersed); global R&D (research and development are both
dispersed)
Table 2.2: Di↵erent taxonomies of the internationalisation of R&D networks
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Collating the parallels between the various typologies, three main categories emerge
in the internationalisation of R&D networks (note that innovation subsidiaries may
evolve from one type to another over time (Ryan et al., 2018)):
Type 1: R&D follows manufacturing internationally to allow for product adap-
tation to foreign markets (homologation).
Type 2: Foreign R&D sites serve as listening posts to allow the company to be
aware of new developments in foreign markets.
Type 3: Foreign R&D sites serve as actual sources of innovation, making use
of skills and talent in foreign markets.
Multiple studies have confirmed the shift of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)3 in
R&D from a market-based focus to a technology-based focus, i.e., from Type 1 to
Types 2 and 3 (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Hurtado-Torres et al., 2018; Singh,
2007; Wolfram et al., 2018).
Centres of Excellence (COEs)
The concept of a subsidiary that has a specific charter and fulfils a strategic purpose
for an MNC has been discussed using varying nomenclature. While some authors use
the idea of decentralised R&D for innovation-specific strategic subsidiaries, others
use terminology like strategic leader (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986), global innova-
tor (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991), or world mandate (Birkinshaw and Morrison,
1995) (see Table 2.1). A further literature stream involves the concept of a Centre
of Excellence (COE), defined as a “small group of individuals recognised for their
leading-edge, strategically-valuable knowledge, and mandated to leverage and make
that knowledge available throughout the global firm” (Moore and Birkinshaw, 1998,
p.81). In their framework of GEN, Zhang et al. (2008) position COEs as belonging
to an autonomous, e↵ective network (see GEN II in Figure 2.1 above). While Moore
and Birkinshaw (1998) discuss COEs in the context of professional service compa-
nies, the concept has since been developed further to include MNCs from di↵erent
industries and COEs focussing on di↵erent activities, such as research, development,
production, marketing and sales, logistics and distribution, and purchasing (Aden-
felt and Lagerstro¨m, 2008; Baraldi and Ratajczak-Mrozek, 2019; Foss and Pedersen,
2002; Frost et al., 2002; Holm and Pedersen, 2000a,b; Richard et al., 2019). For
this research, the concept of R&D COEs is relevant, as it is comparable to other
terminology used for innovation-specific subsidiaries in the literature (see Table 2.3
for a summary):
3FDI is defined as the process by which MNCs “acquire existing assets abroad or set up new
wholly or majority owned activities in foreign markets” (Narula and Zanfei, 2009, p.318).
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Author(s) Equivalent Terminology
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) Strategic leader
Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) World mandate
Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) Competence creating subsidiary
Frost et al. (2002); Holm and Pedersen
(2000a,b); Moore and Birkinshaw (1998)
Centres of Excellence (specifically
R&D COEs)
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991, 1994) Global innovator
Jarillo and Mart´ınez (1990) Active subsidiary
Rabbiosi (2011) Innovator subsidiary
Rugman et al. (2011) Innovation-specific strategic leader
White and Poynter (1984) Global mandate
Table 2.3: Equivalent terminology to corporate innovation subsidiary
Despite the various terminology used to describe the phenomenon, both in the lit-
erature and in practice, this thesis will maintain the label of corporate innovation
subsidiary throughout.
2.2.4 Summary of Global Innovation Networks
As discussed in the above sections, the literature on global innovation networks of
MNCs spans multiple levels: manufacturing, engineering, and R&D. Nonetheless,
key concepts relating to these networks are translatable and relevant across the lev-
els. In particular, the concepts of network configuration, coordination, and knowl-
edge management emerge as key areas of focus. Indeed, given its relevance to this
thesis, the remainder of the literature review will focus on knowledge management
in multinational corporations more generally.
2.3 Knowledge in Multinational Corporations
With the emergence of the knowledge-based theory of the firm, the importance
of knowledge creation and -transfer to the sustainable competitive advantage and
innovation performance in MNCs has been brought to the fore (Grant, 1996a,b;
Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993, 1996). In particular,
as mentioned in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2, the idea that knowledge in an MNC can stem
not only from the company’s headquarters, but also from its international network
of subsidiaries presents a key shift in the way that MNCs function and in the way
their activities are discussed by the academic community (Cantwell and Mudambi,
2005). This warrants delving deeper into the concept of knowledge creation and
-flows within MNCs, for which a definition of knowledge is first necessary.
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2.3.1 What is Knowledge?
The question of the definition of knowledge quickly becomes philosophical. Rather
than focussing on highly abstract notions of knowledge, this review will discuss
how knowledge has been defined in the international business literature, i.e., or-
ganisational knowledge. The literature suggests that there are three key levels of
distinction when defining organisational knowledge: the concept of information ver-
sus know-how, the concept of technology as a subset of knowledge, and the concept
of tacit versus explicit knowledge.
Information Versus Know-How
Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993) define organisational knowledge by splitting it into
the two categories of information and know-how. They define information as “knowl-
edge, which can be transmitted without loss of integrity once the syntactical rules
required for deciphering it are known” (Kogut and Zander, 1992, p.386), for exam-
ple, facts, axiomatic propositions, and symbols. To define know-how, Kogut and
Zander (1992) quote the work of von Hippel (1988): “Know-how is the accumulated
practical skill or expertise that allows one to do something smoothly and e ciently”
(von Hippel, 1988, p.76). Thus, the concepts of information and know-how can be
di↵erentiated by considering the former as knowing what something means and the
latter as knowing how to do something (Kogut and Zander, 1992). It is impor-
tant to note that other studies do not treat both information and know-how as a
subset of knowledge, but instead treat information and knowledge as two separate
concepts (e.g., Malik et al. (2019); Taschler and Chappelow (1997)). However, de-
spite the di↵erence in terminology, the definitions in these instances are still broadly
the same, in that information is considered as being instantaneously transferable,
and knowledge is considered as consisting of hands-on skills, personal know-how,
and judgement, acquired through experience (Taschler and Chappelow, 1997). This
study will henceforth use the term knowledge, rather than know-how, based on the
provided definitions.
Technology as a Subset of Knowledge
The literature on organisational knowledge considers all functions of a corporation,
such as R&D (i.e. technological knowledge), manufacturing, marketing, finance,
and so on. Reviewing the literature on knowledge and technology transfer in MNCs
reveals that some authors appear to use the concepts of knowledge and technology
fairly interchangeably (e.g., Battistella et al. (2016)), whilst others treat technology
as being distinct from knowledge, often as a clear subset of the latter (e.g., Ismail
et al. (2018); Malik (2002); Zhang et al. (2015)). It has been suggested that trans-
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ferring technology is a useful way of transferring explicit knowledge (see below for
definition) because explicit knowledge is often embedded within technology (Argote
and Ingram, 2000; Galbraith, 1990; Zander and Kogut, 1995). In the interest of
clarity, it is crucial to be specific and define the scope of the type of knowledge one
is studying. Given the focus of the present research on knowledge transfer from
corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters to the company’s
headquarters, knowledge in this work will refer to technological knowledge specifi-
cally, rather than focussing on other functions of the firm. However, the rest of the
literature review will continue considering all types of knowledge in order to gain a
broad understanding of the field.
Tacit Versus Explicit Knowledge
A further common discussion point in the literature on organisational knowledge is
the idea of tacitness. The seminal definition of tacit knowledge by Polanyi (1966)
suggests that “we can know more than we can tell” (p.4), i.e., tacit knowledge is
di cult to transmit to another person because it is embedded in our experiences.
Similarly, Kogut and Zander (1992) paraphrase Polanyi’s definition in the context
of organisational knowledge to suggest that “organisations know more than what
their contracts can say” (p.383). In contrast, explicit knowledge is codifiable, i.e.,
it is possible to put into words, numbers, or symbols, and can thus more easily be
transferred, for example, through technology (Galbraith, 1990; Kogut and Zander,
1993; Nonaka, 1994).
2.3.2 Transfer of Knowledge
One reason why firms exist is that they are better than markets at transferring
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993, 1996). As a result, much academic
research has been devoted to studying the transfer of knowledge across and within
organisations. At a high level, the literature on this topic can be split into the
categories of range of transfer (inter-firm versus intra-firm) and, as a subset of intra-
firm knowledge transfer, the direction of that transfer (forwards from headquarters
to subsidiary, lateral from subsidiary to peer subsidiary, or reverse, from subsidiary
to headquarters).
Range of Transfer
The reviewed literature on knowledge transfer focusses, in particular, on how knowl-
edge is created and transferred within the organisation. Nonetheless, certain studies
on knowledge transfer between organisations (i.e., inter-firm knowledge transfer) do
exist (e.g. Albino et al. (1999); Battistella et al. (2016); Gagnon et al. (2019);
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Galati and Bigliardi (2019); Milagres and Burcharth (2019)). These studies focus
particularly on the factors that enable e↵ective sharing of knowledge between or-
ganisations, such as their relationship. Thus, the studies on inter-organisational
knowledge transfer relate closely to the literature on strategic alliances (Aggarwal
and Kapoor, 2018; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996) and open innovation
(Bogers, 2011; Secundo et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2016).
Conversely, intra-firm knowledge transfer has been defined as “the process through
which one unit [of an organisation] (e.g., group, department, or division) is a↵ected
by the experience of another” and, as a result, it “manifests itself through changes
in the knowledge or performance of the recipient units” (Argote and Ingram, 2000,
p.151). Given the relevance of intra-firm knowledge transfer to this study’s research
context, Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 will delve into this topic in more detail.
Direction of Transfer
In keeping with early literature on MNCs placing emphasis on company headquar-
ters as the focal point of investigation, much work on intra-firm knowledge transfer
considers mainly forwards transfer from the organisation’s headquarters to its sub-
sidiaries (e.g., Colakoglu et al. (2014); Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993); Minbaeva
(2007)). However, with the recognition that MNCs can learn at their periphery
and benefit from knowledge sourced and created at subsidiaries, knowledge transfer
literature has begun to incorporate lateral (from subsidiary to peer subsidiary) and
reverse (from subsidiary to headquarters) knowledge transfer (e.g. Ambos et al.
(2006); Bjo¨rkman et al. (2004); Frost and Zhou (2005); McGuinness et al. (2013);
Mudambi et al. (2014); Noorderhaven and Harzing (2009)).
2.3.3 Intra-Firm Knowledge Transfer as a Process
The remainder of this literature review will focus primarily on reverse intra-firm
knowledge transfer (i.e., from subsidiary to headquarters), given its relevance to
this study. In particular, this section discusses di↵erent existing models for intra-
firm (usually reverse) knowledge transfer, taking a process-based view of the matter,
and outlines their similarities and di↵erences.
Existing studies on knowledge transfer predominantly refer to communications the-
ory by representing knowledge transfer using a broadcasting model (Battistella et al.,
2016; Minbaeva, 2007; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009; Szulanski, 2000). Studies
using this broadcasting metaphor have basic elements in common: the source of the
knowledge transfer, the recipient, the channel of transfer, the transfer content, and
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the broader context. This basic broadcasting model of knowledge transfer is shown
in Figure 2.2.
Content
Source Recipient
Context
Channel
Figure 2.2: Simplistic representation of a broadcasting model of knowledge transfer
Despite this common sca↵old, the literature diverges on the additions that each
study makes to the basic model from Figure 2.2. For example, Noorderhaven and
Harzing (2009) suggest a limitation in the broadcasting model as it does not suf-
ficiently emphasise the importance of social interaction between the actors in the
model. To compensate for this, the authors consult social learning theory, suggesting
that more focus needs to be placed on how disparate units within an organisation
communicate and collaborate.
Furthermore, Szulanski (2000) delves deeper into the actual steps of transfer con-
necting the source and the recipient in the broadcasting model. The author suggests
four distinct stages and discusses the challenges, or stickiness (cf. Jensen and Szu-
lanski (2004)), faced at each stage:
1. Initiation: This stage involves recognising, and acting on, opportunities to
transfer knowledge, for instance by noticing a gap in knowledge in the organ-
isation. Stickiness, i.e., di culty of transfer and potential loss of knowledge,
can occur if operations in the business are not understood su ciently to recog-
nise gaps in knowledge, and if there is uncertainty in knowing whom to ask to
fill the gap.
2. Implementation: This is the actual exchange of information and resources
between source and recipient. Stickiness at this stage can occur if communi-
cation between source and recipient is di cult. Facilitating this step might
require solving incompatibilities in how the information has been codified,
any obstacles in language or culture between source and recipient, as well as
di↵erences in technical understanding. A possible solution is the lending of
personnel between units, which can be costly, but increases trust and reduces
the loss of information (cf. Inkpen and Tsang (2005)).
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3. Ramp-up: This occurs when the recipient begins using acquired knowledge.
Stickiness can arise due to unexpected problems in how the recipient uses the
knowledge, which can prevent the recipient from replicating the knowledge
to the expected quality. Reasons for this may include insu cient training of
personnel at the recipient unit, key personnel leaving the unit, or di↵erences in
culture between the source and recipient site, which may prevent the knowledge
from being used in the anticipated way.
4. Integration: This step involves the new knowledge becoming progressively
routinised in the recipient unit. Stickiness can occur if di culties are encoun-
tered that cause the recipient to revert to the former status quo. To avoid this,
the source and recipient must maintain regular interaction to ensure obstacles
can be removed as they occur.
In further studies, Szulanski discusses replication as a basis for reducing stickiness
and thus improving knowledge transfer, particularly through the use of templates
(Jensen and Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski and Jensen, 2004). In other words, knowl-
edge can more easily be transferred within organisations by creating “working ex-
amples” (Szulanski and Jensen, 2004, p.348) (i.e., templates) of the knowledge and
transferring these templates, enabling more exact imitation of the knowledge at the
recipient site. While Szulanski mainly discusses the use of templates in the con-
text of transferring knowledge embedded in organisational routines, the concept of
a template and replication as a basis for knowledge transfer can be translated to the
technological knowledge embedded in innovation projects (the subject of this the-
sis), by suggesting that technological knowledge is more easily transferred through
the use of a physical artefact, such as a working prototype (the template), rather
than through the use of reports or presentations.
2.3.4 Factors A↵ecting Intra-Firm Knowledge Transfer
Addressing the factors that help and hinder successful knowledge transfer is a com-
mon focus in the literature on intra-firm knowledge transfer. These factors, in
particular subsidiary embeddedness, external knowledge sourcing, characteristics of
actors involved in the transfer and the relationship between them, as well as actual
transfer content and mechanism, are discussed in the following sections.
Subsidiary Internal Embeddedness
Authors in the field have increasingly examined subsidiaries’ relationships with their
headquarters (i.e., their internal embeddedness), particularly as the literature on
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subsidiary mandates has evolved towards acknowledging the strategic role that sub-
sidiaries play in creating and absorbing new knowledge for MNCs (Asakawa et al.,
2018; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Go¨lgeci et al., 2019).
While the literature seems to agree on the positive e↵ect of internal embeddedness
on reverse knowledge transfer (Ciabuschi et al., 2017; Ferraris et al., 2018; Go¨lgeci
et al., 2019), an essential aspect of internal embeddedness, namely subsidiary au-
tonomy, has been highlighted as a trade-o↵ e↵ect in this relationship.
The autonomy (both strategic and operational) of a multinational subsidiary can
be considered as a function of its integration into the parent organisation. It has
been defined as “a decision-based process that evolves through bargaining between
centre and periphery in an organisation” (Taggart, 1997, p.55). While autonomy
has been shown to be conducive to the subsidiary’s innovative capabilities (Asakawa,
2001; Beugelsdijk and Jindra, 2018), a certain level of integration into the rest of
the organisation is also necessary to enable a successful transfer of these innovative
ideas and technologies. This balance has been labelled the “innovation-integration
dilemma” by Mudambi (2011) (p.318) and is summarised e↵ectively by Ghoshal
and Bartlett (1995): “In the absence of such an integration process, decentralised
entrepreneurship may lead to some temporary performance improvement as existing
slack is harnessed, but long-term development of new capabilities or businesses is
seriously impeded” (p.148).
Subsidiary External Embeddedness
External embeddedness, i.e., the intensity of interaction with one’s local environ-
ment, has similarly gained interest in the international business literature recently
(Meyer et al., 2011; Narula, 2014; Nell and Andersson, 2012; Santangelo et al., 2018;
Valentino et al., 2018). In particular, focus is placed on how MNCs can strategi-
cally absorb new knowledge by means of their subsidiaries’ external embeddedness
(Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). However, the impact of a subsidiary’s external
embeddedness on knowledge transfer to its company headquarters is complex and
highly debated. While Ferraris et al. (2018) do not find a positive correlation between
subsidiaries’ external embeddedness and reverse knowledge transfer, H˚akanson and
Nobel (2001) find that a subsidiary’s external embeddedness is positively related
to its innovativeness, and that higher innovativeness increases the probability of
knowledge transfer, suggesting an indirect link between external embeddedness and
reverse knowledge transfer. Other authors reject the idea of any linear relationship
between external embeddedness and MNC performance, by introducing the concept
of overembeddedness (Nell and Andersson, 2012; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), i.e., external
embeddedness positively a↵ects MNC performance, but only up to a point.
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Subsidiary Dual Embeddedness
Meyer et al. (2011) highlight the need for subsidiaries to be simultaneously deeply
embedded in their parent company network, as well as in their external environ-
ment, resulting in the critical challenge for headquarters of “shepherd[ing] its most
valuable subsidiaries towards ‘dual embeddedness’” (p.245). The concept of dual em-
beddedness is recurringly discussed in the context of reverse intra-firm knowledge
transfer (Achcaoucaou et al., 2014; Cenamor et al., 2019; Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015;
Oehmichen and Puck, 2016), with the conclusion that multinational subsidiaries
require both strong ties to their local environment, as well as close interaction and
relationships with their parent organisation, to enable them to transfer knowledge
e↵ectively.
External Knowledge Sourcing
The concept of dual embeddedness is related to a subsidiary’s function of sourcing
external knowledge, as the subsidiary needs to both find external knowledge sources
and engage with them (external embeddedness), as well as be able to integrate this
knowledge into the organisation (internal embeddedness) (Monteiro, 2015; Monteiro
and Birkinshaw, 2017; Phene and Almeida, 2008).
In particular, Monteiro and Birkinshaw (2017) study a telecom MNC’s scouting
unit in Silicon Valley (akin to the corporate innovation subsidiaries discussed in this
study), to determine its approach to external knowledge sourcing. The authors find
four key processes that support external knowledge sourcing: channelling, translat-
ing, matchmaking, and transforming. Where channelling refers to the subsidiary’s
initial activities of setting up and scouting the external environment, the remaining
three processes focus on how the subsidiary transfers the externally sourced knowl-
edge into the parent organisation: translating involves manipulating knowledge to
make it understandable for people at headquarters; matchmaking involves finding a
suitable match between a business unit within headquarters and an external partner
in the subsidiary’s local environment (e.g., a start-up); and transforming involves
pushing back on headquarters’ ideas and helping them redefine problems and seek
new solutions. As demonstrated by Monteiro and Birkinshaw (2017), a corporate
innovation subsidiary’s role is thus heavily geared towards transferring newly found
knowledge to the parent company.
The process of matchmaking as defined by Monteiro and Birkinshaw (2017) suggests
delving deeper into the collaboration between large MNCs and small start-ups—a
concept often referred to as managing asymmetric partnerships or alliances (Cimon,
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2004; Hao and Feng, 2018; Pe´rez et al., 2012). The challenges faced by MNCs
trying to collaborate with start-ups are discussed widely in the literature. Pe´rez
et al. (2012) suggest that asymmetries between partners, for example, in size, age,
or scope, can actually facilitate knowledge creation by “clarifying the roles each
partner plays in the relationship and reducing the cooperative-competitive tension”
(p.150). Other authors, however, highlight issues preventing successful collaboration
between MNCs and start-ups. These include the following:
• A lack of trust between partners (Minshall et al., 2010; Niederkofler, 1991;
Prashantham and Birkinshaw, 2019);
• A lack of start-ups’ experience with sticking to stringent quality and safety re-
quirements (Minshall et al., 2010; Niederkofler, 1991; Prashantham and Birkin-
shaw, 2008), especially in the automotive industry (Gassmann et al., 2010);
• A lack of speed on the side of the MNC, given rigid bureaucracies and slow
decision-making (Minshall et al., 2010; Prashantham and Birkinshaw, 2008);
• And traditional, complex supplier contracts not being suitable for exploratory
work with start-ups, given a clear di↵erence in culture between entrepreneurial
small firms and bureaucratic large firms (Gassmann et al., 2010; Minshall et al.,
2010; Niederkofler, 1991).
Actor Characteristics
A particular focus of studies on knowledge transfer lies with the characteristics of
the actors involved in the process, i.e., of the sender and recipient involved in knowl-
edge transfer. For instance, it is found that top management experience and support
for the sender (i.e., for the subsidiary) is a key factor in determining the success of
knowledge transfer (Gaur et al., 2019; Nuruzzaman et al., 2019; Vlajcˇic´ et al., 2019a).
Furthermore, the recipient may struggle with internalising knowledge transferred
by subsidiaries because of their absorptive capacity, i.e., their ability to recognise,
assimilate, and apply that knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Gupta and Govin-
darajan, 2000). In the context of knowledge transfer, studies consider absorptive
capacity as a potential barrier on the recipient unit’s side, as a low absorptive ca-
pacity means that the recipient cannot successfully acquire and integrate knowledge
from the source (Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Minbaeva et al., 2003; Spraggon and
Bodolica, 2012).
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An exemplary factor that hinders the recipient’s absorptive capacity and is also dis-
cussed widely as an obstacle of asymmetric partnerships is the concept of bureau-
cracy. This concept was first formally defined by Weber (1922) to include aspects
such as the size of space and population being administered within the company, the
complexity of tasks being conducted, the scope of the finances being administered,
and the need for more formal communication channels to e ciently manage the var-
ious aspects of increasing bureaucracy. In the context of knowledge management,
bureaucracy has frequently been found to stifle innovation as well as the company’s
ability to absorb new knowledge (Damanpour, 1996; Gaur et al., 2019; Thompson,
1965), and thereby negatively impact knowledge transfer from a subsidiary to com-
pany headquarters.
A further actor characteristic impacting the knowledge transfer process is the in-
novativeness of the sender (i.e., the subsidiary). H˚akanson and Nobel (2001) find
a positive correlation between a subsidiary’s innovativeness and its propensity to
transfer knowledge to its parent organisation. Mudambi et al. (2014) find a similar
result, but only up to a limit. The authors suggest an inverted U-shape for the
positive e↵ect of subsidiary innovativeness on reverse knowledge transfer, as after a
certain point the subsidiary becomes too innovative and autonomous, and thus no
longer has much to gain from transferring its knowledge to the parent organisation
(Mudambi et al., 2014).
Actor Relationship
Leading on from individual actor characteristics is the concept of motivational dis-
position, openness, and flexibility of both source and recipient to share knowledge,
which heavily impacts the relationship between actors (Gaur et al., 2019; Gupta
and Govindarajan, 2000; Kim and Kim, 2019). Given that knowledge is “intimately
and inextricably bound with people’s egos and occupations,” it does not flow easily
between units in an organisation (Davenport et al., 1998, p.53). Considering knowl-
edge as power, more innovation can lead to the subsidiary hoarding its knowledge,
rather than being motivated to share it with headquarters (Mudambi and Navarra,
2004; Mudambi et al., 2014). On the recipient side, psychological resistance, such as
the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) syndrome, can prevent the recipient from incorporat-
ing knowledge that has been transferred by a subsidiary (Gupta and Govindarajan,
2000; Kim and Kim, 2019). Drivers for the NIH syndrome include an ego-defence
mechanism (blocking knowledge that might suggest others are more competent than
the recipient) and power struggles (internal competition) (Gupta and Govindarajan,
2000).
27
The relationship between source and recipient is further discussed along various
dimensions. For example, the relationship between headquarters and subsidiary
can be split into the geographical, cultural, and cognitive distance between them.
Geographic distance is found to have a negative correlation with reverse knowledge
transfer, suggesting that MNCs should dedicate resources to facilitate the knowledge
transfer from far-away subsidiaries (Vlajcˇic´ et al., 2019b). Cultural distance between
a subsidiary’s host and home countries is found to moderate the positive relationship
between the subsidiary’s performance and reverse knowledge transfer, i.e., when the
cultural distance is higher, the positive relationship between the subsidiary’s per-
formance and knowledge transfer to the parent organisation is lower (Qin et al.,
2017). Finally, cognitive distance seems to be mainly discussed in the context of
inter-firm relationships, rather than between units of the same MNC (Nooteboom,
2000; Wuyts et al., 2005). Yet, the findings may still hold for intra-firm relation-
ships, as di↵erent units within an MNC may possess di↵erent knowledge and skills,
resulting in a cognitive gap between them. Relevant studies suggest a trade-o↵ after
a point, i.e., an inverted U-shape, between cognitive distance and learning that can
take place between organisations. This results from the issue that knowledge gained
from other organisations is “useless if it is not new, but it is also useless if it is so
new that it cannot be understood” (Nooteboom, 2000, p.72).
The literature suggests that inhibitors of intra-firm knowledge transfer can be mit-
igated somewhat by having high levels of trust, communication, and coordination,
i.e., corporate socialisation, between actors (Bjo¨rkman et al., 2004). One method
of achieving this involves the transfer of people between the source and the recip-
ient of the knowledge to be transferred, which Harzing et al. (2016), Inkpen and
Tsang (2005), and Szulanski (2000) suggest increases trust, reduces loss of informa-
tion, and thus facilitates the implementation of transferred knowledge. Similarly,
Chiambaretto et al. (2019) discuss the benefits of a knowledge broker to knowl-
edge sharing, as the broker’s core role is to manage the tensions arising between
collaborating units of an organisation. This relates to the discussed concept of in-
ternal embeddedness, as strong communication and trust suggest a higher level of
integration of the subsidiary into the organisation.
Transfer Content
When knowledge is transferred, the ease of transfer depends on the actual content
of the transfer. In particular, the attributes of knowledge that have been found
to a↵ect the ease of transfer include the causal ambiguity, tacitness, and value of
that knowledge (Gaur et al., 2019; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Nair et al.,
2018; Szulanski, 2000). For example, Szulanski (2000) highlights causal ambiguity
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of knowledge as one of the key predictors of stickiness in transfer. Similarly, tacit
knowledge is found to be more di cult to transfer by definition, as it is harder to
verbalise. Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is inherently easier to transfer,
given that it can be written down, codified, or embedded in technology (Zander
and Kogut, 1995). When considering the importance of knowledge to the MNC,
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) find support for their hypothesis that the higher
the value of the subsidiary’s knowledge, the higher the outflows of knowledge from
that subsidiary. However, this relationship has been found to display an inverted U-
shape by other authors, as previously discussed (Mudambi et al., 2014; Nooteboom,
2000).
Transfer Mechanism
The mechanisms by which knowledge is transferred can be split into formal and
informal, as well as virtual and face-to-face mechanisms (Ipe, 2003). Formal knowl-
edge transfer mechanisms include structured work teams, training programmes, and
technology-based systems (Ipe, 2003). In contrast, informal transfer mechanisms
include social networks and personal relationships (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000;
Ipe, 2003). These formal and informal mechanisms can be broken down further into
virtual versus face-to-face mechanisms. For instance, Spraggon and Bodolica (2012)
categorise the following four mechanisms for knowledge transfer:
• Static (formal) virtual processes: e.g., patents, e-documents, reports
• Dynamic (informal) virtual processes: e.g., emails, telephone, blogs
• Canonical (formal) face-to-face processes: e.g., cross-functional teams,
formal meetings, training, brainstorming
• Non-canonical (informal) face-to-face processes: e.g., informal network,
informal encounters, communities of practice, informal mentoring
Di↵erent mechanisms are suggested to be relevant for di↵erent content of knowledge
being shared. While face-to-face and informal mechanisms are relevant to transfer-
ring tacit knowledge, virtual and formal mechanisms apply to transferring explicit,
codified knowledge and technology (Ipe, 2003; Spraggon and Bodolica, 2012).
2.4 Defining the Literature Gap
The previous sections have provided a detailed overview of the literature on multina-
tional subsidiaries, R&D and engineering networks, and the transfer of knowledge.
As demonstrated in Table 2.1, various typologies have been developed over the years
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to categorise di↵erent types of subsidiaries. Despite these e↵orts, fewer studies have
then focussed on taking one specific category of subsidiary and developing theory
around it. Instead, most theory in this area has been developed with the multi-
national subsidiary generally in mind. Filling this gap by focussing specifically on
innovation-related subsidiaries presents a research opportunity.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that reverse intra-firm knowledge transfer, and
especially qualitative, case study-based research in this area, is still underrepresented
in the literature (Ambos et al., 2006; Cunningham et al., 2017; H˚akanson and Nobel,
2000; Michailova and Musta↵a, 2012). The lack of qualitative studies in the field
of knowledge transfer “seems to constrain the in-depth understanding of the studied
phenomena” (Michailova and Musta↵a, 2012, p.384). This call is answered in this
thesis by conducting in-depth case study research on reverse intra-firm knowledge
transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters to their
respective headquarters.
The above literature review integrated the factors a↵ecting knowledge transfer iden-
tified by a variety of studies. The process of integrating this literature has revealed
that studies in the field tend to consider factors of knowledge transfer individually,
rather than holistically, thus neglecting the interactions between them. This gap in
the existing literature is summarised by Spraggon and Bodolica (2012) (p.1273):
Current research concentrates on a single aspect rather than a fruit-
ful combination of knowledge conversion mechanisms, barriers, and en-
ablers, and media richness capacities of knowledge transfer processes for
shedding light on intra-firm knowledge transfer experiences. Although
several taxonomies exist for enhancing the e cacy of knowledge trans-
fer (Daft and Huber, 1987; Dennis et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Nonaka
et al., 2000), these taxonomies generally emphasise a standalone facet
failing to consider the inner multidimensionality of knowledge transfer
phenomena. No attempts are being made to gain a holistic understand-
ing of knowledge transfer ine ciencies faced by organisations and assist
managers in selecting optimal knowledge transfer processes through the
development of an integrative taxonomy of processes that accounts for
their multidimensional contingencies.
While Spraggon and Bodolica (2012) merely call for an integrative taxonomy, i.e.,
a classification of factors, this study takes a further step towards gaining a holistic
understanding of knowledge transfer by developing an integrative conceptual frame-
work, i.e., an analytical structure illustrating the various factors a↵ecting knowl-
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edge transfer and their interactions (Christensen, 2006). The initial framework is
developed in Section 2.4.1 below and is based on the above literature. This initial
framework is subsequently used to approach the analysis of case study data and is
modified according to the findings. Through two phases of case studies and con-
sequent framework modification, this thesis addresses the identified research gap
calling for a holistic understanding about intra-firm knowledge transfer.
2.4.1 Conceptual Framework Development
The initial integrative conceptual framework shown in Figure 2.3 below adopts the
broadcasting model of knowledge transfer (shown in its most basic form in Figure 2.2
above), given its prominence in the literature. The conceptual framework builds on
this basic broadcasting model and integrates the key identified factors that impact
knowledge transfer discussed in Section 2.3.4:
• A knowledge source (in this case the corporate innovation subsidiary) plus its
characteristics;
• A knowledge recipient (in this case the company headquarters) plus its char-
acteristics;
• The internal and external embeddedness of the subsidiary;
• The subsidiary’s external knowledge sourcing activities;
• The relationship between source and recipient;
• The mechanism of transfer as an arrow from source to recipient;
• The content of what is being transferred;
• The broader context (in this case an innovation cluster, such as Silicon Valley,
Tel-Aviv, Beijing, Tokyo, or Berlin).
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Figure 2.3: Initial integrative conceptual framework, based on the reviewed literature
This framework is used to approach the analysis of the automotive case study data
in Chapter 4, constituting Phase 1 of the research. The findings from this phase
are then used to modify the framework and produce an iterated version of it. This
version, in turn, is used to approach the analysis of the case studies in Phase 2
(see Chapter 5). Again, subsequent findings are used to produce a further modified
version of the framework.
Despite its context specificity, throughout the analysis, the aim of the framework is to
provide a holistic view of the transfer process from corporate innovation subsidiaries
to the parent organisation. Dimensions of transfer are not considered in isolation,
but their interactions and implications are explored, thus addressing the identified
literature gap and allowing the researcher to answer the research questions, which
are reiterated in the following chapter.
Chapter 3
Research Approach
This chapter outlines the research approach taken in this study. This includes
discussing research objectives, the philosophical stance taken, as well as the resulting
methodology used to answer the research questions in a replicable way. This chapter
closes with an evaluation of the quality of the research approach, with reference to
the study’s validity, reliability, and ethical considerations.
3.1 Research Objectives
The previous chapter reviewed relevant existing literature, reinforcing the research
question and sub-questions introduced in Chapter 1:
How is knowledge transferred from a corporate innovation subsidiary located in an
innovation cluster to its company headquarters?
1. What are the obstacles impeding the knowledge transfer from a corporate
innovation subsidiary located in an innovation cluster to its headquarters?
2. How are these obstacles managed in practice?
To answer these questions, the following research objectives have to be achieved,
thus contributing to the field of international business, particularly the topics of
internationalisation, transfer of knowledge, and subsidiary-headquarters relations,
from both a theoretical and a practical perspective:
1. Understanding what a corporate innovation subsidiary is and what it does;
2. Identifying critical obstacles to the knowledge transfer from a corporate inno-
vation subsidiary to its headquarters, as well as the measures that have been
put in place to facilitate the process;
3. Developing a framework that conceptualises the knowledge transfer process
from a corporate innovation subsidiary to its headquarters.
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3.2 Philosophical Stance
A crucial element of research involves determining the relationship between data and
theory. This requires an understanding of the philosophy of science (Easterby-Smith
et al., 2015). Key considerations in this area include the researcher’s ontological and
epistemological positions, as well as their impact on the study. Evaluating these con-
cepts allows an appropriate methodology to be devised, as benefits and drawbacks of
various methods, in particular in reference to bias caused by the researcher’s reflexive
role, can be weighed against each other. To this end, ontological and epistemological
issues require defining (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).
3.2.1 Ontological Assumptions
Ontology concerns the nature of social reality, i.e., of the phenomenon under study
(Blaikie, 2007; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It addresses the existence of certain en-
tities in the physical world and the assumptions that one makes about them, such
as the existence of truth and facts (Blaikie, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).
Ontology in the social sciences has commonly been split into three opposing posi-
tions: realism, relativism, and nominalism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Realism
supports the idea that social concepts exist independently of their being researched,
discovered, or labelled (Blaikie, 2007; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Relativism sug-
gests that social concepts are defined di↵erently by di↵erent actors, and that truth
is therefore not absolute, but “can vary from place to place and from time to time”
(Collins, 1983, p.88). Nominalism distances itself further from realism, by suggest-
ing that reality is made up only of artificial concepts, names, and labels given by
mankind, and that therefore, there is no truth (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The
concepts of realism, relativism, and nominalism are summarised in Table 3.1, which
has been adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (2015).
Ontology Realism Relativism Nominalism
Truth Single truth There are multiple
‘truths’
There is no truth
Facts Facts exist and can
be revealed
Facts depend on the
viewpoint of the
observer
Facts are human
creations
Table 3.1: Contrasting the concepts of realism, relativism, and nominalism, adapted
from Easterby-Smith et al. (2015)
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3.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions
Epistemology concerns how one inquires into the nature of the world and addresses
the theory of knowledge (Blaikie, 2007; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Easterby-Smith
et al., 2015; Johnson and Duberley, 2000).
Epistemology has been split into two main contrasting views in the social sciences:
positivism and interpretivism (also called social constructionism) (Easterby-Smith
et al., 2015). Positivism makes the ontological assumption that “reality is exter-
nal and objective,” as well as the epistemological assumption that knowledge is of
significance only if it is the result of empirical verification (Easterby-Smith et al.,
2015, p.51). Interpretivism suggests that positivism achieves limited success in the
social sciences, as reality is socially constructed and interpreted by the researcher,
rather than objectively observable (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Instead, interpre-
tivism focusses on the meaning that people (individually and collectively) give to a
situation (Blaikie and Priest, 2019). The di↵erences between the two positions are
summarised in Table 3.2 (adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (2015)).
Positivism Interpretivism
The observer... must be independent. is part of what is being
observed.
Human interests... should be irrelevant. are the main drivers of
science.
Explanations... must demonstrate
causality.
aim to increase general
understanding of the
situation.
Research progresses
through...
hypotheses and
deductions.
gathering data, from which
ideas are induced.
Concepts... need to be defined so
that they can be
measured.
should incorporate
stakeholder perspectives.
Units of analysis... should be reduced to
simplest terms.
may include the complexity
of ‘whole’ situations.
Generalisation
through...
statistical probability. theoretical abstraction.
Sampling requires... large numbers selected
randomly.
small numbers of cases
chosen for specific reasons.
Table 3.2: Contrasting the concepts of positivism and interpretivism, adapted from
Easterby-Smith et al. (2015)
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3.2.3 Integrating Ontology and Epistemology
When linking the spectra of ontology and epistemology, a strong realist ontological
view aligns with a strong positivist epistemology. Nominalism, on the other hand,
aligns with a strong interpretivist epistemology (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Rel-
ativism finds a middle ground between the spectra, incorporating aspects of both
positivism and interpretivism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).
Based on the above considerations, the philosophical stance for this study encom-
passes elements of a relativist ontology, as the reality of what is being researched
(corporate innovation subsidiaries of incumbent automotive manufacturers) exists
independently of this research, yet the facts and truths of the somewhat subjective
field of study may vary from place to place and from time to time. Furthermore, this
study identifies with an interpretivist epistemology, as the subject of study involves
a whole complex situation, rather than simple, individual variables. The aim of the
study is to gain an understanding into this complex situation to induce ideas from
it, rather than to find statistical causality based on precise hypotheses.
Thus, the philosophical stance for this study follows a relativist ontological, and an
interpretivist epistemological viewpoint.
3.2.4 Resulting Research Strategy
Research strategies provide “a procedure, a logic, for generating new knowledge”
(Blaikie, 2007, p.8) and thus answering a study’s research questions. Blaikie (2007,
2009) defines four distinct research strategies, as outlined in Table 3.3:
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Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive
Aim To establish
descriptions
of characteris-
tics and
patterns
To test
theories, to
eliminate false
ones and
corroborate the
survivor
To discover
underlying
mechanisms to
explain observed
regularities
To describe and
understand
social life in
terms of social
actors’ meanings
and motives
Start (a) Collect
data on char-
acteristics
and/or
patterns
(a) Identify a
regularity that
needs to be
explained
(a) Document
and model a
regularity and
motives
(a) Discover
everyday lay
concepts,
meanings
(b) Produce
descriptions
(b) Construct a
theory and
deduce
hypotheses
(b) Describe the
context and
possible
mechanisms
(b) Produce a
technical account
from lay
accounts
Finish Relate these
to the
research
questions
Test
hypotheses by
matching them
with data
Establish which
mechanism(s)
provide(s) the
best explanation
in that context
Develop a theory
and elaborate it
iteratively
Table 3.3: Outlining four research strategies, adapted from Blaikie (2009)
Given their focus on regularities (in contrast to the complex, uncertain research con-
text of this thesis), neither a deductive, nor a retroductive research strategy are suit-
able for this study. Inductive reasoning is commonly known as making an “inference
from particular to general” (Cohen, 2005, p.432), while abductive reasoning refers
to accepting “a conclusion on the grounds that it explains the available evidence”
(Hookway, 2005, p.1). Both approaches suitably address the research purposes of
exploration, description, and evaluation, although the inductive research strategy
is less suitable for “why?” and “how?” questions and understanding complex social
phenomena (Blaikie, 2007, 2009). Abductive reasoning, first introduced by Peirce
(1931), aims to build theory by using multiple suitable existing theories as inputs
to empirical observation. The strategy involves following an iterative loop between
theory and empirical data (theory matching or systematic combining), guiding re-
searchers to their conclusions (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Thereby, the abductive
research approach allows a researcher to understand data and literature “from the
perspective of a new conceptual framework” (Kova´cs and Spens, 2005, p.138) (see
also Danermark et al. (2001) and Dubois and Gadde (2002)).
Given the relativist ontological and interpretivist epistemological stance, as well as
the research context of this study (the complex social situation of global automotive
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companies having corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters),
a preliminary conceptual framework and structure based on existing literature was
necessary to bring an initial order to the problem. The resulting preconceptions of
the researcher rule out the use of pure inductive grounded theory as laid out by
Glaser and Strauss (1967), and point instead towards the iterative theory matching
process of the abductive research strategy as a more suitable approach. Follow-
ing the abductive research approach allows the researcher to modify the analytical
framework derived from the literature throughout multiple phases of data collection
and analysis.
3.3 Research Context
3.3.1 The Automotive Industry
The contemporary automotive industry has been characterised as mature and in-
cumbent, with large barriers to entry and exit (Diehlmann and Ha¨cker, 2013; Holweg
and Oliver, 2016), and has thus been named the “industry of industries” (Drucker,
1946, p.149). Innovation and life-cycles are relatively slow, and the leading firms are
highly embedded, which stems from the dominant design in the industry, established
about a century ago (Holweg and Oliver, 2016). It is argued that the automotive
industry is facing drastic changes, given contemporary issues of climate change,
rapid technological advancement, and the market entrance of new, less conventional
players, such as Tesla, Google, and Apple (Butler and Martin, 2016; Diehlmann
and Ha¨cker, 2013; Holweg and Oliver, 2016). Research suggests that incumbent au-
tomotive manufacturers need to react to this volatility and innovate more rapidly,
making the study of innovation in this industry relevant, exciting, and important.
Automotive Supply Chain Structure
Figure 3.1 depicts an overview of a generic automotive supply chain. Historically,
the manufacturers, known as OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) conducted
most of the work along the supply chain, with Ford even going as far as control-
ling coal and iron ore mines, as well as rubber plantations and sheep farms in the
1920s (The Economist, 2009; World Bank, 2019). However, since the 1980s, the
industry has been undergoing manufacturing and supply chain reforms, resulting in
more manufacturing responsibility being given to first-tier suppliers, while OEMs
focus on vehicle design, marketing, and assembly (Holweg and Oliver, 2016). Thus,
today we have a structure as depicted in Figure 3.1, with a consolidated number of
“mega-suppliers” (Tier 1) (Holweg and Oliver, 2016, p.30), such as Bosch, Denso,
and Continental, providing most core systems of the vehicle, and smaller second-tier
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suppliers providing first-tier suppliers with the parts needed for their integrated sys-
tems (Silver, 2016). This thesis focusses on the activities of OEMs, though references
are made to other points in the supply chain where relevant.
Raw material
suppliers
Tier 2
suppliers
Tier 1
suppliers
OEMs Dealers Consumers
Figure 3.1: Automotive supply chain, adapted from Chandra and Kamrani (2003)
Automotive Research and Development Structure
While nomenclature varies between companies, most automotive OEMs split their
research and development activities into three phases: (1) an initial phase (funda-
mental research); (2) a concept phase (pre-development); and (3) series development,
after which the project is passed on to production (Weber, 2009). The entire vehicle
development process usually takes about seven years and is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Research Pre-development Series development
Figure 3.2: An outline of the automotive research and development process
Traditionally, an automotive OEM’s innovative activity was largely conducted in-
house (Ili et al., 2010). More recently, however, high costs of R&D and the entrance
of new players into the industry have resulted in the boundaries of automotive
OEMs becoming more permeable (Hering et al., 2011; Lazzarotti et al., 2013). One
method of collaboration that these OEMs have been following involves setting up a
“technology scouting o ce” (Lazzarotti et al., 2013, p.44) (falling under the umbrella
term corporate innovation subsidiary adopted in this thesis) in innovation clusters
such as Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv, Beijing, and others. These corporate innovation
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subsidiaries take on many forms and sizes, but generally search for new technologies,
develop prototypes, and feed these into the first two phases of the process depicted
in Figure 3.2 (research and pre-development) at headquarters.
3.3.2 Prominent Innovation Clusters
Silicon Valley
While the first automotive innovation subsidiaries were established in Silicon Valley
only in the mid- to late 1990s, Silicon Valley has been developing into a prominent
innovation cluster since roughly the Californian gold rush of the mid-19th century.
Since then, “one industry has led to the next one in an apparently endless cascade of
continuous reinvention” (Scaru , 2016, p.6). The gold rush led to railways, shipping
operations, and ports being built for transportation. The establishment of ports,
in turn, had two side-e↵ects: firstly, ports created coastal cities requiring electrical
power, which could only be transmitted through high-voltage power transmission.
This need established the San Francisco Bay Area as a leader in electrical engineer-
ing. Secondly, ports required radio communications, which drove the development
of electronics, the semiconductor industry, microprocessors, personal computers, the
software industry, and eventually the internet (Scaru , 2016). The high levels of
innovation and wealth in the region have attracted companies and people from all
over the world, including major players from the automotive industry.
Research has indicated that one of the factors that has made Silicon Valley so suc-
cessful today is a focus on social and regional networks (Engel, 2015; Saxenian,
1994). The boundaries between firms are porous, and labour markets are open
(Saxenian, 1994), making Silicon Valley a prime location for exchanging ideas and
collaborating to drive innovation forwards; i.e., for practising open innovation (Ches-
brough, 2003a,b). Researchers have highlighted the combination of competition and
cooperation between entrepreneurs, which is used to attempt to displace incumbent
companies (Engel, 2015). This emphasises the importance of incumbents being
present in such a regional cluster, so they can be a part of, and drive, the innovation
process, rather than be displaced by it.
The amalgamation of innovative actors, such as universities, MNCs, entrepreneurs,
and investors, makes Silicon Valley a particularly successful, and therefore interest-
ing, example of an innovation cluster (Engel and del Palacio, 2011; Engel, 2015),
warranting further exploration of the region.
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Other Prominent Innovation Clusters
While Silicon Valley is considered the largest and most talked-about innovation clus-
ter globally, it is certainly not the only one. Engel and del Palacio (2011) discuss
Israel as another key “Super Cluster of Innovation” (p.27) as it, too, constitutes
“an environment that favours the creation and development of high potential en-
trepreneurial ventures and is characterised by heightened mobility of resources, in-
cluding people, capital, and information” (Engel and del Palacio, 2011, p.27). Sim-
ilarly, prominent authors such as von Zedtwitz (e.g., see von Zedtwitz et al. (2007,
2018); von Zedtwitz (2004); Sun et al. (2007)) conduct research into multinationals’
foreign R&D units in China and South Korea, given the countries’ transforma-
tion into highly innovative economies over the last two decades (Jang et al., 2017;
Prud’homme and von Zedtwitz, 2018). Indeed, several of the automotive OEMs
that are present in Silicon Valley have established similar corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries in Tel Aviv, Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, Paris, and Berlin.
3.4 Selection of Research Methodology
“A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions
to be drawn) to the initial questions of study” (Yin, 2003, p.19). Thus, careful con-
sideration of the research methodology is vital for successful research. Researchers
have many options when designing methodology and must choose whether to con-
duct experiments, surveys, histories, archival analysis, or case studies. As illustrated
in Table 3.4, Yin (2003) considers the suitability of each approach:
Strategy Form of research
question
Requires control
of behavioural
events?
Focuses on
contemporary
events?
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes
Survey Who, what, where,
how many, how
much?
No Yes
Archival analysis Who, what, where,
how many, how
much?
No Yes/no
History How, why? No No
Case study How, why? No Yes
Table 3.4: Suitability of di↵erent research approaches, adapted from Yin (2003)
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3.4.1 Case Study Approach
The case study approach has been chosen as the most appropriate research method
for this study, given the recommendations of Yin (2003) above, the author’s dis-
cussed relativist, interpretivist philosophical stance, the research context, as well
as the study’s research questions. Yin (2003) defines a case study as an empirical
inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly ev-
ident” (p.13). Case studies are used in situations in which there are more variables
of interest than data points, and must thus employ a variety of data collection and
analysis methods to encompass the complexity (Yin, 2003).
A qualitative, exploratory case study approach is particularly relevant for this study,
as “how?” questions are being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which
the researcher has little or no control (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003). Case stud-
ies allow for a combination of planned and opportunistic data gathering, which can
be useful in a complex social situation which cannot be fully understood a priori,
and must therefore be open to emergent requirements for further data gathering
(Cassell and Symon, 2004). This study encompasses multiple cases, rather than be-
ing a single case study, given that the phenomenon under investigation (automotive
OEMs having corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters) is not
a critical, unique, typical, revelatory, or longitudinal case (Yin, 2003, p.40-1).
The case study approach has historically been criticised for its lack of precision,
quantification, objectivity, and rigour (Yin, 2003). However, this stereotype can
be challenged by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the case study
approach (Gable, 1994). The purpose of a case study is not to generalise statistical
results from a sample to a population (Gioia et al., 2010; Thorngate, 1976). Instead,
the purpose is to gain an in-depth, yet encompassing understanding of a complex
phenomenon and then induce from a case result to a framework, typology, model,
or theory (Gioia et al., 2010; Niederkofler, 1991; Thorngate, 1976).
3.4.2 Flowchart of Research Methodology
The research method for this study is outlined in Figure 3.3 which has been adapted
from a diagram by Yin (2003) (p.50). Note that, while Yin (2003) incorporates a
feedback loop in the flowchart to signify important discoveries during the study
resulting in a reconsideration of the literature and the analytical framework, as well
as further phases of data gathering, Figure 3.3 has these feedback loops drawn out
in full in the interest of clearly conveying all steps of the abductive research method.
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the research method, based on Yin (2003)
As illustrated, this study encompasses two phases of data gathering and analysis.
Following the summary of these phases below, details of the case study design and
analysis are discussed in Section 3.5.
Phase 1
The first round of qualitative case interviews was conducted at Silicon Valley auto-
motive corporate innovation subsidiaries, based on the initial conceptual framework
developed from the literature. To gain a more complete picture of the cases, each
subsidiary’s headquarters was interviewed. After writing individual case reports
and cross-checking these with interviewees to avoid misunderstandings and misrep-
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resentations, cross-case solutions were inferred from open coding analysis. These
cross-case conclusions were then used to modify the initial conceptual framework.
Phase 2
The output of Phase 1 prompted the researcher to attempt validation of these find-
ings at automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries of three of the case companies
in other locations (including Berlin, Tel Aviv, Paris, Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, and
Tokyo). Based on further rounds of open coding, the framework was again modified.
3.5 Case Studies: Design and Analysis
This section discusses the details of the case study design, including sampling and
case selection, the unit of analysis, as well as data collection and analysis procedures.
3.5.1 Case Selection
Given the automotive industry as a contemporary example of an industry undergoing
radical changes, as well as Silicon Valley as a prominent cluster in which many such
changes are occurring (see Section 3.3), relevant cases for this research needed to
fulfil the following criteria:
1. The parent company must be an incumbent global automotive OEM;
2. The parent company must have a corporate innovation subsidiary located in
Silicon Valley and possibly another in a further innovation cluster;
3. Subsidiaries must not conduct only corporate venture capital (CVC) activities,
as knowledge transfer to headquarters in these cases is limited.
Based on extensive internet research, a list of 11 automotive OEMs with an R&D
presence in Silicon Valley was created. Of these, one is a young manufacturer of
electric vehicles (founded in 2003 in Silicon Valley) and thus does not fulfil the
criteria of being an incumbent automotive OEM. Furthermore, one of the identified
Silicon Valley subsidiaries conducts solely CVC activities and therefore does not
qualify. This leaves nine viable cases to choose from, one of which the researcher was
unable to gain access to. Thus, this study has selected eight of the nine incumbent
automotive OEMs that have a relevant corporate innovation subsidiary located in
Silicon Valley (note that Company F has two subsidiaries in Silicon Valley, referred
to in this thesis as Subsidiaries F1 and F2):
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Case Silicon Valley
subsidiary size
(# employees)
Silicon Valley
subsidiary age
(# years)
HQ
location
Overall
company size
(# employees)
A 50 21 Germany ⇠130,000
B 300 24 Germany ⇠280,000
C 70 8 France ⇠470,000
D 200 21 Germany ⇠650,000
E 3 12 USA ⇠180,000
F F1: 40; F2: 250 F1: 18; F2: 3 Japan ⇠370,000
G 200 7 USA ⇠200,000
H 30 19 Japan ⇠220,000
Table 3.5: Overview of case companies’ Silicon Valley subsidiaries (as of Aug. 2019)
To test the validity of the findings from the Silicon Valley based subsidiaries, the
global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries of each of the eight companies
was considered for further interviews (Phase 2 of this study). Of the eight companies,
five do not have other corporate innovation subsidiaries with similar characteristics
to the Silicon Valley o ces (for example, some interviewees or websites mention the
company’s R&D headquarters Asia, or a single technology scouting contractor work-
ing in Israel, when prompted about their global network of innovation subsidiaries).
These cases were thus rejected for Phase 2 of this study, while the remaining three
companies (Companies A, B, and C) were chosen for a further round of interviews.
3.5.2 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is related to the study’s research questions (Yin, 2003). Given
the focus of this work’s research questions on the knowledge transfer from subsidiary
to company headquarters, the chosen unit of analysis constitutes the unit level of
an organisation. In this study, unit level refers to the subsidiary itself, as well as
the knowledge-receiving unit at headquarters (usually the R&D unit). This unit
of analysis allows for comparisons between sender and receiver of knowledge, as
well as between subsidiaries in di↵erent locations—a trait that is highly relevant to
answering the research questions and achieving the research objectives.
3.5.3 Data Collection
Yin (2003) defines six distinct sources of data in case study research: documenta-
tion, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and
physical artefacts. Of these, documentation, archival records, and physical arte-
facts are secondary data sources because their collection “is not the responsibility
of the analyst” (Stewart and Kamins, 1993, p.3). Interviews, direct observations,
45
and participant observations are primary data sources, as the researcher collects
the data him– or herself. In addition to categorising data sources into primary and
secondary sources, they can further be divided into those that provide data internal
to the main unit of analysis (the subsidiaries and the respective company headquar-
ters), as well as those providing data external to these units. A summary of the
data sources used in this study is shown in Figure 3.4:
Internal
External
Primary Secondary
Interviews with
employees of
subsidiaries and HQ
Company documents
(e.g., presentations
websites, minutes);
existing
case studies
Interviews with
third parties
(e.g., automotive
Tier 1 suppliers &
other industry experts)
Academic publications;
other publications
(e.g., newspaper articles)
Figure 3.4: Summary of data sources used in this study
While interviews with employees (mainly managers) of the subsidiaries and the re-
spective company headquarters (i.e., primary, internal data) comprise the main data
source, data from the remaining three quadrants of Figure 3.4 are triangulated with
this interview data, resulting in the creation of “converging lines of inquiry” (Yin,
2003, p.98), thereby improving the study’s construct validity (see Section 3.6 below).
Qualitative interviews with employees of the case subsidiaries and their headquar-
ters were designed in a semi-structured format. Guiding questions were established
beforehand and captured in a case study protocol (see Appendix A), but interviews
were kept open and flexible, allowing the researcher to opportunistically pursue cer-
tain topics with certain interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Yin, 2003).
For Phase 1 of this study (see Figure 3.3), the researcher commenced by conducting
initial phone interviews with Silicon Valley based automotive corporate innovation
subsidiaries, in order to establish contact and ask about potential in-person visits.
She subsequently spent three months in California as a visiting student at the Haas
School of Business, UC Berkeley, in order to conduct fieldwork locally. Interviews
were conducted at all eight cases in Silicon Valley. Upon her return to the UK,
the researcher conducted follow-up phone interviews with the Silicon Valley based
subsidiaries, as well as with managers at the eight companies’ headquarters. Inter-
viewing headquarters provided a valuable and necessary perspective to knowledge
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transfer, as it was important to gain insights from both the knowledge source (sub-
sidiary) and the knowledge recipient (headquarters). Individual case reports were
sent to interview partners in Silicon Valley for comments and approval, to avoid
misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the data.
To explore similar issues at automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries in other
locations (Phase 2), the researcher conducted initial phone interviews with further
subsidiaries of case Companies A, B, and C, located in other innovation clusters,
in order to establish contact and ask about potential in-person visits. This enabled
her to travel to Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo for one month of fieldwork,
consisting of interviews at the Asian corporate innovation subsidiaries of Cases A,
B, and C. Subsidiaries in other locations to which the researcher was not able to
travel in person (e.g., Berlin, Paris, and Tel Aviv) were interviewed on the phone.
Given that most interview partners in Phase 2 were interviewed more than once and
the researcher already had a deep understanding of the research context, individual
case study reports were not written for this phase. Instead, the researcher was able
to triangulate the data with her previous understanding and analysis from Phase 1.
Throughout this study, all in-person interviews (and most phone interviews) were
recorded and transcribed. For phone interviews in which consent to record was not
given, or in which the audio quality was not su ciently high to record, the researcher
took rigorous notes during the interview and wrote up summaries immediately fol-
lowing the call. In sum, a total of 79 interviews were conducted, seven of which did
not involve any of the eight case companies, but provided valuable external input.
This study comprises a total of 421 pages of interview transcripts and notes, as well
as 247 pages of secondary internal documents.
Table 3.6 provides an overview of how many interviews were conducted per case
company. As can be seen, the number of interviews conducted varies case by case.
Companies A and B exhibit significantly higher numbers of interviews, as both cases
were used for a second round of case studies (Phase 2), and because both cases were
used for initial scoping interviews. Generally, the principle of saturation was followed
in deciding how many interviews to conduct per case company: further interviews
were conducted until no novel, additional data was found (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
A more detailed summary of all interviews (including interviewee role, interview
medium, and duration) is provided in Appendix B. Note that all interviewees were
promised anonymity in order to encourage a more open dialogue. Thus, company
and individual names are anonymised throughout this study.
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Case A B C D E F G H Other
# Interviews 17 18 6 9 4 8 4 6 7
Table 3.6: Overview of interviews per case company
3.5.4 Data Analysis
As discussed in Section 3.2.4, this study aims to build theory through abduction and
therefore iteratively consults the literature for a conceptual framework on knowledge
transfer and modifies this framework based on di↵erent phases of data collection and
analysis. To this end, the Gioia method (Gioia et al., 2010, 2013) of analysing quali-
tative data was adopted. While the Gioia method builds on the concept of grounded
theory as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1998), Gioia
agrees that one should not be “completely uninformed about prior work,” but in-
stead focus on not letting “existing knowledge get in the way” of the data analysis
(Gehman et al., 2018, p.291). Whilst this study consults prior literature for the
development of an initial conceptual framework, this serves mainly to narrow down
the field of study to the knowledge transfer from the subsidiaries to the respec-
tive headquarters and helps formulate some guiding open-ended questions for the
semi-structured interviews. In keeping with the abductive approach, this conceptual
framework is modified after each phase of case study data collection and analysis
(see Figure 3.3).
The Gioia method consists of multiple rounds of coding, i.e., reading through all
interview transcripts and notes and highlighting relevant first-order codes (akin to
Strauss and Corbin (1998)) for the purposes of providing some overview and struc-
ture to the data (Gioia et al., 2010, 2013). The first order analysis does not yet
aim to reduce data, as it attempts to remain close to the interviewees’ terminology.
The large resulting number of codes are subsequently compared for similarities and
di↵erences, and condensed to bring order to a cluttered, sometimes tautological list
of codes, thus resulting in a re-combination to second-order categories (akin to axial
coding defined by Strauss and Corbin (1998)). Two examples of the coding proce-
dure conducted for each interview transcript is shown in Appendix C.
Data analysis following the Gioia method resulted in a code tree, outlining the rela-
tion between the list of first-order codes and second-order categories. An example of
this code tree, developed from the analysis of the case study data in Phase 1 of this
study, is shown in Appendix D. Following the abductive approach, the second-order
categories in this code tree are compared with the conceptual framework derived
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from the existing literature and are thus used to modify the framework. Note that,
for simplicity and clarity, the code tree shown in Appendix D only exhibits those
codes that were not found in the existing literature and were thus used to modify
the framework. The same analysis procedure was used in the Phase 2 case studies.
The qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA, was used for coding, allowing
the researcher to maintain a structured and organised overview of all interview data
and all first- and second-order codes. This measure follows the recommendation of
Yin (2003) to maintain a case study database including all notes and transcripts for
improved oversight and reliability (see Section 3.6).
3.6 Evaluation of Research Approach
To judge research design quality, Yin (2003) suggests four criteria against which to
measure. Table 3.7 defines these criteria and how they are fulfilled in this study.
Criterion Definition Fulfilment in this study
1. Construct validity Consideration of the
extent to which cor-
rect operational mea-
sures are being used
for the concepts being
studied.
Multiple sources of evidence have
been used: interviewing a wide
range of employees from case
companies and other companies;
triangulating these with other
sources of secondary data; pre-
senting findings back to key con-
tacts to confirm interpretations.
2. Internal validity This applies mainly
to explanatory or
causal studies, rather
than to exploratory
ones. Internal valid-
ity involves ensuring
that correct cause-
e↵ect relationships
are derived.
Given the exploratory nature of
this case study research, which
does not aim to answer propo-
sitions by making causal claims,
internal validity is of less con-
cern. Nonetheless, comparative
analysis was performed on inter-
view data by identifying similari-
ties and di↵erences between infor-
mation provided by interviewees.
3. External validity Consideration of the
study’s generalisabil-
ity to other domains.
Replication logic was used across
cases; findings from Phase 1 were
cross-checked for validation in
Phase 2.
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4. Reliability Consideration of the
study’s repeatability.
A strict case study protocol
was followed; interviews were
recorded and transcribed (where
interviews could not be recorded,
rigorous notes were taken); in-
terview transcriptions and notes
were coded and stored in a case
study database.
Table 3.7: Fulfilling the criteria for good research design by Yin (2003)
3.6.1 Ethical Considerations
To evaluate a research approach, not just methodological considerations, but also
ethical aspects must be examined. Based on the recommendations of Easterby-
Smith et al. (2015), the following measures have been taken to improve the ethical
considerations of this work:
• Ensuring a rigorous research design to improve quality and validity of findings;
• Honesty and transparency about research intentions when approaching po-
tential case companies, to avoid deceit, build trust with interviewees, and
therefore improve research findings;
• Gaining consent that interviews will be recorded;
• Careful consideration of confidentiality issues as and when they arise, such as
promising anonymity of case companies and individuals to encourage a more
open dialogue;
• Reviewing interpretations of data with relevant employees to ensure validity
of findings;
• Ongoing self-assessment on the part of the author about the ethics of research.
3.7 Chapter Conclusion
Based on the above considerations of the research approach, including the research
objectives, the philosophical stance taken, the methodology used to answer the
research questions, and an evaluation of the quality of the research approach, the
following chapters present an analysis of the data collected in Phases 1 and 2 of this
study. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the research implications and this
study’s contribution to theory and practice.
Chapter 4
Phase 1: Case Studies from Silicon Valley
This chapter provides an analysis of the
data gathered in Phase 1 of this study,
i.e., eight case studies of automotive cor-
porate innovation subsidiaries located in
Silicon Valley (see right). Each case
is discussed using key factors a↵ecting
knowledge transfer uncovered from the
literature and incorporated into the ini-
tial conceptual framework (see Figure
4.1 below). Note that, in the inter-
est of brevity and clarity of presenta-
tion, certain factors a↵ecting knowledge
transfer will be combined into one head-
ing when discussing the case study data
(e.g., external embeddedness and ex-
ternal knowledge sourcing, and transfer
content and mechanism). Furthermore, observations from each case that deviate
from the existing literature are discussed, resulting in a refinement of the framework
at the end of this chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Initial conceptual framework derived from the literature
4.1 Case A
4.1.1 Subsidiary A Background
Established in 1998, Subsidiary A was among the first automotive corporate in-
novation subsidiaries in Silicon Valley. When founded, the subsidiary had six
employees—a mix of local hires and expatriates (expats) from Company A head-
quarters (located in Germany). The original task of the subsidiary was exploratory
in nature, with the aim of finding new technology trends in Silicon Valley, and send-
ing them to headquarters for further evaluation and development.
Realising the strategic importance of the Silicon Valley region, the subsidiary grew
to about 10 employees by 2000, 20 employees by 2005, 30 employees by 2010, and
around 50 employees by 2019. With the increase in hiring, in particular engineers,
the subsidiary shifted from technology scouting to conducting research projects with
universities, as well as collaborative prototyping with start-up companies and auto-
motive Tier 1 suppliers’ innovation subsidiaries in Silicon Valley.
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4.1.2 Internal Embeddedness
Employees at the subsidiary require an excellent network (internal embeddedness)
in the parent organisation to be able to find a home for projects. This network is
facilitated through expats, i.e., employees from headquarters who are sent to the
subsidiary on a temporary basis (usually three to five years), as well as through
a designated team at headquarters that acts as a bridge-builder between the sub-
sidiary and headquarters business units. The importance of expats is the following:
“Expats are the real connection to [headquarters], because [headquarters] is huge.
And so it is hard to wade through everybody to get to the actual key person respon-
sible” (A-7)1. Furthermore, expats facilitate raising awareness about the subsidiary
at headquarters, because: “I guarantee you, there are people in [my headquarters
business unit] that do not even know that an o ce exists here [...], so [expats] are
here to help open people’s eyes and raise the awareness through their network” (A-5).
Furthermore, even when the correct contact person is known, physical and time dif-
ferences complicate communication: “One challenge is being so far away, but trying
to get the attention of someone that you need information from. [...] You can’t just
go to their desk and ask them a question” (A-7).
The autonomy of a multinational subsidiary has been considered as a function of
its integration, i.e., embeddedness, into the parent organisation. Subsidiary auton-
omy in terms of both strategic aspects (e.g., decision-making for which projects to
launch), as well as operational aspects (e.g., budget), constitutes a trade-o↵: too
little autonomy and the subsidiary merely replicates what could easily be done at
headquarters; too much autonomy and knowledge created at the subsidiary is un-
likely to reach headquarters due to a lack of integration.
Operationally, Subsidiary A employs a dual-budget mechanism, where some budget
for research projects is autonomous and funding for projects that are closer to series
development has to be raised on a project-by-project basis. Strategically, however,
this subsidiary is less autonomous than the budget suggests. Whilst projects should
be able to be launched without first obtaining support from headquarters, the inter-
viewees rarely follow this option. Instead, they highlight the importance of securing
interest from a headquarters business unit before starting a project, in order to be
“better safe than sorry” (A-5). This can limit the innovativeness of the subsidiary,
as suggested by the literature (e.g., Beugelsdijk and Jindra (2018); Birkinshaw and
Hood (2001); Ghoshal and Bartlett (1995); Gupta and Govindarajan (1991)).
1See Appendix B for an overview of interviewees and their IDs.
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4.1.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Whilst part of the subsidiary’s purpose is to find relevant start-ups in Silicon Valley
and develop prototypes with them, interviewees suggest that these collaborations
often cannot proceed further than the prototyping stage because of asymmetries
between the partners. For example, “start-ups have much faster processes” (A-5),
IP contracts “take months to be drawn up by the di↵erent legal departments” (A-
5) and start-ups are “seldom able to scale and industrialise” (A-9). To mitigate
these challenges, the subsidiary usually facilitates the connection of the start-up to
an established Tier 1 supplier in the industry, who ensures that the technology is
“feasible and reproducible at high quantity and quality” (A-9).
4.1.4 Actor Characteristics
Problems in the knowledge transfer process from subsidiary to headquarters are
attributable in part to bureaucracy. Given the size of the entire organisation, finding
the right department at headquarters to work with poses a major challenge for
subsidiary employees: “The company is so large, finding someone to answer your
question or that has the authority to give the information or support something is
a challenge” (A-7). Furthermore, even if subsidiary employees find an appropriate
department, employees at headquarters are, by definition, busy with their day-to-
day work:
Say I find something new and approach series development [at headquar-
ters] with it. They are currently in over their heads with a project that
might not even be going fully according to plan. So they are already un-
der a lot of pressure. And then I tell them that I have something new for
them. Their enthusiasm for this is usually limited. (A-8)
As this is similar across business units, subsidiary employees may have to “pitch the
project five or even ten times” (A-6) in order to find a department at headquarters
that is the right strategic fit for that project and that has the time to adopt it.
Similarly, in the words of an interviewee at headquarters:
Yes, we are all [Company A] employees. Nonetheless, we all have our
own goals, we all have our own work. And if somebody calls and says:
‘Can you look at this for 1.5 hours?’, then that is a lot of time. And
if it is somebody that I don’t personally know and only know that they
are from Silicon Valley, then of course it is di cult to take the time to
look at their proposal. I have to admit that. You really need a personal
network for this, as well as top management support, who say that this
[subsidiary] is important. (A-8)
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Depending on the project, it is not just time of headquarters employees that the
subsidiary needs top management support to obtain: “For some of the projects, I
do require hardware which I get shipped over [from headquarters]. So if you just
ask blankly to [headquarters], the answer is always: ‘No’” (A-7). Support for the
subsidiary has to come from the very highest level to make sure that headquarters
business units have the pressure to supply time and resources to the subsidiary.
Certain measures are taken to improve top management awareness and support. For
example, regular visits to Silicon Valley are carried out: “[Management] will make
a point to visit our o ce and we usually give them an overview of all the projects
we are working on” (A-7). Furthermore, there is a training course for top executives
from the organisation that is run in Silicon Valley, through which the subsidiary “has
gained awareness within the organisation” and which has enabled them to “earn a
high standing, all the way up to the board” (A-6).
4.1.5 Actor Relationship
The discussed challenge of headquarters employees not having the time to listen
to ideas from the subsidiary is an issue that can be traced back to what has been
labelled as the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) syndrome in the literature. The follow-
ing statement suggests a certain envy and mistrust of the subsidiary, which can be
categorised as an ego-defence mechanism in the NIH syndrome (Gupta and Govin-
darajan, 2000): “Being in a highly attractive location, of course we are often told:
‘You work where other people go on holiday’” (A-5). Another interviewee at the
subsidiary discusses that “there are still many [at headquarters] who think in more
traditional ways, who say: ‘Hmm... where does this come from?’” (A-6)—a definite
sign of the NIH syndrome.
Di↵erences in organisational and national culture constitute a key obstacle to knowl-
edge transfer. For instance, challenges such as a large MNC not knowing how to
work with start-ups, budgeting, communication, trust, and headquarters bureau-
cracy all encompass issues of opposing culture. In essence, the subsidiary behaves
more like an entrepreneurial start-up, while headquarters behaves like the large
MNC that it is, weighed and slowed down by heavy processes. According to the
current head of the subsidiary, the subsidiary tries to be “as little like [headquarters]
as possible” (A-3), because they want to “think like a Silicon Valley company” (A-3).
This bureaucracy also results in the relationship between subsidiary and headquar-
ters being fairly one-sided. In the words of an interviewee at the subsidiary: “We do
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not have direct influence over whether the technologies we find end up in the car. [...]
The decision is not in our hands” (A-5). Nonetheless, the subsidiary makes sure
to “provide as much knowledge and insight about our projects for the higher-level
decision-makers as possible, to support their decision, no matter in what direction
it might go” (A-5). This level of loyalty appears to be unrequited by headquarters.
The main strategy for mitigating these relationship issues seems to be the presence
of expats in the subsidiary. While expats are expensive, they foster a “natural col-
laboration” (A-6) with headquarters. Of the roughly 50 employees at the subsidiary,
eight are expats who are spread across various topical areas (A-6). Similarly, a des-
ignated unit at headquarters helps by being a “bridgehead” (A-8) between Silicon
Valley and headquarters.
4.1.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
To catch headquarters’ attention, the subsidiary must demonstrate the value of their
idea. This can be done by “making ideas come alive” (A-8) because:
Simply presenting a PowerPoint about the start-up or technology they
[the subsidiary] have found doesn’t work. They need to build a POC
[proof of concept] that is close to an automotive use-case and approach
the relevant business unit [at headquarters] with it. (A-8)
The idea of demonstrating value by delivering a tangible POC rather than a slide
presentation has been labelled “Death by PowerPoint” by multiple interviewees in
this study and can determine whether a project will be transferred successfully.
A further obstacle to knowledge transfer involves timing. New vehicle development
cycles last an average of five to seven years and there are only “certain points [in
the cycle] at which you can feed in” (A-8). Hardware can only be added between
certain development stages, whilst software is usually easier to integrate during de-
velopment, though only if the system architecture allows (A-6, A-8). This presents a
challenge as innovations from faster moving industries, such as consumer electronics,
will often be outdated by the time they are integrated into the vehicle if the correct
point in the development cycle is missed. Thus, technology roadmaps have to be
proactively considered when conducting projects at the subsidiary.
The discussed obstacles to knowledge transfer are mitigated using various formal
and informal mechanisms. For one, expats help establish a network within the or-
ganisation so that the subsidiary knows whom to talk to. Secondly, regular business
trips are carried out both by subsidiary employees to headquarters and vice versa
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because “there is nothing more important than the face-to-face interaction to help
with working together” (A-7). In addition to face-to-face meetings, the subsidiary
is in phone or video contact with headquarters at least four to five times per week
and has a regular newsletter in which it updates headquarters on projects and new
technology trends in the industry (A-5, A-8). Finally, Company A headquarters
conducts an annual innovation fair day, attended by the board and managers from
series development business units, at which innovative projects from the company’s
global network of innovation units are showcased. This raises awareness about the
innovation subsidiaries throughout the organisation and can facilitate the match-
making between a subsidiary’s project and a relevant headquarters business unit.
4.1.7 Further Considerations
When the subsidiary was first established, its task was very exploratory in nature:
“In the early days, [the subsidiary] had the task of just seeing what new trends there
are” (A-6). Starting in 2010, the organisational structure of Subsidiary A shifted, so
that, while all employees at the subsidiary are now organisationally part of the Com-
pany A R&D department, the employees’ specific focus areas mirror the business
unit organisation of headquarters. This means that each team at the subsidiary has
a specific business unit in the headquarters series development department2, with
whom they communicate and collaborate most closely (for example, IT, electronics,
powertrain, driver assistance, etc.). In other words, the subsidiary has shifted from
being mainly exploratory to being organisationally tied into headquarters series de-
velopment and carrying out more series development-orientated work. Now, projects
have to be taken to higher levels of maturity before transferring them directly into
series development, rather than carrying out greenfield projects and transferring
them into research at headquarters. This organisational restructuring is described
by one of the interviewees in the subsidiary:
We are in the R&D department code which used to be kind of farther out
research and it used to be way more independent and so things would be
taken up and then done for several years and then killed o↵ because it
would either be very long-term focussed, so nothing that they could put
in series, or two, it would be too expensive, or three, the promise never
found itself out. But we have had more of a re-organisation, where we
are supposed to be very similar to [headquarters]. We are supposed to be
more R&D for series and it is supposed to be more like D&P, development
and production, than R&D. (A-7)
2The typical automotive R&D process can be split into three phases: (1) an initial phase
(fundamental research); (2) a concept phase (pre-development); and (3) series development, after
which the project is passed on to production (see Figure 3.2).
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A possible explanation for this shift lies with the rapid developments in the auto-
motive industry which are putting pressure on integrating technologies that used to
be on a farther out horizon (e.g., driver assistance systems, cloud-connected vehi-
cles, and electric vehicles) into the actual vehicle. Thus, the subsidiary is shifting
from being an innovation subsidiary working on greenfield, radical innovations, to
being an extended, outsourced arm of headquarters’ series development department.
Whilst the interviewees at the subsidiary merely stated that they are moving closer
to series development without providing judgement on this shift, an interviewee at
headquarters is more blatant in the evaluation:
It is beneficial to get rid of the pre-development phase and instead tie
the [subsidiaries] into the series development department straight away.
They should be doing fewer POCs, fewer pilot projects. Either do the
project, or leave it, but don’t waste time on pre-development projects that
are too expensive, too far removed from the customer, or too unscalable
and so don’t get taken on by any business units. Series development has
to be involved from the very start to ensure that there is buy-in. It has to
be clear from the start who will be the internal customer: who will adopt
the project and take it further? (A-11)
The subsidiary’s organisational shift closer to series development is symptomised
by the subsidiary approaching a series development business unit in headquarters
before even launching a project to make sure the unit provides buy-in to the project,
either financially or in other ways, such as resources, people, or agreeing to adopt
the project at hand-over. Securing early buy-in from headquarters reduces the risk
of carrying out projects in Silicon Valley as it provides a target customer at head-
quarters. If buy-in is not secured early on, the subsidiary might find itself having
finished a project, proposing it to headquarters and then: “They may say that we
never talked about doing this project and that it is not valuable to them. So it is
important to have that communication and to discuss that project, to make sure we
are all aligned with the overall company objectives” (A-7).
This organisational shift has further resulted in the expectations for the subsidiary
changing accordingly. Instead of carrying out greenfield projects, they are now ex-
pected to be more aligned with what headquarters series development is working on
already. While employees at the subsidiary meet this expectation by, for example,
securing buy-in from a headquarters business unit before launching a project, they
nonetheless feel part of Silicon Valley and want to partake in novel ideas that may
lie outside the scope of the company’s series development department. However, the
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subsidiary is often not utilised to carry out projects “that make sense in that loca-
tion” (A-6), but are instead used as a “free resource” (A-6). This goes against the
idea of making use of the “location’s unique advantage” (A-6) and instead resembles
(very expensive) outsourcing of development work.
A further issue relating to the expectation about the subsidiary’s role is the idea
of innovation theatre, i.e., large companies establishing a presence in an innovation
cluster not for the purpose of actually gaining technological value from the region,
but to instead appear innovative, new, and prepared for the future. This usually
is not a conscious decision, but instead manifests itself in how top management
treats the subsidiary, how seriously headquarters takes projects coming from the
subsidiary, and how well projects are actually integrated into the company. For
example, Subsidiary A is often “misused by management to take a tour of Silicon
Valley and experience digitisation up close” (A-11), which is “not the point” (A-11).
Furthermore, visits by top management have been described as a “dog and pony
show3” (A-7). Management viewing the subsidiary as a public relations campaign
suggests a conflict in the expectations by headquarters and subsidiary about the
latter’s role.
3A dog and pony show is defined as “an often elaborate public relations or sales presentation;
also: an elaborate or overblown a↵air or event” (Merriam-Webster, 2019).
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4.2 Case B
4.2.1 Subsidiary B Background
Subsidiary B was the first automotive corporate innovation subsidiary to be estab-
lished in Silicon Valley. It was founded in 1995, with the original task of being
a technology trend scouting facility with just five employees. It grew over time
as di↵erent technologies became relevant in the area. For example, the topic of
the dot-com boom was a contemporary trend that drove the subsidiary to hire more
employees in the early 2000s, followed by consumer electronics, electric vehicles, con-
nectivity, and autonomous driving. The subsidiary grew to 40 employees by 2000,
100 employees by 2010, and over 300 employees by 2019. With new technological
trends, it became strategically beneficial to be present and engaged in Silicon Valley,
resulting in the subsidiary shifting from conducting pure research and early-stage
prototyping, to also carrying out more mature development work.
Furthermore, Company B headquarters (located in Germany) established a unit
focussing on business innovation and new business models in 2007, incorporating
this unit into the Silicon Valley subsidiary in 2012. In August 2017 this unit was
reconfigured to become an internal incubator for the company (from here on called
Lab-B), allowing all employees of Company B to submit business ideas and poten-
tially receive funding and support to take this idea to market. Ideas from Lab-B
can either be implemented within Company B, or spun-o↵ as separate start-ups. In
2018, Lab-B was set up as a separate legal entity, to enable it to move faster and
autonomously of headquarters.
4.2.2 Internal Embeddedness
To facilitate the process of knowledge transfer, Company B has introduced desig-
nated knowledge transfer personnel, both at the subsidiary and at headquarters, that
foster the subsidiary’s embeddedness into the organisation. On the subsidiary side,
the knowledge transfer personnel consist mainly of expats who have strong connec-
tions to various headquarters business units and can bridge the gap between the two
sides. They understand both the Silicon Valley and headquarters perspective and
are therefore in charge of ensuring “a smooth, transparent exchange of information”
(B-6), as well as “that the innovations being scouted and developed in Silicon Valley
actually fit into the company’s technology roadmap and eventually end up in front
of the customer” (B-6). Projects taken to headquarters by expats “have a higher
chance of success because they have a champion” (B-10). On the headquarters side,
Company B established a designated unit to “facilitate the collaboration model with
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[the subsidiary]” (B-6) and to ensure that the two parties “are interlocked” (B-6).
Subsidiary B is part of Company B’s headquarters R&D department and mainly
conducts projects that have been specifically requested by business units in this de-
partment (B-9). The autonomy of the subsidiary is thus limited, which is similarly
reflected by its budget mechanism. The budget is secured on a project-by-project
basis from business units at headquarters which “has benefits because you have dedi-
cated funding to work on certain things, but it also has risks because it doesn’t provide
much opportunity to do much on your own” (B-3). This budget mechanism results
in the following Catch-22 cycle: to pitch for funding for a project, the subsidiary
needs a POC or a prototype to demonstrate its value, but this is di cult to achieve
before having secured funding for that project.
Lab-B, the internal incubator at this subsidiary, does not “fit into any divisional unit
of the organisation” (B-3), and so does not “want to put any unnecessary risk into
any group” (B-3). To avoid having a single unit within the company shouldering the
liability of incubating uncertain business ideas, Lab-B was split o↵ as a separate legal
entity in 2018 (B-4). This allows for more autonomy and faster decision-making,
which reduces some of the obstacles that can stifle innovation (e.g., being slowed
down by headquarters’ bureaucratic processes). However, “being a separate legal
entity has its risks because you have to be a sustainable business on your own. Our
funding mechanism is not 100% subsidised, so our projects that we garner, or gain
will have to support the business” (B-4).
4.2.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Subsidiary B was founded in Silicon Valley because “we access the ecosystem through
the o ce located there. That is why [the subsidiary] was founded [...]. I don’t think
doing this sort of thing from [headquarters] works. You need to really be part of
the ecosystem and you need to be located in the region” (B-6). This interview ex-
cerpt clearly demonstrates the importance of the subsidiary being well-embedded in
its external environment. This allows the subsidiary to collaborate with start-ups
and other players in the cluster, which is particularly important when headquarters
“don’t have the competence in-house, such as for software projects” (B-7).
Nonetheless, the subsidiary is aware that “start-ups will not be our Tier 1 suppliers”
(B-6) because “they cannot produce on that scale” (B-6). Having start-ups collab-
orate directly with Tier 1 suppliers from an early stage “enables [the start-ups] to
ramp up and to have the expertise of someone that is able to convert something into
being automotive-grade” (B-4). To further mitigate the asymmetries between start-
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ups and a global OEM, Company B does not enforce exclusivity for a project when
working with a start-up. In other words, once Company B has taken a project to
market, the start-up is free to also o↵er this technology to a competitor. The rea-
soning behind this is demonstrated by the following interview excerpt: “The worst
thing you can have, as [Company B], is putting an investment in a start-up and
keeping them all for yourself because, at the end of the day, we are a small supplier
of vehicles to the world” (B-6). Instead, “the success of a start-up is providing to all
the world’s vehicles and us benefitting from doing it first” (B-6).
4.2.4 Actor Characteristics
Despite Subsidiary B being the first of the automotive corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries in Silicon Valley (established in 1995), the first Company B executive did
not visit Silicon Valley until 2015 (B-3). “This was really an ‘oh-shit’ moment, in
which everything changed” (B-3). Indeed, “this executive saw the digitisation that
would be a↵ecting the automotive industry first-hand” (B-3), prompting a Company
B executive meeting in Silicon Valley to raise awareness about Subsidiary B through-
out the company. Now, “[top management] are here [at the subsidiary] on a regular
basis. We have board members here three times a year. [...] We are just having
co↵ee with them, [...] it is very intimate” (B-4). This is vital for knowledge trans-
fer, given that “if top management does not fully support [the subsidiary], then it is
di cult to actually implement anything [at headquarters]” (B-6).
4.2.5 Actor Relationship
“When people from Silicon Valley and [headquarters] series development encounter
each other, expect a clash of cultures” (B-10). Throughout the cases in this thesis,
the clash of cultures between the bureaucratic company headquarters and the small,
agile corporate innovation subsidiary is strongly supported by various evidence. For
instance, the following interview excerpts elucidate the basis of this clash of cultures
at Company B:
Although we are all one organisation, it’s not that they [headquarters]
don’t trust us [the subsidiary] as individuals, it’s that the methodology,
the approach that we have, is not something that they are used to. So
that takes time to understand and accept and also to see what we are
able to deliver. (B-4)
Furthermore:
There is rejection of the people working at [the subsidiary] by the people
working in [headquarters] series development. The series development
Chapter 4. Phase 1: Case Studies from Silicon Valley 62
people think: ‘What have you guys ever actually brought into the car? Let
us show you how to develop a car.’, while the people in [the subsidiary]
think: ‘How slow are you? You will be disrupted tomorrow.’ (B-10)
This clash of cultures and consequent NIH syndrome result in low acceptance of
subsidiary projects by business units at headquarters (B-4, B-6, B-9), and so the
subsidiary “really has to put e↵ort into bringing their innovations to the right per-
son in the company” (B-9). Finding the right person in the company to take on
projects is facilitated by having an expat leading the subsidiary and by having ex-
pats manage projects, to then “champion” (B-10) their project when they move
back to headquarters.
4.2.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
As similarly discussed for Subsidiary A above, interviewees at Company B support
the view that software projects are easier to transfer than hardware projects, given
that software projects have a “shorter innovation cycle” (B-6) and can therefore be
integrated more easily into headquarters’ roadmaps (B-3). Nonetheless, challenges
of knowledge transfer persist.
Indeed, an interviewee at Company B headquarters suggested that, while the sub-
sidiary “does new stu↵, like software and autonomous driving and infotainment,
there is not enough of a connection with series development to ever do anything
with it” (B-7), resulting in the subsidiary “designing PowerPoints” (B-7), without
implementing their technology at headquarters. This challenge of Death by Pow-
erPoint is being addressed by moving the subsidiary ever closer to headquarters’
series development department (see Section 4.2.7 below).
Other knowledge transfer mechanisms include regular communication between the
subsidiary and headquarters, in order to “foster this relationship and information ex-
change” (B-6). Furthermore, the subsidiary gets exposure at headquarters through
writing a regular newsletter, in which they avoid focussing exclusively on automotive
and “insinuating” (B-3) any specific solutions. Instead, the newsletter aims to “en-
able the others” (B-3) because “the big success of innovation is allowing someone to
have the initial idea and supporting them to run with it” (B-3). This spirit suggests
a certain selflessness by the subsidiary in putting the innovation capabilities of the
company ahead of their own desire for recognition.
As discussed, projects are often managed by an expat, who then has responsibility of
bringing the project to headquarters and championing its implementation. However,
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for projects not led by an expat, transfer is a lot harder: “In this case, the project is
presented at an innovation fair at headquarters, but usually nothing further happens”
(B-10), because series development does not take su cient interest.
4.2.7 Further Considerations
Projects at corporate innovation subsidiaries are commonly split into the categories
of pull projects and push projects, where pull projects are specifically demanded, i.e.,
pulled, by a headquarters business unit, and push projects are those in which the
subsidiary has an interesting idea and pitches it to headquarters to push it into the
organisation.
At Subsidiary B, the balance between pull and push projects is about 80/20 (B-7).
The balance has been shifting ever more in favour of pull projects and has resulted
in the subsidiary only being able to work on “blue sky projects that are 25 years away
[if they] have spare time next to pull projects” (B-7). Generally, projects driven by
the subsidiary (push) are handed over to the pre-development department at head-
quarters because these projects tend to be less mature and more exploratory (B-9).
Pull projects, on the other hand, are usually demanded specifically by a series de-
velopment business unit, given that they “know exactly what they want and when
they want it developed by” (B-7). This results in the knowledge transfer between
the subsidiary and headquarters being less linear and not a “one-way street” (B-
6). Instead, projects are developed collaboratively, with knowledge generation and
transfer taking place iteratively between the two parties (B-6).
Projects pulled from series development usually involve “traditional R&D” (B-4),
such as improving existing vehicle mechanisms, while push projects involve “new
innovation concepts” (B-4). The rise of pull projects suggests that the subsidiary
is evolving to be closer to headquarters’ series development department and is thus
moving towards conducting incremental, rather than radical innovation. This de-
velopment suggests a dichotomy in expectation between headquarters and the sub-
sidiary about Subsidiary B’s role. While a senior manager at headquarters believes
that the subsidiary needs “more structure” (B-10) rather than being “new and cool
[...] without clear tasks and goals” (B-10), a manager at the subsidiary supports the
following view about the subsidiary’s role:
You know you’re doing a job right when you eliminate your entire job.
And I think that’s the most important thing here too. [...] Our success is
when the entire organisation is doing it [innovation] naturally, and there
is no need for us. And that is our objective. (B-3)
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While the subsidiary manager aims for the subsidiary to have a deep impact on
the innovation capabilities of the overall organisation, the headquarters senior man-
ager views the subsidiary as an extended workbench for series development—two
contrasting expectations.
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4.3 Case C
4.3.1 Subsidiary C Background
Subsidiary C was established in Silicon Valley in 2011 as a scouting facility consist-
ing of three employees. The subsidiary had the original aim of finding new ideas
and technology trends in Silicon Valley and sending them to headquarters in France
for further evaluation and development. Today, the subsidiary consists of about 70
people, of which 50 are in charge of conducting research, while 20 are in charge of
conducting open innovation activities.
Since its establishment in 2011, this subsidiary has evolved from mainly conducting
scouting activities to also carrying out POC and prototyping work. This is done
in collaboration with external companies, such as start-ups, as the subsidiary’s key
aim of being located in Silicon Valley is to source knowledge from other industries.
4.3.2 Internal Embeddedness
Subsidiary C consists of about 50% local hires and 50% expats who stay for two
to three years before returning to headquarters (C-1, C-5). Part of the purpose
of having expats at the subsidiary is to “avoid di↵erences in expectations between
the mothership and the Silicon Valley o ce” (C-3), which can arise given the cul-
tural di↵erences between an entrepreneurial, risk-friendly, fast-moving innovation
subsidiary, and bureaucratic, risk-averse, slow-moving headquarters. The benefits
of the expat rotation programme are further described by an interviewee:
We [the subsidiary] are so far from headquarters you can talk every day,
but still you are not there. Right now, we have a new guy from headquar-
ters and he has all this information, so we are jumping on him. Like
‘Who is thinking about this? Who is thinking about that?’ Just because
the team [in Silicon Valley] knows he still knows all this. [...] At the
same time, you are so disconnected from the headquarters that you need
some people who are well-integrated there to make it work. (C-1)
Knowledge transfer is inhibited by the subsidiary often lacking a network in head-
quarters and thus not knowing whom to talk to: “On [the subsidiary’s] side it is
more or less clear who [the counterpart for knowledge transfer] is. But from head-
quarters’ side it is less clear. You cannot just talk to anybody” (C-1). By providing
this vital network in headquarters, expats facilitate knowledge transfer.
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This subsidiary changed leadership in March 2018. The new head of the subsidiary
has placed more emphasis on the challenges of knowledge transfer and has there-
fore introduced two new personnel roles to help ease this process: the role of Chief
Technology Director (CTD) and the role of Innovation and Operations Director
(IOD). The CTD is in charge of “upstream activities” (C-3) such as “finding and
understanding cutting-edge technology” (C-3) from external actors like start-ups and
universities, and making key decisions such as: “This part should be done in-house,
and this should be sourced from the outside” (C-4).
The IOD’s role, on the other hand, is to “bridge the gap between Silicon Valley and
[headquarters]” (C-3). The IOD is in charge of bringing project outputs from the
subsidiary to business units at headquarters to make sure “something gets done with
it” (C-3). The role of the IOD is “very important for the outcome of this lab because
if projects are not transferred to the mothership, then nothing happens” (C-4).
Subsidiary C has a fairly autonomous budget, with which it can freely conduct
prototype and POC development. The details, benefits, and drawbacks of this
system are described by an interviewee:
What [the founder of the subsidiary] did very well, but what causes a lot
of problems at the same time, is negotiating autonomy for the lab. We
can decide on our own what project we want to start, and we do not need
an approval of a business unit [at headquarters] to start a project. We
have our own budget, so the decision is taken just by [the head of the
subsidiary]. It is easier when you come [to the business unit] and you
can show something. It can look ugly, it can have tonnes of wires around
it, but it is a working prototype. It is easier to have something tangible
to show. At the same time, it causes a di↵erent kind of dilemma, when
you come out of nowhere to a business unit saying: ‘Hey, we have this
cool stu↵.’ In many cases, they say that that’s not how they want it. So,
it turned out that it is a very good thing in comparison to many other
[innovation subsidiaries], because you can move faster, but sometimes
you are too fast. And so now we try to work more with business units
from early stages of the process to get their buy-in earlier. (C-1)
While the autonomous budget mechanism allows the subsidiary to move fast, its in-
ternal embeddedness is compromised as a result. To improve internal embeddedness
while maintaining its autonomy, the subsidiary is thus trying to involve headquarters
in projects from an earlier stage, to enable business units to take more ownership
over the projects, thereby increasing the chances of successful transfer (C-1).
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4.3.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
As mentioned, this subsidiary consists of 50% local hires and 50% expats from
headquarters (C-1, C-5). While local hires do not outweigh expat hires, according
to an interviewee at this subsidiary, the “reason for being here is really to hire local
talent” (C-1). This is because:
Silicon Valley has a very specific mindset and style and you need to know
the ecosystem. And [expats from headquarters] come here and they have
no idea how Silicon Valley works. [...] In my opinion, there is no point
in having only expats here just because, if you do that, what is the reason
for being here? (C-1)
Company C’s motivation for setting up a corporate innovation subsidiary in Silicon
Valley involves the benefit of learning from external actors, especially from a range
of industries. This drive is discussed by an interviewee at the subsidiary:
Automotive is an interesting space to be and there are lots of convergences
with entertainment, with energy right now in terms of electric vehicles,
with IoT [internet of things] [...]. Automotives are historically super bad
at this. I mean, it is not their core business, they have no idea how to
do these things. So, in order to do these things, you need to kind of
outsource those capabilities from other companies. And that is the main
driving force behind being here [in Silicon Valley]. (C-1)
The main type of company the subsidiary outsources these innovative capabilities to
is start-ups. Working with start-ups can be challenging as the start-up’s technology
needs to fit into a larger system, usually supplied by a traditional automotive Tier
1 supplier. To ease this process, the subsidiary can engage a Tier 1 supplier in the
collaboration with the start-up because “it is more e↵ective to let a Tier 1 buy it
from the start-up” (C-5). Indeed:
We realised that some of the projects are impossible without suppliers.
Or they are possible, but it makes it hard if we need to change something
[...]. So, we have partnerships with the few Tier 1 suppliers that have
innovation o ces here [in Silicon Valley]. (C-1)
This collaboration model holds multiple benefits for the subsidiary: firstly, it attracts
more start-ups to the subsidiary because it o↵ers a clear growth path to the start-
up. Secondly, it reduces the risk of wasting resources by working with the start-up
because the Tier 1 supplier can more easily plan on integrating the technology into
its existing systems from an early stage.
Chapter 4. Phase 1: Case Studies from Silicon Valley 68
4.3.4 Actor Characteristics
Having support from Company C executives is “very conducive” (C-4) to the rela-
tionship and the knowledge transfer between the subsidiary and headquarters. In the
interest of improving transparency and trust between the two sides, the Company
C CEO visited the Silicon Valley subsidiary in July 2018:
It is very rare for the CEO to visit an R&D location. We were very
proud and the people here [at the subsidiary] were excited. It motivated
them. He listened to our issues and will bring this experience back to the
mothership. Hopefully he will be supporting us in future as well. (C-4)
Other higher-level managers at headquarters’ series development department visit
the Silicon Valley subsidiary more often, about “once a quarter” (C-5), and some-
times “every month” (C-5), when a project requires it.
4.3.5 Actor Relationship
Subsidiary C has, as of 2019, “not yet delivered any outcomes” (C-4) that have ended
up on the market, resulting in headquarters not having “much trust in us [the sub-
sidiary]” (C-4). This issue, paired with the notion that “naturally, the mothership
wants to do everything” (C-3), has resulted in a strong NIH syndrome of headquar-
ters towards the subsidiary.
Other fundamental cultural di↵erences are adversely a↵ecting the relationship, and
thus the knowledge transfer, between subsidiary and headquarters. For instance,
there is a “di↵erence of speeds. [...] On [headquarters’] side, you have to go through
bureaucratic processes, so [headquarters] are much slower compared to the Silicon
Valley team” (C-5). On the other hand, “the Silicon Valley team is similar to a
start-up. They can implement their products the next day” (C-5). This di↵erence of
speeds results in frustrations on the subsidiary side, as headquarters lags behind in
implementing ideas o↵ered by the subsidiary. Frustrations on the headquarters side
result from a di↵erent cultural issue:
The Silicon Valley culture is that the people are getting in and out of
jobs quickly. So there are some projects that, while in the transfer phase,
we [at headquarters] might have some questions for the people in Silicon
Valley, but the key contact person is already gone, so we just have to
stop that project. (C-5)
The demonstrated obstacles to a functioning relationship between the two sides
result in a “gap of mindset” (C-5), as well as a “gap of goals” (C-5). As discussed,
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as of March 2018 the new head of the subsidiary has introduced the position of
an Innovation and Operations Director (IOD) to facilitate the relationship between
headquarters and the subsidiary. However, the e↵ects had not yet been felt by early
2019, when follow-up interviews were conducted.
4.3.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
Subsidiary C highlights the benefit to knowledge transfer of demonstrating tangible
value by developing a working prototype with “tonnes of wires around it” (C-1)
rather than preparing a slide presentation. Furthermore, a key issue relating to
transfer content and mechanism highlighted by interviewees involves timing of said
transfer. Indeed, “the problem is the lead-time because you need to feed into this
[development] cycle. You can finish a POC, but the cycle is already in the middle,
so they [headquarters] are not able to take it into the cycle” (C-1). While projects
relating to software, sales, or after-sales are easier to accommodate at various points
in the development cycle (C-1, C-2, C-5), when projects from the subsidiary “feed
into the roadmap, [...] you really need to ensure a two-way street. They [headquar-
ters] need to tell you [the subsidiary] what they are working on and you say what
you can feed in, and when” (C-1).
Company C implements various formal and informal mechanisms to facilitate the
transfer process, such as regular visits between headquarters and subsidiary employ-
ees. While “there is not one recipe” (C-1) for managing the knowledge transfer, a
key ingredient is discussed by an interviewee:
It is really constant, constant communication and that is what I keep
telling to the team. You need to communicate. You cannot just show
up once every half a year infront of a business unit [at headquarters]
and say: ‘Hey, we have this great project.’ You really need to talk to
them week, by week, by week, so you have these good relations and an
understanding of what is happening on both sides. Because we do not
have any control over the [development] cycle. (C-1)
4.3.7 Further Considerations
To gain support from headquarters top management, the Silicon Valley subsidiary
demonstrates projects and their value to executives. However, according to inter-
viewees at Company C headquarters’ series development department, the subsidiary
“often demonstrates one aspect of the [project] scenario and not the entire scenario”
(C-5). This means that “the executives understand only what has been done, but
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they do not see that almost everything has not yet been done” (C-5), resulting in
top management having unrealistic expectations about the ability of headquarters
series development to integrate the project into a vehicle. The executives are left
believing that “everything can be done” (C-5), when in reality “it’s not that easy
and not true” (C-5).
This gap between what the subsidiary promises Company C executives and to what
extent these projects can actually be implemented by headquarters series devel-
opment results in friction between series development and the subsidiary. “Both
teams have to show their presence” (C-5) which is di cult when the subsidiary has
“an interesting idea and they gather good feedback from executives, but actually it
is not easy to do, or not possible, not realistic” (C-5), making it look as though
the project’s failure is caused by the series development department’s inability to
integrate it.
The above issue can result in unrealistic expectations of Company C executives
about the role of the subsidiary. While the subsidiary is “upstream” (C-5), focussing
on early-stage research, executives are given false impressions about the maturity of
the projects being conducted. Thus, top management sees the subsidiary as being
more closely related to headquarters series development, when in reality the sub-
sidiary “often only tests their ideas on a simulator, not on an actual vehicle, and
not in an actual environment, so [...] they don’t understand the real problems we
[headquarters] encounter in the real world, with real people” (C-5).
A further misunderstanding between the subsidiary and headquarters results from
a key performance indicator (KPI) used by the subsidiary: a failure KPI for “how
many ideas we have to kill” (C-1). This concept aligns with the entrepreneurial
culture of Silicon Valley: failure is acceptable and encouraged, as long as lessons are
learned. However, this failure KPI is “super hard for headquarters to understand.
Like: ‘What? Failure KPI?’ But it’s very important to us [at the subsidiary]” (C-1).
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4.4 Case D
4.4.1 Subsidiary D Background
Subsidiary D was first established in 1998, making it one of the first automotive
corporate innovation subsidiaries in Silicon Valley. The subsidiary started out as a
listening post with just three employees, in charge of being the “ears on the ground
and eyes on the ground” (D-2), reporting technology trends to Company D head-
quarters. In particular, at the time the company was interested in learning more
about silicon chips and the internet, and how these technologies might be relevant
for the automotive industry. In order to expand the scope of their activities in Sil-
icon Valley, the subsidiary grew to around 50 employees by 2005, with the added
task of developing prototypes, rather than just focussing on trend scouting.
Since then, the subsidiary has grown to almost 200 employees, making it the com-
pany’s biggest research facility outside its home country (Germany). The subsidiary
is made up of a large variety of engineers, designers, scientists, psychologists and
more, and is now carrying out research, pre-development, series development, and,
in the case of digital and software projects, even full production. In particular, the
subsidiary focusses on collaborating with local partners, particularly start-ups and
universities.
4.4.2 Internal Embeddedness
In the last five years, Subsidiary D has consciously been trying to reduce its number
of expats because, while on the one hand, “expats are the network to the mothership
and that should not be underestimated” (D-8), they are also “extremely expensive
because they have very good contracts” (D-8). Furthermore, “if you have 20% expats
you also have 20% knowledge loss after a while. This is tough because you have a
high mobility of the workforce in Silicon Valley anyways, so you have a lot of knowl-
edge loss anyways, as people rotate” (D-8). Having too many expats exacerbates
the knowledge loss. Thus, the subsidiary has reduced its percentage of expats from
100% when founded in 1998, to 25% in 2005, and to just 5% in 2019 (D-8).
Company D is made up of multiple brands, as is common across many automo-
tive OEMs. The subsidiary caters to multiple of the company’s brands, but often
conducts projects for specific brands separately, without sharing results across the
whole organisation. In 2013, one of these brands established a unique organisational
feature at its headquarters to aid the collaboration with the subsidiary: an Inno-
vation Circle, consisting of representatives from di↵erent departments across the
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organisation who can help assess a project from the subsidiary and decide whom at
headquarters to transfer it to (D-5). Among others, the Innovation Circle includes
representatives from product management, marketing, the subsidiary itself, purchas-
ing, and heads of various series development business units, who may become the
future owner of a project.
Before establishing this Innovation Circle, transferring projects from the subsidiary
was “random, unstructured, and based on networks” (D-5). Now, while some projects
are still transferred using subsidiary employees’ personal network at headquarters,
the Innovation Circle presents a structured way of “catching” (D-5) projects from the
subsidiary and making it easier for the subsidiary to “penetrate the organisational
boundary” (D-5). Other brands at Company D still follow the “entirely network-
based” (D-5) approach to knowledge transfer, which can result in the subsidiary not
feeling like a core part of the organisation if they lack a personal network in a specific
topic area.
To fund its projects, Subsidiary D employs a dual-budget system:
We have one component, which is roughly 40%, that is our base funding.
That is the base amount that we get every single year, that we can use
for research projects that we are proposing. And then roughly 60% of our
funding is what we call ‘bilateral project funding’, where [headquarters]
specifically request us to work on a specific topic on their behalf and they
have to pay for that. That does not come out of our yearly base funding,
that is straight-forward project funding. (D-2)
According to the head of the subsidiary, finding funding from a business unit at
headquarters is a deliberate strategy for knowledge transfer (D-3). While speed is
the most important factor in the early stage of a project (thereby warranting the
use of the autonomous base budget), finding “co-investors” (D-3) from a headquar-
ters business unit becomes vital as the project matures, as this secures an internal
customer and eventual recipient of that project. Having a dual-budget system is a
“systematic way of improving the success chances of a transfer” (D-3).
4.4.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
A key aim of Subsidiary D is to hire locally (D-1, D-8). The motivation behind this
is the talent from a range of industries available in Silicon Valley:
Almost 80% of the people that work for us [the subsidiary] are not from
the car industry. They are coming from other places and other indus-
tries. Being able to use their expertise and their outside perspective and
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translating it into our industry really creates a lot of respect for the team
that we have created here. And with that we get a lot of open ears [from
headquarters]. (D-2)
As can be discerned, hiring local talent not only improves the subsidiary’s embed-
dedness into its local environment, but also fosters its credibility and standing within
headquarters.
Furthermore, the subsidiary’s purpose is to gain “access to the ecosystem” (D-1),
where ecosystem refers to the “start-ups, [...] the mindset, [...] the meet-up events”
(D-1). Engaging with the ecosystem is vital, given that “if you only go to Silicon
Valley once or twice a year, you won’t take the spirit back” (D-1), the spirit being less
“fail-safe” (D-1) than the traditional automotive culture. Instead, the subsidiary
aims to embrace the idea that “when you fail, it is nothing bad as long as you learn
from it” (D-1).
Being embedded in its external environment enables the subsidiary to collaborate
with, and source knowledge from, local companies which is highly desirable, given
that “it is actually more beneficial to work with an outside firm than trying to re-
invent the wheel inside the company itself” (D-2). A key way of looking outside is to
work with start-ups in Silicon Valley because this enables “faster and cheaper inno-
vation” (D-6). However, as Company D headquarters is “not that good at working
with start-ups yet” (D-6), the subsidiary tries to ease the process by first consider-
ing which Tier 1 supplier will eventually integrate the start-up’s technology into a
scalable system and further facilitating the relationship between the start-up and
that Tier 1 supplier (D-5).
4.4.4 Actor Characteristics
The subsidiary requires employees with varying characteristics. On the one hand,
employees with a technical background are necessary for “developing productive an-
alytical solutions” (D-1). However, these people are not usually “in direct contact
with the business” (D-1) because they often lack the skills to be “communicative,
open, and willing to explain technical stu↵ in detail to someone who is new to it”
(D-1). For this purpose, the subsidiary also employs project managers, who “have
skills in negotiating and talking to [headquarters]” (D-1), thereby closing “the gap
between both sides” (D-1).
On the headquarters side, it is particularly important that the top levels of manage-
ment support the subsidiary, because, according to an interviewee at the subsidiary,
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“if anybody ever tells you that you can get buy-in [from headquarters business units]
without the C-level [CEO, CTO, etc.], I have not seen that in my 11 years in Silicon
Valley” (D-2). Without buy-in from the headquarters business units, knowledge
transfer is impeded, as projects from the subsidiary do not have a committed re-
cipient. To improve the C-level’s awareness of, and support for, the subsidiary,
executives conduct visits during which “[the subsidiary] has [the executives] fully
captive” (D-2), and the subsidiary can thus pitch projects without the headquar-
ters’ representatives being distracted by “their day-to-day work” (D-2).
4.4.5 Actor Relationship
A key issue a↵ecting the transfer of knowledge from Subsidiary D to headquarters
is the “human factor” (D-3), in particular the NIH syndrome. In the words of the
head of Subsidiary D:
Nobody will look you in the eye and say: ‘I am not taking over this project
because it was not invented by me.’ Instead, they will find a lot of other
reasons for why the project cannot be taken over. Until you actually find
out that the real reason is NIH, this takes a long time. [...] The pride
of developers at headquarters is too strong. This is a problem that is
impossible to eliminate because, at the end of the day, you are working
with people. (D-3)
When projects from the subsidiary are not taken on by headquarters business units,
this prevents the subsidiary from demonstrating its credibility. In turn, “business
units won’t directly finance a project without knowing the credibility of the [sub-
sidiary]” (D-8). Thus, the NIH syndrome is not only preventing projects from the
subsidiary from being transferred to headquarters, but is preventing the financing
of new potential projects. Instead, headquarters still maintains the mindset that:
“It is good to have the [subsidiary] and I like them and I get inspired by them, but
regardless, the decisions are made at headquarters. [...] Why should those guys in
Silicon Valley tell me what to do?” (D-1).
The relationship between the subsidiary and headquarters appears to be charac-
terised by envy, competition, threat, and resentment. The IT department of the
subsidiary was founded as an alternative IT to that at headquarters. As discussed
by an interviewee in this department:
It was an initiative from our CIO. He said we need a sort of ‘second
IT’, but there is no way to really give it a good name. You can’t really
say the ‘slow’ IT [at headquarters] and the ‘fast’ IT [at the subsidiary],
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[...] because the others [at headquarters] get o↵ended. So instead, we
just have two ITs. (D-1)
Furthermore, the following interview excerpt points to the envy felt by headquarters
towards the subsidiary employees:
You can imagine, coming from a small town [at headquarters], how people
think when your colleague leaves to San Francisco and is doing cool stu↵.
What would you think? ‘Ah this guy, such a nice life. He is doing cool
[stu↵ ]. So much freedom.’ And then six months later, you call him and
say: ‘Hey, I have a perfect idea, and actually, your boss liked it, so now
please take it back and do it.’ How do you give the feeling to the people
at home who are doing a great job every day, and it is just not as sexy
as our job, how do you give them the feeling that they are not the team
from the bench when it comes to IT innovation? (D-1)
The relationship, and the knowledge transfer, between subsidiary and headquar-
ters is further strained by the inherent cultural di↵erences between the two parties.
Headquarters has “lots of requirements when it comes to security” (D-1), leaving
“lower space for exploring new things” (D-1). Given the nature of their jobs, head-
quarters’ employees follow the mindset of “don’t make a mistake. Make sure this
car is running, because, ultimately, we don’t want to have our customers get hurt”
(D-1). While this is vital for the safety and success of the vehicles produced, the
subsidiary follows the mindset that they “just want to show that it works” (D-1).
As a result, it is headquarters’ job “to get on [the subsidiary’s] nerves” (D-1).
At many companies discussed in this study, expats serve as a bridge between head-
quarters and subsidiary and can help mitigate relationship issues. However, as
mentioned, Subsidiary D is focussing on reducing the proportion of expats, given
their expensive contracts and the knowledge loss occurring when they rotate back
to headquarters (D-2, D-8). In the context of knowledge transfer specifically, expats
are considered “a soft factor” (D-3). They “can be helpful, but they do not guarantee
a successful transfer” (D-3). Given this uncertainty, it is considered too risky to rely
on expats for knowledge transfer, resulting in the subsidiary having organised its
knowledge transfer “independently of expats” (D-3).
Given the reluctance of relying on people to fix people issues, it was suggested that
“having structured processes in place, and understanding how decisions at headquar-
ters are made, can help mitigate the human challenges of transfer” (D-3). However,
structured processes further complicate the bureaucracy and resulting lack of speed
in decision-making at headquarters.
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4.4.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
At Subsidiary D, early stage POCs are usually conducted using the autonomous
base budget and are then presented to a business unit at headquarters to pitch for
further funding. Firstly, conducting the POCs with their base budget “saves time in
the early steps of a project” (D-5). Secondly, having something tangible to present
to headquarters allows the subsidiary to demonstrate the value of their projects
better and thereby avoid “Death by PowerPoint” (D-2), a problem that can occur
when ideas are presented using a slide presentation rather than a POC because “you
cannot bring back technology with a slide deck” (D-1). The predilection for devel-
oping POCs has gone so far that “there is this goal, that no one does PowerPoint
at [the subsidiary]” (D-1). While this idea “doesn’t work out” (D-1) in practice, it
demonstrates the importance of presenting tangible value to headquarters’ business
units for successful knowledge transfer.
A further consideration during knowledge transfer involves how the project “fits
into the typical timeline of new vehicle development” (D-2). Getting the timing of
transfer to match with a gap in the development cycle involves tight collaboration
and communication, i.e., a two-way street, between the subsidiary and headquarters:
Sometimes it is us [the subsidiary] asking: ‘Hey, we are ready to hand
over because we have done our part and now you need to take it for the
rest of the way.’ Or sometimes they [headquarters] say: ‘Hey, we are
ready now to include it in our production process.’ (D-2)
Mechanisms in place to facilitate this collaboration and communication between the
subsidiary and headquarters include “travelling to [headquarters] frequently to work
with teams on the ground” (D-2), having representatives from headquarters visit
the subsidiary (D-2), daily calls with headquarters (D-1), and a “trade show” (D-2)
within headquarters, where all the company’s R&D teams show o↵ their projects
to the C-level suite (D-2). However, while these trade shows provide an excellent
opportunity to raise awareness about the subsidiary’s work, an interviewee raised
the following concern about them: “Series development managers are then meant
to choose projects at the trade show that they want to take on, but this doesn’t
realistically happen” (D-7). This reluctance can be ascribed to a lack of interest in
new, external ideas by the headquarters business units (D-7).
4.4.7 Further Considerations
Being part of headquarters’ R&D department, this subsidiary splits its projects into
two main categories: those considered research (i.e., earlier stage, later time horizon)
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and those considered development (i.e., higher maturity, closer time horizon) (D-2,
D-8). The subsidiary currently has a 50/50 split between research and development
projects. The fairly high proportion of development projects “goes against the orig-
inal purpose of the [subsidiary]” (D-8); its original purpose being more exploratory
and early-stage.
The development projects tend to be “direct requests from headquarters” (D-2). In-
deed, “ideally, the results from the [subsidiary] will be transferred into series devel-
opment” (D-6) at headquarters because this improves the chances of the subsidiary’s
results eventually ending up in a vehicle. However, to be able to transfer projects
directly to series development business units at headquarters, the subsidiary needs
to ensure that their projects are developed to a certain level of maturity, thus ex-
plaining the subsidiary’s shift to incorporating more and more development projects
over time. This shift is further justified by the following interview excerpt: “If it
takes too long for an idea to be implemented into a vehicle, it hurts your reputation
and it demoralises your workforce. They want to see their stu↵ in the vehicle” (D-2).
An interviewee at Company D headquarters supports the subsidiary shifting closer
to series development, away from early-stage research:
The subsidiary used to work without clear tasks and goals and without
clear OKRs [Objective Key Results]. When they were new and cool they
could do this. Now there needs to be more structure [...] because there
needs to be more responsibility for doing series development work at the
[subsidiary], so that integration into headquarters is easier. (D-7)
Thus, despite it being “too expensive to do mainly development in Silicon Valley”
(D-8), this subsidiary, like many of the others discussed in this study, has been
moving in the direction of series development, rather than sticking with its original
exploratory purpose.
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4.5 Case E
4.5.1 Subsidiary E Background
Subsidiary E was established in Silicon Valley in 2007 with two employees, to improve
the company’s proximity to experts in the field of consumer electronics, thereby fa-
cilitating the integration of consumer electronics into Company E vehicles. While
Company E has its headquarters in the USA, the company nonetheless sought to
establish a technology scouting o ce in Silicon Valley, given the region’s growth
in expertise not just for consumer electronics, but mobility generally. The scope
of the subsidiary has since been to enable the company as a whole to learn how
to work with early-stage start-ups, to find technologies that may be interesting to
the company in future, and to scout potential talent for the company to hire. The
subsidiary serves as the “eyes and ears on the ground in Silicon Valley” (E-2).
Since 2007, the subsidiary has never employed more than seven people at one time.
While size and purpose of the subsidiary have not changed much, its methods for
scouting for relevant start-up companies has developed. As of late 2016, Subsidiary
E has been partnering with a Silicon Valley start-up accelerator, i.e., an organisation
that o↵ers fixed-term programmes in which it provides a range of seed investments,
mentoring, and commercial connections for start-ups (E-1). Company E is part-
nering with this accelerator in order to find interesting start-ups to work with and
mentor. The accelerator has introduced a separate mobility track for start-ups to
apply to, with Subsidiary E being involved in the selection process for this track.
4.5.2 Internal Embeddedness
As with other cases in this study, this subsidiary’s embeddedness into the organisa-
tion is key for knowledge transfer:
You have to make sure that the people out here [at the subsidiary] under-
stand how the mothership operates. It doesn’t do you any good to have
a bunch of people out here coming up with great ideas, who then can’t
communicate back to the mothership. So it is really important for all my
people to not only be well-networked in Silicon Valley, but also to have
good connections back to other groups at [headquarters]. (E-3)
While other subsidiaries manage this internal network through expats from various
headquarters departments that continuously rotate through the subsidiary, this is
not possible at Subsidiary E, given that it currently only has three employees, none
of whom are expats on rotation (E-3). As “good internal connections [...] take
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forever to build up” (E-3), the employees at this subsidiary spend a lot of time
engaging with various departments at headquarters by making phone calls, visiting
in-person, and writing a weekly newsletter (E-4).
4.5.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
The allure of Silicon Valley, and the resulting reason for Company E choosing this
location for an innovation subsidiary, are described by an interviewee:
It’s not just that Silicon Valley has start-ups. The reason there are start-
ups is because there is a strong venture capital community, a strong com-
munity of corporations that have people who either want to do start-ups
or who want to pull start-ups in, and a strong university community
where you have a lot of innovative people. (E-3)
Company E wanted to be close to this agglomeration of innovative actors, to “not
just react to trends, but to drive them” (E-3). Being located in Silicon Valley thus
allows the subsidiary to source knowledge from local actors more easily than if it
attempted to access the ecosystem from the outside.
As mentioned, one strategy for engaging with its external environment has been
to form a partnership with a Silicon Valley accelerator, the reason being that the
subsidiary’s three employees are spread thinly in their scouting e↵orts across Silicon
Valley. The accelerator provides a concentrated selection of mobility-relevant start-
ups for Company E to potentially work with:
We [the subsidiary] figured out that we wanted to get into working with
earlier stage companies. We realised that this was a gap. We would fre-
quently find early-stage companies and have people [at headquarters] say
that: ‘The technology sounds exciting, have them come back to me in
two years when they’re ‘automotive-ready’.’ And I think that’s the wrong
answer. So, it was like: ‘How do we work better with early-stage com-
panies, knowing that early-stage companies are very di↵erent than later
stage companies?’ We said: ‘Well, one of the things about early-stage
companies is that it’s a lottery, so we need to work with someone who
is familiar with early-stage, who knows how to pick potential winners.’
And so, we went around looking for di↵erent accelerator partners. (E-3)
While partnering with this accelerator is helping the subsidiary find more start-ups,
these start-ups are unlikely to become Tier 1 suppliers for Company E:
One of the reasons that we try to get past or get around some of these
process barriers [at headquarters] is because the processes are all set up
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for stu↵ that is going straight into production. It’s about sourcing a
million axles. And what we’re doing is, we’re talking to start-ups about:
‘Let’s try a new thing.’ We don’t know if this is ever going to go into
production. But we need a way to work together quickly, right now, [...]
and understand that this might go nowhere. (E-3)
Instead of directly sourcing “a million axles” (E-3) from the start-ups it works with,
Subsidiary E determines how best to proceed with a start-up on a case-by-case
basis (E-4). If the technology requires further R&D help, the subsidiary connects
the start-up to a relevant contact at headquarters’ research team, as the subsidiary
itself does not have the facilities or the capabilities to take this step itself (E-4). If
the start-up requires further funding, Company E has a corporate venture capital
(CVC) unit at headquarters, which the subsidiary can connect the start-up to (E-
4). If the start-up has a fairly mature technology, the subsidiary will introduce the
start-up to an existing Tier 1 supplier who can then provide more details on specific
automotive requirements and potentially help integrate the start-up’s technology
into a wider system (E-4). Introducing the start-up to an existing Tier 1 supplier
helps Company E “get to market faster than just working with a start-up” (E-4)
because the whole supply chain can be considered, and the start-up’s technology
can be integrated into a larger system, from an early stage.
4.5.4 Actor Characteristics
Subsidiary E has experienced a similar reaction by headquarters’ employees to vis-
iting Silicon Valley and seeing the subsidiary first-hand as other cases discussed in
this chapter: “We had a workshop where we brought people out here to understand
Silicon Valley. [...] People have come out here now, and been exposed to what we
have been talking about for years and are like: ‘Wow!’ It’s a very di↵erent expe-
rience” (E-3). Having headquarters understand Silicon Valley and the subsidiary’s
work first-hand is key for gaining “really strong buy-in from the mothership” (E-3).
This buy-in, in turn, heavily a↵ects the success of knowledge transfer from the sub-
sidiary to headquarters because one needs “people back home who are like: ‘Yes,
this is important, we are going to have somebody whose job it is to pay attention
to make sure [the subsidiary] produces something useful.’” (E-3). If there are no
champions for the subsidiary at home, headquarters might “just send people out [to
Silicon Valley] and say: ‘Let us know if you find something’, but aren’t really saying:
‘We’re here to catch.’” (E-3).
In addition to buy-in and support from headquarters, a key actor characteristic af-
fecting the knowledge transfer is headquarters’ bureaucracy—a prominent obstacle
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when the subsidiary is trying to mediate a potential collaboration with a start-up:
“As a large company, we have some large, heavy-weight processes, which doesn’t al-
ways work well for a small company that we’re trying not to kill” (E-3).
Indeed, these heavy-weight processes result in slow decision-making which carries
with it the added challenge of “keeping people engaged over the length of time that
it takes to get something to happen” (E-3). While headquarters is working through
the decision-making process of whether and how to engage with a start-up, the
start-up needs to have “something else to do, like another customer who is actually
paying them, so that they are not just waiting for us. Because otherwise they go
out of business” (E-3). Similarly, if the start-up is not yet “automotive-ready [...],
headquarters has to be kept engaged” (E-3) until the start-up is “prime-time” (E-3).
4.5.5 Actor Relationship
At Company E the NIH syndrome constitutes a challenge to knowledge transfer:
When you’re a researcher you have to keep your head down and do your
work. [...] But I think that the longer you have been in business, it is
just more and more obvious that not all of the good ideas come internally
from your own company. And you have got to have a good way of working
with outside people, keeping track of what ideas are out there and helping
them grow. (E-3)
Being an automotive OEM, this is particularly di cult because “we’re not used to
doing this” (E-3).
To improve the relationship with headquarters and thus help counteract the NIH
syndrome, the subsidiary assigns mentors from Company E headquarters to start-
ups that it wants to collaborate with (E-2, E-3). Mentors from headquarters are
often “technical experts” (E-3), but can also take on a more general role of helping
the start-up navigate the complexities of a large automotive company. This is not
only beneficial for the start-up, but also helps Company E “to understand about
outside innovation, understand about establishing those kinds of relationships, being
helpful, working with outside companies” (E-3), and generally how to work with
early-stage start-ups.
While working with start-ups presents a valuable opportunity for Subsidiary E, it
also poses a challenge given the “di↵erences in culture” (E-3, E-4) between start-ups
and an automotive OEM. Part of the subsidiary’s role is to balance these cultures
and to manage the expectations of both headquarters and the start-up. An example
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of the type of culture clash the subsidiary needs to deal with is described by the
following interview excerpt:
We [the subsidiary] have got start-up companies that would like to work
with our [...] data. But we’ve got to get approval, which is fine, and I
totally agree with that, but we tell them [at headquarters]: ‘Look, the kind
of approvals that you put in... These guys [at the start-up] just want a
small, anonymised data set to do some testing. It’s di↵erent from asking
for a full data set of real-time data.’ And the approval process should
reflect that. If we want to learn what we can do with our data and we
think that outside people are going to come up with clever ideas, maybe
we should come up with a lighter-weight process, so more people can do
it. (E-3)
This example shows what start-ups and automotive OEMs can potentially gain from
each other. Where an OEM has a wealth of experience and data, it does not nec-
essarily know what new opportunities lie hidden in the data. Yet, Company E is
hesitant to allow external companies to use its data, “mainly because as an auto-
motive company, we have never had data to share. Mostly it’s been physical assets”
(E-3). Thus, part of the subsidiary’s purpose is to provide the bridge between head-
quarters’ resources and start-ups’ innovative capabilities to use those resources, i.e.,
balancing the start-up and corporate culture.
Not only is there a culture clash between headquarters and start-ups, but between
the subsidiary and headquarters, as the subsidiary functions more like a start-up
than the multinational company it is a part of. The following interview excerpt ex-
emplifies this fundamental culture clash which can inhibit headquarters from taking
ideas from the subsidiary seriously:
You talk to people who come from [headquarters] and one of the guys [at
the subsidiary] likes to ask them: ‘Have you ever used Uber or Lyft4?’
A lot of the older guys say: ‘No.’ Their issues are di↵erent. [...] Their
response is like: ‘What are you talking about? Sharing a ride? Calling
some random person to take me? Why would I want to do that?’ And
then I’m like: ‘You guys live places where there is good parking all the
time and it is not hard to get around. You all have cars. You don’t
understand what it is like. People want this service.’ (E-3)
4Uber and Lyft are two widely-used ride-sharing service companies.
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4.5.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
The subsidiary’s “biggest pet peeve” (E-3) is that transfer of projects can only be
successful if the lead times of the vehicle development process are carefully observed.
If the subsidiary has a project that they want to transfer, the subsidiary needs to
go through the following process:
We need to be thinking right now about what programme we want to put
[the project] into because we have to have X number of months lead time
to get something into a programme. And if we know they [headquarters]
are going to take, let’s say, 18 months to get their product out, then what
[programme] could we put [our project] into that is 18 months away from
happening? (E-3)
Roadmapping at Company E is “first in, first out” (E-3), resulting in current tech-
nologies being added to the bottom of the priority list at headquarters. This is a
problem because, for example, “if you have a USB port on your computer, you don’t
want to have to wait five years for it to show up on your car” (E-3). Planning ahead
to make sure that technologies are integrated into the vehicle not too long after they
reach other markets is thus an important factor impacting the transfer of projects
from the subsidiary to headquarters.
As with other cases in this study, the key mechanism for facilitating knowledge
transfer is communication. Subsidiary E sends a weekly newsletter to its network
at headquarters, updating the network about new start-ups that have been scouted
(E-4). Additionally, the subsidiary conducts frequent, regular phone conversations
and in-person visits with headquarters to maintain the relationship (E-2, E-3, E-4).
4.5.7 Further Considerations
Company E headquarters employs a “talent circulation” (E-4) programme, in which
employees at the management level of the research department are rotated to the
series development team for a few months and vice versa. This aims to teach funda-
mental researchers more about “user experience, the mindset of engineering, doing
research with a market focus in mind” (E-4). Conversely, it aims to teach series
development engineers more about “fundamental science and how to work with a
longer time horizon in mind” (E-4).
This talent circulation is beneficial for Subsidiary E. As projects are usually trans-
ferred from the subsidiary to the research team which eventually transfers them to
series development, it helps for all teams along the chain to understand the others’
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priorities and aims. Without the understanding of the long-term view of research
and the security and reliability requirements of series development, securing “buy-in
from the mothership” (E-3) is di cult. For one, the employees in series development,
who will eventually take over the project, may not understand that early-stage re-
search projects do not yet have all problems figured out and may only be a POC.
Similarly, employees in the research team may lack an appreciation of the pressure
on series development to develop secure, reliable technologies that can feasibly be
mass-produced. Thus, each party understanding the others increases the chances
for successful knowledge transfer from the subsidiary to headquarters’ research de-
partment, and from research to series development.
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4.6 Case F
4.6.1 Subsidiary F Background
Company F, headquartered in Japan, has two subsidiaries in Silicon Valley. The
first (Subsidiary F1) was established in 2001 and currently has around 40 employees,
focussing specifically on research and technology in the field of connected vehicles.
In addition, with the advance of autonomous vehicles, Company F decided to set up
a further subsidiary in Silicon Valley in 2016 (Subsidiary F2), focussing specifically
on artificial intelligence for the purposes of autonomous mobility. Subsidiary F2
is set up as a separate legal entity and has three branches across the USA: Silicon
Valley, close to Stanford University; Ann Arbor, close to the University of Michigan;
and Cambridge, close to the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT). These
three universities are world-class in terms of their research on artificial intelligence,
which is why the company wanted to be physically close to said locations (F-4).
After investing equity in three start-ups with their initial autonomous budget, Sub-
sidiary F2 decided to establish a dedicated CVC company (also a separate legal
entity with its own budget) in Silicon Valley in 2017. Subsidiary F2 has grown
quickly, from just 45 employees in 2016, to about 250 employees across all three
locations in 2019 (the CVC company employs five people) (F-4, F-6). The following
sections discuss both Subsidiaries F1 and F2, including references to the CVC unit
where relevant.
4.6.2 Internal Embeddedness
Until about five years ago, Subsidiary F1 transferred knowledge to headquarters by
writing reports. However, “not much reaction happened with that” (F-1). Instead,
the subsidiary now has a small number of expats from headquarters (about 10% of
the subsidiary employees), who come to the subsidiary to work on specific projects
for one to three years and then rotate back to headquarters (F-1). These expats “are
kind of our idea of transferring ideas directly to headquarters” (F-1) as “exchanging
people is more e cient” than writing reports (F-1). Subsidiary F2 similarly has
expats from headquarters (about 20% of the subsidiary employees), who spend two
years in Silicon Valley, “working with us, side-by-side on projects” (F-4). Subse-
quently, “the way that the project is transitioned to [headquarters] is to travel with
the people that worked on it” (F-4). Expats thus present a valuable means of sharing
knowledge by providing a link between both of the Silicon Valley subsidiaries and
Company F headquarters.
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Despite expats providing a bridge to headquarters, Subsidiary F2 “realised that
we need to be more autonomous compared to the way most of [other innovation
subsidiaries] go” (F-4), in order to enable faster decision-making and to avoid being
stifled by headquarters’ bureaucracy. Subsidiary F2 is thus set up as a separate legal
entity. The CVC unit is “considered a subsidiary of [Subsidiary F2]” (F-6), but is
also a separate legal entity of its own because:
We [the CVC unit] wanted to make sure that we were able to be both
really nimble and agile and that we could provide start-ups with a bit of
certainty so that they wouldn’t be subject to the whims of [Company F
headquarters], which can change from time to time. (F-6)
The autonomous governance system should allow the subsidiary to achieve the free-
dom of fast decision-making, thus enabling it to work with, and source knowledge
from, start-ups more e↵ectively.
Subsidiary F1 has to apply for funding on a project-by-project basis, via a “job
request mechanism” (F-1). Having to follow multiple steps of applying for budget
from various headquarters administrative departments slows the subsidiary down
considerably and results in frustrations (F-8): “We [the subsidiary] are watching
what they [start-ups in Silicon Valley] are doing, but we cannot decide anything. We
can provide small funding for a very small project, but it is very small. Nobody can
be satisfied with that kind of project” (F-7).
On the other hand, Subsidiary F2 and the CVC unit have “more independence”
(F-7) and a completely autonomous budget. This enables them “to be quick” (F-6)
and “to get stu↵ done” (F-4). This is important for the following reason: “We want
to be quick because we don’t want to waste our opportunities, but also because we
understand that start-ups often have a limited amount of runway which they need to
survive, or they die” (F-6).
4.6.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
While Subsidiary F1 and F2 have expats from headquarters, the hiring at both sub-
sidiaries is “mostly local” (F-1), thus embedding the subsidiaries into their external
environment. Hiring locally is preferred because “it is not e cient to hire somebody
from [headquarters]” (F-1), given the added costs of an expat contract and reloca-
tion. Furthermore, employing local talent is not only an issue of e ciency, but also
targets skills and capabilities from the Silicon Valley job market: “It is about access
to talent. That is really the driving factor” (F-5).
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A further means of engaging with the external environment involves collaborat-
ing with local actors, such as start-ups. Besides Subsidiary F2 investing equity
in start-ups through the CVC unit, Company F does not have much experience
in collaborating with start-ups, because doing so is “unnatural for the automotive
industry” (F-7). This is described further in the following excerpt:
[Working with start-ups] is a big problem. Basically, the automotive
industry has a long history. It is already more than 80 years old and we
have been focussing just on manufacturing. All of our technologies were
coming from in-house. [...] This expertise made us very strong for this
period. But now this is a kind of game changer. We have to utilise start-
ups properly to speed up our development process and the development
period. But we are still searching for how to do that. (F-1)
4.6.4 Actor Characteristics
To gain top management support, Subsidiary F2 reports directly to a board of
directors including the president and top executives of Company F headquarters
(F-6). While assignments and budget still come from headquarters’ R&D depart-
ment, having a direct link to Company F executives helps Subsidiary F2 achieve a
higher standing. Furthermore, as of 2017, the head of Subsidiary F2 has taken on
a dual role as head of subsidiary, as well as “the number two person in the R&D
division in [headquarters]” (F-4), thus strengthening the subsidiary’s influence and
helping to “bridge the gap between there and here” (F-4).
Subsidiary F1 has a less authoritative position at Company F headquarters. Instead,
the subsidiary attempts to gain support from headquarters through having repre-
sentatives visit Silicon Valley. However, these visits are not necessarily conducive
towards enhancing the knowledge transfer process because “there is this tendency
of a lot of these [innovation subsidiaries] to end up becoming sort of like tourist
destinations for executives” (F-4). This results in frustrations, as employees coming
from headquarters are “just visitors. They don’t make any decisions” (F-1). Indeed,
the subsidiary has to “work very hard for [the visitors] not to be tourists. [...] They
would come here, then we would go to Napa, you know, to see the wine country, and
that has nothing to do with any of this innovation in any of these places at all” (F-4).
A further characteristic a↵ecting the knowledge transfer from both subsidiaries is
the bureaucracy and resulting slow decision-making at headquarters. Naturally,
“it is really hard to steer the ship. It is really hard to change things. And the
tendency is to make really slow decisions because everyone is afraid of making the
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wrong decision” (F-4). This results in delays in implementing projects from the
subsidiaries. For instance, a computer vision project at Subsidiary F2 “was finished
a couple of years ago and [headquarters] is still testing it now” (F-1). Delays in
seeing projects implemented at headquarters (if implemented at all), result in the
subsidiary maintaining that “[headquarters] is not very highly motivated to think of
very new things. I think they could a↵ord to spend some money for just research”
(F-1). Frustrations about the knowledge transfer and headquarters’ priorities are
discernible.
4.6.5 Actor Relationship
Given that Company F headquarters is located on a di↵erent continent to the sub-
sidiaries in Silicon Valley, there are certain practical issues that impede the relation-
ship between the two sides:
It all goes back to the fact that the Pacific Ocean is wide. It is wide in
terms of the time zone shift, which is really tough. You can see I have
two clocks on my wall. And I know [headquarters] is waking up right
now, but it is Saturday there. So everything is wrong. There is no one
to talk to when I pick up the phone. So that is really tough. The language
barrier is an issue. The cultural barrier has traditionally been an issue,
but we are getting used to it. (F-4)
At Subsidiary F1, interviewees allude to frustrations from the subsidiary towards
headquarters, especially in the context of the subsidiary trying to collaborate with
start-ups. For instance, when Subsidiary F1 receives requests from start-ups for
a meeting to discuss a potential project, “we are happy to hear them and we are
interested in these new technologies, but the next step might be to just introduce them
to headquarters [because] we cannot decide. Even if we are really excited, we cannot
decide” (F-1). When the subsidiary does introduce the start-up to headquarters,
“even if headquarters people are happy, they have to get some supplier involved in
the discussion. So then we will be out of the discussion” (F-1). This process is slow
and excludes the subsidiary, which is in closer physical and cultural proximity to
the start-up, from the collaboration. As a result, the subsidiary has “never seen a
successful collaboration with a start-up” (F-7) since its foundation in 2001.
4.6.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
When transferring projects to headquarters, the subsidiaries need to consider the
di↵erences between hardware- and software-focussed projects (F-7). Given the de-
velopment cycle and roadmap for a new vehicle, timing for knowledge transfer is
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crucial: “A new vehicle needs five years to develop so it’s very slow, very conserva-
tive, and so it is hard to take the new technology hardware into the business” (F-1).
However, for software-focussed projects, “[headquarters] can immediately use the
new IT service and so the uptake is quicker” (F-1).
Furthermore, projects that are not aimed at reaching the market, but are instead tar-
geted at building internal capabilities, can more easily be transferred than projects
that will end up being bought by the end consumer (F-1, F-2). For instance: “Some-
times we make software that is used to help the engineers, not in the product. If the
[Company F] engineers like it, they can immediately start to use it” (F-1). Building
software tools for headquarters engineers, for instance related to “checking for bugs”
(F-1), does not require the same levels of safety standards as software that ends up
on the market (F-2, F-7).
To facilitate the transfer of knowledge, various mechanisms are employed by both
subsidiaries. For instance, frequent phone calls help to confirm the “direction and
progress” (F-8) of the subsidiary: “Every two weeks, I [at headquarters] have a
meeting for about one and a half hours in which I and [Subsidiary F1] researchers
discuss the progress of the business, the direction, the output image, the schedule,
and so on” (F-8). Furthermore, knowledge is transferred via reports (F-8), as well
as through expats on rotation at the subsidiaries (F-1, F-2). Finally, Subsidiary F2
has “a big demonstration that happens at the end of each year. That helps to explain
how well we are doing [to the rest of the organisation]” (F-4).
4.6.7 Further Considerations
At Subsidiary F1, “about 90% of all projects” (F-8) are pull projects which are
specifically demanded by a headquarters business unit in series development or pro-
duction, rather than push projects in which the subsidiary pitches an own idea to
headquarters. The level of maturity to which the subsidiary needs to take projects
depends on which department at headquarters assigns the project (F-8). If the pro-
duction department requests a project, Subsidiary F1 must complete the project
past the “advanced development” (F-8) stage and then hand over to production.
If headquarters’ series development department assigns a project, Subsidiary F1
prepares a POC to be handed over to series development (F-8). Conversely, an
interviewee at Subsidiary F1 maintains that the subsidiary conducts “very funda-
mental research” (F-1). Similarly, Subsidiary F2 “are doing fundamental research,
but their responsibility is that they need to build certain cars” (F-1). There thus ap-
pears to be a mismatch in expectation about what level of maturity the subsidiary
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conducts projects to, as the departments at headquarters requesting projects are
production and series development, while both subsidiaries see their core task as
being fundamental research. As a result, “a very limited number of transfers [from
subsidiary to headquarters] were successful. There is a huge gap” (F-1).
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4.7 Case G
4.7.1 Subsidiary G Background
Company G, headquartered in the USA, established a subsidiary in Silicon Valley
in 2012, with a small team of four people, focussing on technology scouting in
the area of big data. In 2015, Subsidiary G moved to new facilities, with a shift
in scope of activities from scouting to research and prototyping, and an increase
in size from four to 125 employees (G-2). The subsidiary has since grown to a
mixed team of 200 engineers, industrial designers, ethnographers, and marketing and
sales specialists. The team is focussed on a range of topics, including connectivity,
mobility, autonomous vehicles, customer experience, and big data, and carries out a
variety of activities in these areas, such as partnering with accelerator programmes
in Silicon Valley, and collaborating with universities and start-ups.
4.7.2 Internal Embeddedness
Subsidiary G employs a mix of both expats (20%), who stay at the subsidiary for
about three years before going back to headquarters, and local hires (80%) (G-
2). An important aspect of expats is that “they absorb some of the culture [from
Silicon Valley] and bring it [to headquarters]” (G-2). This helps di↵use the culture
of innovation and risk-taking that is so common across Silicon Valley throughout
Company G (G-4). Furthermore, expats carry the benefit of understanding both
Silicon Valley and the traditional automotive industry, and are therefore better able
to translate between the two, easing the process of knowledge transfer from the
subsidiary to headquarters:
There are a few of us [at the subsidiary] that have spent time in both
industries [automotive and software] that understand them, and we can
make those translations. Because honestly, a lot of the frustrations that I
have [...] are cultural di↵erences between Silicon Valley and a traditional
car company. It has nothing to do with language, nothing to do with
country culture, as much as industry culture. (G-2)
Expats thus present a valuable means of sharing knowledge by providing a link be-
tween Silicon Valley and the core of the organisation.
Not only do the subsidiaries in this study employ expats from headquarters on a
team level, but the heads of the subsidiaries are often themselves expats following
the three- to five-year rotation programme. Expat leadership is a key aspect of
the knowledge transfer process because it ensures that the subsidiary has a network
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within headquarters, making it easier to know whom to pitch ideas to. Subsidiary G
employs a unique, noteworthy leadership model: a co-leadership approach involving
one head of subsidiary from headquarters and one from Silicon Valley locally: “We
are trying to set up a bit more stability by having [the local head of the subsidiary]
always be there and then having a partner that rotates every three years that comes
in from [headquarters]” (G-2).
The co-leadership governance approach allows the subsidiary to reap the benefits
of two distinct leadership models: while the head from headquarters provides a
bridge into the rest of the organisation, the local head provides stability and an
understanding of the Silicon Valley cluster. The expat head thus enhances internal
embeddedness further than merely employing expats on a team level, while the local
head enhances external embeddedness further than the expat head could on his or
her own.
Subsidiary G employs a dual-budget system (G-3). Initial POCs are conducted
with the autonomous base budget, while more complicated prototypes are carried
out with the financial support of a person or unit at headquarters (G-3). The initial
POCs are usually presented to a business unit to pitch for further funding. Having
something tangible to present to headquarters allows the subsidiary to demonstrate
the value of their projects better, thereby increasing the chances that further funding
will be supplied.
4.7.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Subsidiary G was originally established in Silicon Valley because it is “impossible to
pull innovations from Silicon Valley from afar” (G-4). Instead, “it is about being in
the place, making connections, being close to the technology” (G-4). The company
wanted to “keep a finger on the pulse” (G-3) which is much more di cult to do
without being embedded in the region through a permanent presence.
As mentioned, 80% of Subsidiary G’s employees are local hires (G-2). The team
is interdisciplinary, made up of engineers, industrial designers, ethnographers, and
marketing and sales specialists. The purpose of hiring a “balanced portfolio” (G-2)
of both locals and expats from a range of backgrounds is the following:
If you have only people who are local, we are going to end up designing a
phone, because you have no concept of what is required for a car. If you
move everyone from [headquarters] here, they will end up doing the same
thing they were doing before, but at three times the cost. You need to have
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that mix, where most of the ideas are new, most of the ideas come from
areas that are not traditionally the expertise of [Company G], but you
also need to mould them into what it means for a car. So, when you do
software, for example, it is similar to doing software for a phone, but not
the same, and that di↵erence, that is important, because there are safety
requirements and regulatory issues there, which a software developer in
the Valley wouldn’t know about. That’s where that mix happens. (G-2)
To further embed itself in the local environment, Subsidiary G has become a com-
mercial partner of some of the local universities’ accelerator programmes which help
commercialise discoveries made by members of the university through setting up
start-ups. The accelerators focus on early stage start-ups and provide advisers and
commercial partners. Subsidiary G has become one of these commercial partners
in order to “make sure we [the subsidiary] are not missing any important trends of
any important companies that might come along” (G-2). Furthermore, the benefit of
partnering with an early-stage accelerator is demonstrated by the following excerpt:
This is where we can provide the biggest value. Because if we are plugged
in to all those start-ups, you get to see the trends and the signals very
early on. If you wait for a later stage, like even Series B or C5, by
then pretty much everyone knows about [the start-up]. So, either they
get snatched, or the valuations are too high, or you don’t have a chance
to mould them towards your interests. (G-2)
Despite its strong motivation to collaborate with start-ups, the subsidiary is aware
that start-ups will probably not end up being Tier 1 suppliers for Company G, as
“once you get to production, you need to rely on [the start-up] to actually provide
you with enough [parts]” (G-2). To ease the process of working with start-ups, the
subsidiary has thus started acting as a platform to connect start-ups to existing Tier
1 suppliers, creating a three-way collaboration model:
[At the point of production] it makes sense that, if we can’t rely on a
ten-person start-up, we will have to pair them up with a Tier 1 supplier.
But at least the Tier 1 supplier knows that [Company G] is interested.
So, they don’t take any risk. The start-up has a buyer, and we get the
supply from someone we trust. It’s a win-win-win. (G-2)
4.7.4 Actor Characteristics
“To have an environment that promotes innovation, you need leadership support” (G-
3). While a positive prerequisite for having top management support at Subsidiary
5“Series B or C” refers to later stage funding rounds for start-ups.
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G is that the subsidiary reports directly to Company G’s CTO (G-2), the subsidiary
nonetheless faces challenges in trying to transfer projects to headquarters business
units. For instance, when discussing a project proposed by the subsidiary, an in-
terviewee reported that “there was nobody in [headquarters] who saw that [project]
within their job scope and said: ‘This is something we should look into.’” (G-4).
Indeed, projects proposed by the subsidiary often lie outside the scope of headquar-
ters employees’ core responsibilities and thus do not easily find ownership within
headquarters, making it di cult to transfer knowledge across (G-4). As a result,
“we [the subsidiary] are never the priority of somebody’s day” (G-4).
4.7.5 Actor Relationship
Despite the research and series development departments at headquarters having
“the o cial responsibility to help the company innovate more [...], the NIH syn-
drome is still a resistance point” (G-3), preventing knowledge from the subsidiary
being successfully transferred to, and implemented by, headquarters. Indeed, when
the subsidiary tries to transfer projects, “this is where things can break down because
people [at headquarters] are too busy to consider alternatives to what they are cur-
rently doing” (G-3). Furthermore, transferring knowledge to headquarters is “almost
an art” (G-2) because it needs to occur at the optimal level of maturity:
If you bring [the project] too early, people [at headquarters] can shut it
down. The antibodies shut it down because it doesn’t look like something
they know. If you grow it too much, they don’t take ownership. Then
they complain that you just impose it on them. So you want to have
it somewhere in the middle level, where it is old enough and mature
enough to survive on its own, but not so mature that people back there
[at headquarters] cannot take ownership. (G-2)
To improve the chances of knowledge from the subsidiary being implemented at
headquarters, the subsidiary requires a champion for their project: “We [the sub-
sidiary] really need to find somebody in [headquarters] who will own this project and
so the project will only be as successful as that person. And that person can’t be
[the CEO] every time” (G-4). Instead, to find a champion, the subsidiary employees
require a broad network at headquarters:
There is no dedicated team or unit or person [at headquarters], whose
job it is to facilitate the transfer of projects. Instead, the team [in Sili-
con Valley] has to know the right people in [headquarters] to pitch ideas
to and make the connection with the person who is responsible for this
technology. This person in [headquarters] will end up owning the project
so it has to be the correct person. (G-3)
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In addition to the NIH syndrome, the relationship between the subsidiary and head-
quarters is further characterised by feelings of dismissal from headquarters towards
the subsidiary: “We [the subsidiary] are very easily dismissed. People in [Company
G] just think of us as this strange group in California doing their own thing. That
makes us very easily ignored” (G-4). As a result, “it is very di cult for us to have
an impact from afar” (G-4). Furthermore:
Everybody [at headquarters] sees you [at the subsidiary] as a bunch of
surfers in the California sun. [...] A lot of times you get seen as just
adding more work for them, because all these new ideas need to be in-
corporated. Obviously, the ideas are disruptive and they need to be built
in somehow, so you are adding work. And again, we are coming from a
di↵erent point of view, so you are forcing them to think di↵erently and
that is always uncomfortable. (G-2)
The somewhat adverse relationship between the subsidiary and headquarters may
partly be ascribed to “the cultural di↵erences [being] so big” (G-2). Where the
subsidiary thinks and acts like a Silicon Valley start-up, headquarters is a slow,
bureaucratic multinational corporation focussing on reliably mass-producing safe
vehicles. As a result, the subsidiary ends up being “a bridge between the Valley and
[headquarters]. Almost cultural translators. Technical translators. We bridge that
gap between how you work with a start-up versus how you work with a Tier 1 supplier
that they are used to” (G-2). Mediating the relationship between headquarters and
start-ups presents challenges of its own:
At that point [of production], I start to understand [headquarters]. So, up
to that point, I am a defender of the start-ups. I beat on big, bureaucratic
[Company G], I narrow them down from an 80-page contract to a four-
page contract. I see [Company G] as the bad guys. But once you move
to production, and you need to make sure that you can bump six million
cars a year, then I start defending [Company G]. (G-2)
4.7.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
As similarly illustrated in previous cases, Subsidiary G needs to check whether ideas
for new projects are “really strong or if [they are] just a PowerPoint” (G-3). In
other words, the subsidiary needs to demonstrate true value, as well as feasibility
of an idea to get it to a stage “where you have crossed most of the t’s and dotted
the i’s” (G-2), before transferring it to headquarters. Furthermore, as discussed in
previous cases, software projects “move a lot faster” (G-2) than hardware projects,
making knowledge transfer easier in these cases.
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To facilitate this transfer the subsidiary employs a variety of mechanisms. For in-
stance, Company G holds board of directors meetings in Silicon Valley and sends
senior managers from across the company to workshops at the subsidiary, thus
improving the subsidiary–headquarters linkages (G-3). Frequent communication
through phone calls and in-person visits to headquarters by subsidiary employees
further aid knowledge transfer (G-3). Finally, as discussed, the subsidiary employs a
co-leadership approach with one head of the subsidiary being a permanent local hire
and the second head of the subsidiary being an expat on rotation from headquarters
(G-2). This approach provides a link to headquarters on a managerial level.
4.7.7 Further Considerations
The subsidiary conducts “about 80% pull projects, 20% push projects” (G-4). In
other words, the majority of projects conducted at the subsidiary are specifically
demanded by a headquarters business unit. Push projects are di cult to trans-
fer to headquarters because the subsidiary needs to find “continuous engagement
with somebody in the business” (G-4). In these cases, “you really need an executive
sponsor who really wants it, because everyone along the way is going to fight you”
(G-2). As a result, “most projects are requested by, and done in conjunction with,
[headquarters]” (G-3).
Collaborating on projects with headquarters helps the subsidiary close the “huge
gap between the [subsidiary] and production” (G-2) which can prevent ideas from
the subsidiary being implemented at headquarters. Indeed, to close this gap and
thus facilitate the transfer of knowledge from the subsidiary to headquarters, the
subsidiary is “trying to get a lot closer to production” (G-2) by developing projects
to higher levels of maturity. This statement contradicts the subsidiary’s original
exploratory nature, as similarly seen in previous cases.
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4.8 Case H
4.8.1 Subsidiary H Background
Subsidiary H was first established in Silicon Valley in 2000, with the purpose of car-
rying out computer science research with local universities (H-2) and reporting on
this research to its headquarters in Japan. However, the subsidiary quickly “realised
that [Silicon Valley] is the ‘Mecca’ of start-ups” (H-2) and that there was thus more
to be harvested than just research with universities. The agglomeration of start-up
companies, investors, early adopter customers, and government policy favouring the
development of new technologies drove Company H to establish a CVC arm in Sili-
con Valley in 2005 (H-2). Starting out with only four employees in 2000, the o ce
grew to about six employees by 2005, 10 employees by 2010, and about 30 employees
by 2019.
Conducting CVC investments in Silicon Valley exposed Subsidiary H to a variety of
start-ups, as well as interesting larger companies (H-2). The subsidiary discovered a
range of potential partners in which it did not want to invest equity, but with whom
it nonetheless wanted the option of collaborating (H-2). Thus, in 2011 the sub-
sidiary was transformed from a CVC lab into an open innovation lab, with the aim
of co-conducting research, as well as POC and prototype development with external
partners. This model enabled the subsidiary to collaborate with both young, small
companies, as well as larger, established companies, around relevant technologies for
the automotive industry.
However, problems arose when collaborating with start-ups, as the subsidiary was
forced to implement standardised contracts used for automotive supplier relation-
ships, which were too intricate for exploratory work with start-ups (H-2). In order
to enable the subsidiary to move more quickly and independently from the rest of
the organisation, Subsidiary H became a separate legal entity in 2017.
4.8.2 Internal Embeddedness
Subsidiary H employs a mix of local hires (70%) and expats from the parent or-
ganisation (30%) (H-2). Furthermore, the subsidiary is split into two teams: the
open innovation team (mainly local hires in charge of external-facing activities, such
as working with, and advocating for, start-ups), and the synergy team (mainly ex-
pats from Company H headquarters who have strong connections to various business
units and can thus bridge the gap between the subsidiary and headquarters). As the
synergy team understands both the Silicon Valley and the headquarters perspective,
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they are in charge of “translating the requirements of both sides and finding the right
people within [Company H]” (H-5). The synergy team knows “who the most relevant
people [at headquarters] are” (H-5) and can therefore ease the process of transferring
knowledge from the subsidiary to the most appropriate people at headquarters.
Until 2017, Subsidiary H was forced to use headquarters’ standardised contract for
external collaborations when working with start-ups in Silicon Valley (H-2). How-
ever, this contract was tailored to established relationships between OEMs and Tier
1 suppliers, including product liability insurance and other complicated agreements,
rather than to exploratory projects with start-ups (H-2). In addition, the subsidiary
experienced a gap between the month-long development cycles of many start-ups
in Silicon Valley, versus the traditional automotive seven-year vehicle development
cycle. In the words of an interviewee: “Speed, we really needed speed [...]. We needed
to move much faster than our mothership, so that is the main reason why we sepa-
rated” (H-2), to become a separate legal entity. Changing the governance structure
of the subsidiary by setting it up as a separate legal entity allows for more autonomy
around supplier contracts and faster decision-making independently of headquarters,
which addresses some of the obstacles that can hinder external knowledge sourcing
(such as being slowed down by bureaucratic processes at headquarters).
While Subsidiary H is now a separate legal entity, it does not have a fully autonomous
budget, but instead employs a dual-budget system. In other words, the subsidiary
has an autonomous base budget with which it can freely conduct projects, but
has to apply for funding from headquarters business units on a project-basis if
it wants to take projects to higher maturity (H-5). Furthermore, if a business
unit at headquarters specifically asks the subsidiary to carry out a certain project,
funding for this project will come from the headquarters business unit because, “if
[headquarters] want us [the subsidiary] to do it, they should pay for it. If we want
to do it, we should pay for it” (H-5). The dual-budget system allows the subsidiary
to achieve a balance of both external embeddedness (through a certain level of
autonomy and speed) and internal embeddedness (through securing buy-in and a
home for the project inside the organisation).
4.8.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Since being established in 2000, Subsidiary H has become progressively more embed-
ded in its local environment. As discussed, the subsidiary evolved from conducting
computer science research with universities, to investing equity in start-ups, to de-
veloping POCs and prototypes with start-ups and other local players, to becoming a
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separate legal entity in 2017 (H-2). Today, being an open innovation lab, Subsidiary
H provides four key resources for external innovation partners (such as start-ups):
funding for prototyping, test vehicles, a collaborative workspace, and mentors from
Company H headquarters. While mentors are discussed in detail in Section 4.8.5
below, the following interview excerpt gives insight into the collaborative workspace,
akin to an internal accelerator, o↵ered by Subsidiary H: “We host start-ups here.
[...] We have a shop in the back to work together with the start-ups to modify the
test vehicle and install their sensors, or displays, or other technologies” (H-2).
The collaborative workspace eases the subsidiary’s ability to source knowledge from
start-ups, as it enables the start-ups to test their technologies in an automotive con-
text. When working with start-ups, the subsidiary does not demand exclusivity, nor
a time window in which Company H is the preferred customer. This collaboration
agreement is described in detail by an interviewee:
We treat outside innovators as a fair, equal partner. So, whatever you
have before the collaboration, it is yours, of course. And whatever we
had, is ours. And whatever we put on the table and create new together,
that is going to be shared. You have the freedom to do anything with this.
We also have the freedom to do anything with this. You even have the
freedom to go to [a competitor] and propose this to [a competitor]. Fine,
no problem, we don’t tie your hands at all. (H-2)
The subsidiary and Company H want to give start-ups the opportunity to scale by
also providing to other manufacturers. This constitutes a strong incentive for start-
ups to partner with Subsidiary H first, instead of potentially approaching competing
companies.
4.8.4 Actor Characteristics
The “main challenge” (H-5) to knowledge transfer is “the slow response time by
headquarters” (H-5) which can be ascribed to the following:
[Headquarters] are busy, by definition. [...] And what we find is totally
outside their scope. Of course, that is what we are looking for, disruptive
innovation, so the better job we do, the farther outside the scope it is
for people in [headquarters]. So there is a fundamental mismatch, a
gap. We wasted a number of great opportunities because [headquarters]
couldn’t move at all. (H-2)
To counteract these issues, support from Company H top management can be con-
ducive because executives “can drive projects top-down” (H-6). Indeed:
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Strong top leadership support is really the key for this type of problem, for
innovation. Because this problem potentially creates some friction. [...]
And friction is a good thing, but you need to have a certain mechanism
to accommodate the friction. Otherwise it is a simple rejection by people
at [headquarters] and nothing will really materialise from that. (H-2)
A further factor impeding knowledge transfer is the di culty of finding somebody
at headquarters to “drive the project” (H-6) once it has been transferred. This issue
may be ascribed to the following characteristic of many headquarters engineers:
“The project leader [at headquarters] needs to know the technical details and also has
to have a personality to do such a risky project. Most of the people in headquarters
who have the technical skill usually have many other things to do” (H-6).
4.8.5 Actor Relationship
As discussed, when collaborating with local start-ups, Subsidiary H o↵ers mentors
from Company H headquarters, who provide “rich experience in certain domains”
(H-2) from the automotive industry, which is particularly relevant for start-ups
from other industries. Furthermore, they provide a bridge between the subsidiary
and headquarters which can help foster the relationship between the two sides and
thus ease the knowledge transfer process (H-2).
However, despite certain measures, such as having mentors from headquarters and a
synergy team at the subsidiary in charge of fostering the link between the subsidiary
and headquarters, the relationship between the two parties is characterised by a
feeling of threat, given that certain projects from the subsidiary can be “competitive
to what [headquarters] are doing” (H-2), and because:
Everyone here [in Silicon Valley] is comfortable with buzz words like AI
[artificial intelligence], connectivity, cloud, robotics, VR [virtual reality]
and so on. In [headquarters], people are more worried about these buzz
words being a threat to their existence. They are afraid it will take away
their significance. (H-4)
The following example of successful knowledge transfer from the subsidiary to head-
quarters, which ended up causing trouble with the recipient department, further
illustrates the subsidiary–headquarters relationship:
We built this [new infotainment unit] and showed this to our infotain-
ment development team [at headquarters]. The head of that team [...]
was so mad at us. It is a total threat to that department. It’s a matter of
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job security, so he was really upset, and he said to me that: ‘I don’t think
this is your job. Your job is to find or create a new idea, something that
smartphones cannot do, and only cars can do.’ I was kind of scratching
my head and said: ‘Well, I think, actually, that’s your job. My job is
to show how other technologies from outside are going to disrupt and
change the way we do business.’ (H-2)
The feeling of being threatened by the subsidiary, coupled with the narrow focus
of headquarters engineers (“They are tasked with building next year’s model so new
ideas are not their priority.” (H-5)) results in the NIH syndrome preventing knowl-
edge from being successfully transferred from the subsidiary to headquarters.
4.8.6 Transfer Content and Mechanism
A further obstacle to knowledge transfer is that headquarters waits “for the next
planning cycle to take projects” (H-5). Given the seven-year length of the average
new vehicle development cycle, introducing a project to headquarters at the correct
time to fit into this cycle is crucial to facilitate the project’s transfer. While this is a
little easier for software than for hardware projects, given the faster development cy-
cles, timing is nonetheless a key challenge (H-2). Moreover, given that headquarters
business units are far removed from Silicon Valley “physically and technologically”
(H-4), the subsidiary needs to tangibly demonstrate a project’s value so that head-
quarters can “see it, touch it, feel it” (H-4). Thus, developing POCs is crucial, as
“sending [headquarters] a report or a slide deck is not going to demonstrate and
explain the technology well” (H-4).
To facilitate knowledge transfer, Subsidiary H employs a variety of mechanisms. For
instance: “We [the subsidiary] invite [Company H] executives here two to three times
a year to showcase all the outputs in a real prototype demo. This way, the decision-
makers can really see the value, see what customers really experience” (H-2). In
addition to executives, engineers from headquarters are invited to the subsidiary
for multiple months at a time to collaborate on specific projects (H-5, H-6). Upon
returning to headquarters, these visiting engineers subsequently serve as champions
for their projects (H-5, H-6). Finally, the subsidiary conducts frequent calls with
headquarters and sends a regular newsletter because “frequent communication is
really what it comes down to” (H-4).
4.8.7 Further Considerations
By evolving into a legally separate open innovation lab, Subsidiary H has been
able to provide more specialised resources to start-ups, thus enabling them to de-
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velop projects to higher levels of maturity (H-2). This is beneficial to knowledge
transfer, given that Company H has a “long history of being engineering-driven and
engineering-centric” (H-5). As a result:
[Company H], for better or for worse, believes in its internal capability
and doesn’t look much to the outside. This makes them very practical,
which is also a reason why we [the subsidiary] target series development
rather than research [when transferring projects to headquarters]. (H-5)
By taking projects to higher levels of maturity locally, the subsidiary is better able
to target these projects to headquarters series development, thus improving chances
of successful knowledge transfer. This notion reflects the trend seen in previous
cases, of subsidiaries moving away from their initial exploratory purpose, towards
series development.
Nonetheless, transferring projects to headquarters “takes time. It is not over night
like tossing something over the fence and they catch it” (H-2). To improve knowledge
transfer, an employee at headquarters, who had been to Silicon Valley to work on
a project for six months, suggests that headquarters needs to train its engineers
to have “experience in working with start-ups and know the new technologies. [...]
The best way to do this is to send more people [to the subsidiary]. Not long-term,
but short-term” (H-6). This is particularly important given the following analogy:
“There are many pitchers in Silicon Valley. [...] It is not di cult to train a pitcher,
but it is di cult to train a catcher” (H-6).
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4.9 Cross-Case Analysis
This chapter presented findings from Phase 1 of this study, i.e., from eight auto-
motive corporate innovation subsidiaries in Silicon Valley, along dimensions derived
from the conceptual framework (see Figure 4.1): internal embeddedness; external
embeddedness and knowledge sourcing; actor characteristics; actor relationship; and
transfer content and mechanism (as well as further considerations outside of the ini-
tial framework). The following sections present a cross-case analysis of each dimen-
sion, culminating in a refinement of the conceptual framework. A summary table of
the data is provided in Appendix E.
4.9.1 Internal Embeddedness
As demonstrated, the main means by which subsidiaries achieve internal embedded-
ness into their respective parent organisation involves expats, who spend between
one and five years at the subsidiary before returning to headquarters. Furthermore,
Subsidiaries A, B, C, D, and H employ designated knowledge transfer personnel,
either at the subsidiary, at headquarters, or both, to further help foster the con-
nection between the two sides. However, while expats provide important linkages
to headquarters business units and can help champion the subsidiary at home, thus
facilitating knowledge transfer, having too many expats can result in instability and
knowledge loss when the expats leave. This suggests a risk of over-reliance on expats
for knowledge transfer.
Subsidiary autonomy constitutes a further aspect of internal embeddedness, partic-
ularly with regards to the subsidiaries’ budget and decision-making freedom. The
studied cases tend to employ a dual-budget mechanism. In other words, the sub-
sidiary has a base budget with which it can freely conduct certain POC development
projects, but requires the involvement of headquarters business units for further
funding to take projects to higher levels of maturity and thus transfer them to these
aforementioned business units. This system results in limited subsidiary autonomy,
as support from a headquarters business unit needs to be secured before a project
can be conducted on a larger scale. To enable faster decision-making abilities, Sub-
sidiaries F2 and H have been set up as separate legal entities. Nonetheless, while
this does allow them to begin projects without headquarters’ permission, continuing
and transferring these projects requires involvement from the target recipient team
from headquarters, to improve their sense of ownership over the project.
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4.9.2 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Where expats provide the connection to headquarters, local hires help embed the
subsidiaries in their external environment—a key aim of the subsidiaries, given that
access to the region was commonly stated as a reason for establishing a permanent
presence in Silicon Valley.
In addition to hiring local talent, the subsidiaries embed themselves in Silicon Val-
ley by collaborating with local actors, particularly start-ups. Given the cultural
di↵erences between automotive OEMs and Silicon Valley start-ups, the subsidiaries
reported di culties in bridging the gap between the two worlds. This, coupled with
the inabilities of start-ups to provide technologies according to automotive quantity
and quality needs, has resulted in the subsidiaries introducing a three-way collabora-
tion model between their headquarters, the start-ups, and a traditional automotive
Tier 1 supplier, who can eventually integrate the start-up’s technology into a larger
system. Further means of facilitating the collaboration with start-ups include part-
nering with a local accelerator programme to increase exposure to start-ups, not
demanding exclusivity (thus allowing the start-ups to grow faster), providing a col-
laborative workspace within the subsidiary, and investing equity through CVC units.
Generally, a balance of external and internal embeddedness, i.e. dual embeddedness,
appears to be vital for knowledge transfer, as external embeddedness allows the
knowledge to be sourced and acquired locally, while internal embeddedness allows
this knowledge to be transferred and implemented in the wider organisation.
4.9.3 Actor Characteristics
While there are many characteristics of both the subsidiaries and headquarters that
can be derived from the data, most of these are implicitly covered in other dimen-
sions, such as the actor relationship. Instead, this section focussed mainly on the
level of support for the subsidiary by headquarters’ top management. A common
theme appears to be that top management support has recently been improving, fol-
lowing visits by executives to Silicon Valley. A potential explanation for this is the
surge in automotive-relevant technologies appearing in Silicon Valley in recent years,
including autonomous driving, cloud connectivity, and big data. These potentially
disruptive technologies may have driven the need for automotive executives to visit
Silicon Valley, witnessing the pace of innovation first-hand and thus lending more
support to their subsidiaries. However, despite improving support from top man-
agement, the subsidiaries’ standing with lower level employees within headquarters
is still lacking, resulting in knowledge transfer di culties.
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4.9.4 Actor Relationship
Across all eight cases, the relationship between subsidiary and headquarters is char-
acterised by varying levels of adversity, manifested mainly in the NIH syndrome.
In particular, interviews supported feelings of envy from headquarters employees
towards subsidiary employees working in a more desirable location and conduct-
ing more ground-breaking projects, as well as a sense of threat that these ground-
breaking projects might render headquarters employees obsolete. Furthermore, a
lack of successful transfer has resulted in few projects from the subsidiaries actually
entering the market. This, in turn, inhibits the subsidiary from building credibility,
thus preventing headquarters from establishing trust for the subsidiary.
Adversity in the relationship between the subsidiaries and their respective headquar-
ters may be ascribed to a vast di↵erence in culture between the two sides. Where
the subsidiaries see themselves as, and act like, start-ups, by wanting to be agile,
entrepreneurial, and disruptive, headquarters is slowed down by bureaucratic pro-
cesses, inertia, and regulations. Naturally, the two do not align well, thus presenting
an obstacle to the knowledge transfer process.
4.9.5 Transfer Content and Mechanism
While the above dimensions have focussed on the softer issues surrounding knowl-
edge transfer, such as people and the relationships between them, the dimension
of transfer content and mechanism addresses more practical factors. For instance,
a clear emphasis on developing tangible POCs to demonstrate value, rather than
presenting slide presentations to headquarters, emerges from the data. This concept
has been referred to as Death by PowerPoint and can result in the following Catch-
22 cycle: to pitch for funding for a project, the subsidiary requires a tangible POC
to demonstrate its value, but this is di cult to achieve before having been allocated
any funding for that project. The challenge of Death by PowerPoint highlights the
importance of autonomy for the subsidiary to conduct POC development.
A second practicality to consider is timing. Interviewees at the subsidiaries highlight
the challenge of fitting ideas into the rigid vehicle development cycle at headquarters
and the resulting delays in introducing new projects to the market, if at all. In the
case of software projects this issue is easier to overcome than for hardware projects,
given the faster development times.
Mechanisms to facilitate knowledge transfer are fairly consistent across cases: ex-
pats, frequent phone- or video calls, newsletters, bilateral business trips, and in-
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novation fair days at which to showcase projects all foster the communication and
collaboration between subsidiaries and headquarters. However, despite these struc-
tural mechanisms, interviewees report ongoing struggles with knowledge transfer.
4.9.6 Further Considerations
While the data discussed in this chapter revealed interesting new insights along the
above dimensions, these dimensions emanate from the initial conceptual framework,
i.e., from the existing literature. However, each case further exposed certain con-
siderations that are not discernible from the knowledge transfer literature and were
thus not included in the initial framework.
Firstly, the subsidiaries appear to be shifting ever closer to their headquarters’ series
development department, despite their original purpose being highly exploratory in
nature. As shown in the automotive research and development process in Figure
3.2, series development relates to a much higher level of maturity and proximity
to the market than an exploratory innovation subsidiary might imply. A potential
explanation for this evolution lies with the common focus on market success of a
multinational corporation. Exploratory projects that have a long time horizon are
too far-removed from the market and from the core scope of the organisation and
can thus only be transferred to headquarters with great di culty. Not being able to
transfer immature projects, in turn, has driven the subsidiaries to develop projects
to higher levels of maturity, thereby moving closer and closer to their headquarters’
series development department and losing sight of their original exploratory purpose
along the way.
This shift towards series development appears to be related to a dichotomy in ex-
pectation between headquarters and the subsidiaries about the latter’s role. Where
the subsidiaries tend to still consider themselves as focussing mainly on earlier stage
research and technology scouting, headquarters often uses the subsidiaries as an
extended workbench for their series development work. This manifests in the large
proportion of pull projects, i.e., projects specifically demanded by headquarters se-
ries development, and in the resulting frustrations on both sides, given the inability
of subsidiaries to meet these expectations. Furthermore, outsourcing series develop-
ment to Silicon Valley is not only expensive, but also contradicts the subsidiaries’
original exploratory purpose.
The prominence of pull projects further points to a certain level of collaboration be-
tween headquarters and the subsidiaries. Indeed, many interviewees discussed joint
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projects and the tendency for headquarters engineers to spend time at the sub-
sidiary for collaborative projects and vice versa. This suggests an imprecision in the
broadcasting model for knowledge transfer widely used in the literature: knowledge
transfer in this case is not linear, as indicated by the one-way arrow in the broad-
casting model, but instead follows an iterative, non-linear path from headquarters
to subsidiary, and back again.
Furthermore, knowledge transfer should not be limited to the subsidiaries as knowl-
edge sources and headquarters as recipients, as depicted in the broadcasting model.
Instead, the subsidiaries take on the role of knowledge recipient in their collabora-
tive e↵orts with local Silicon Valley actors and often act as platforms connecting
various knowledge sources to various knowledge recipients. Similarly, when creating
the aforementioned three-way collaboration model between headquarters, start-ups,
and Tier 1 suppliers, each participant often acts as both source and recipient of
knowledge. The complexities revealed through these case studies indicate a fuzzi-
ness and ambiguity inherent to the context of knowledge transfer from automotive
corporate innovation subsidiaries in Silicon Valley to their respective headquarters,
which has previously not been su ciently addressed in the literature.
4.9.7 Refinement of the Conceptual Framework
As discussed in Chapter 3, the above data was analysed following the Gioia method
and resulted in a code tree, outlining the relation between the list of first-order codes
and second-order categories. An example of this code tree, showing only those codes
that are new to the literature and are thus used to modify the framework, is shown
in Appendix D.
As can be seen in the code tree, elements such as the issues of Death by PowerPoint
and timing knowledge transfer according to headquarters’ roadmaps, as well as the
dichotomy in expectations about the subsidiaries’ role (the subsidiaries moving closer
towards headquarters series development, and the idea of innovation theatre) have
been included in the revised version of the framework, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Note that while, in the interest of highlighting modifications to the framework, ele-
ments of the original framework have been placed in the background, these elements
are not to be considered any less important than in the previous version of the con-
ceptual framework.
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Figure 4.2: Initial modifications to the conceptual framework
Further to the above additional elements to the framework, a more fundamental
modification is in order. As discussed, the knowledge transfer process from the
corporate innovation subsidiaries to headquarters can no longer be considered as
merely linear. While the linear knowledge transfer from the subsidiaries to their
respective headquarters still exists, this process is more bidirectional than previously
indicated. Similarly, the data analysis has shown that there are multiple players
involved in an iterative loop of knowledge transfer, and that the roles of various
actors in the framework have become more ambiguous. Instead of limiting the
subsidiary to being the knowledge source, and headquarters to being the recipient,
the subsidiary, headquarters, start-ups, and Tier 1 suppliers all provide and receive
knowledge in their collaboration model. As discussed, these complexities suggest an
inherent ambiguity in the knowledge transfer process. As a result, an extra layer
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must be added to the conceptual framework, to highlight the ambiguity and non-
linearity of the knowledge transfer process. This additional layer is shown in Figure
4.3 below, in which the thick arrows represent the non-linear flow of knowledge
throughout the collaboration model of the various actors.
Figure 4.3: Additional layer to the conceptual framework
Finally, combining both layers together, a refined version of the overall conceptual
framework emerges, as illustrated in Figure 4.4 below.
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Figure 4.4: Modified conceptual framework, based on Phase 1 of this study
The following chapter will present findings from Phase 2 of this study, i.e., the global
network of corporate innovation subsidiaries of Companies A, B, and C. Chapter 6
concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings, in relation to the
literature.
Chapter 5
Phase 2: Case Studies from Other
Clusters
Following the conceptual framework
modification in the previous chapter,
Phase 2 now attempts to validate these
findings by providing an analysis of
the global network of corporate inno-
vation subsidiaries of case Companies
A, B, and C. As discussed in Chap-
ter 3, Companies D–H are rejected for
this phase, as they have no further
corporate innovation subsidiaries simi-
lar in nature to their Silicon Valley of-
fices.
In this chapter, each section discusses
one case company’s global network of
corporate innovation subsidiaries, analysed using the same dimensions a↵ecting
knowledge transfer as used in Chapter 4. However, to avoid a tedious duplica-
tion of concepts from Chapter 4, the following sections mainly focus on how the
subsidiaries in other locations deviate from the Silicon Valley subsidiaries, and what
further factors are important when considering not only one, but a whole network
of subsidiaries. Thus, if a heading from the Chapter 4 analysis is not included for a
particular case below, this signifies that there are no significant di↵erences to the Sil-
icon Valley subsidiary in this area. This chapter concludes with a further refinement
of the conceptual framework.
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5.1 Case A
5.1.1 Background
In addition to its Silicon Valley subsidiary, Company A has a global network of four
corporate innovation subsidiaries of similar purpose, with locations in Shanghai,
Tokyo, Seoul, and Tel Aviv. These locations were chosen by Company A for their
prominent innovation clusters and their “propensity for entrepreneurship” (A-14).
The subsidiaries are all part of the open innovation department at Company A
headquarters and thus have certain synergies and collaborative e↵orts between them
(A-9). Table 5.1 provides a comparative overview of the five subsidiaries. As can
be seen, the subsidiaries in Asia and Israel are much younger and smaller than the
Silicon Valley subsidiary. Furthermore, where the Silicon Valley subsidiary develops
projects to higher levels of maturity (approaching series development), the Asian
subsidiaries focus on earlier stage POCs and homologation (adapting technologies
to the local market). The Tel Aviv subsidiary was established midway through 2019
and thus does not yet conduct activities beyond technology scouting. The following
sections therefore discuss only the Asian subsidiaries and how they compare to their
Silicon Valley counterpart.
Location Year est. # Employees Scope
Silicon Valley 1998 50 Tech. scouting; POC;
prototyping; ready for
series development
Shanghai 2013 15 Tech. scouting; POC;
homologation
Tokyo 2014 5 Tech. scouting; POC;
homologation
Seoul 2015 2 Tech. scouting; POC;
homologation
Tel Aviv 2019 6 Tech. scouting
Table 5.1: Comparative overview of Company A innovation subsidiaries
5.1.2 Internal Embeddedness
As similarly demonstrated for Company A’s Silicon Valley subsidiary, “being well
connected in relevant business units [at headquarters]” is a key success factor for
the Asian subsidiaries (A-12). The network at headquarters is facilitated through
expats who can leverage personal contacts, as well as through a designated team
at headquarters that acts as a bridge-builder for the subsidiary (A-12, A-13, A-14).
However, while the expats’ role is highly emphasised in Silicon Valley, the Asian sub-
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sidiaries instead highlight the importance of their local hires, given their superior
understanding of the market and their resulting ability to help adapt technologies
to local requirements (A-12, A-13, A-15).
For instance, an interviewee at the Shanghai subsidiary suggested having two pos-
sible means of justifying a project choice to headquarters to secure funding: “The
project has to be either unique because of its technology or unique because it o↵ers
features that are necessary for the Chinese market” (A-15). Homologation is of key
concern for the Asian subsidiaries, given the large di↵erences between customer pref-
erences of Company A’s home market in Germany, and those of the Asian markets
(A-12, A-13, A-15). On the other hand, the American market is much more similar
to that of Company A’s home country, thus resulting in the Silicon Valley subsidiary
focussing less on homologation and more on developing new technologies.
5.1.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
The Asian subsidiaries’ focus on homologation suggests high levels of external em-
beddedness. The subsidiaries carry out similar activities in their respective envi-
ronments as their Silicon Valley counterpart, attending “fairs, conferences, presen-
tations to find new technologies” (A-13) and working with “universities, research
centres, start-ups, and established companies” (A-12). However, in contrast to the
Silicon Valley subsidiary, the Asian subsidiaries’ activities are often marked by a
focus on local market preferences.
The emphasis on homologation further manifests itself in where the subsidiaries
transfer projects to. For instance, Company A has a large R&D centre located
in Beijing, given that China constitutes the largest single market for Company A
(A-15). As a result, “[The Shanghai subsidiary] actually transfer projects to the
China R&D Centre” (A-14). Transferring to the China R&D Centre, rather than
to Company A headquarters is further explained by the following:
[The Shanghai subsidiary] do a lot for the R&D centre in China. This
means, they do Chinese business models for the Chinese market, tailored
to Chinese needs, just because the Chinese market is large enough to
justify this. We [the Seoul subsidiary] also do small things for the Korean
market because we are located here and we breathe the air here. But our
market is smaller than the Chinese market, so we tend to transfer more
to [Company A headquarters]. (A-16)
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5.1.4 Actor Relationship
The NIH syndrome was discussed as a key obstacle to the relationship between the
Japanese subsidiary and headquarters: “You know the term, Not-Invented-Here?
That means, when we throw something over the wall [to headquarters], then it’s not
their baby and so they drop it” (A-17). However, while in Silicon Valley it appears
that di↵erences in organisational culture play the biggest role in impeding knowl-
edge transfer (corporate versus start-up culture), in Asia “the topics of distance,
national culture, and language” (A-17) constitute a key challenge. Working with
a business unit at headquarters is “definitely easier if you speak their language. If
you are a Japanese start-up, very far away, and you don’t speak English very well,
then [headquarters] would prefer working with somebody else. That’s too bad, but we
cannot change that” (A-17).
Furthermore, at the Shanghai subsidiary a challenge in managing the relationship
between the subsidiary and headquarters involves understanding the requirements of
Chinese customers because “the Chinese market has very specific requirements. We
[the Shanghai subsidiary] have proximity to the Chinese customers and understand
them, but [headquarters] does not. We have to explain certain features that have
to be prioritised here” (A-14). Similarly, the local employees at the subsidiaries
sometimes struggle given their cultural di↵erences. For instance:
We have to find employees [at the subsidiary] who are open. Because
Japanese culture is quite closed. Approaching a stranger directly is not
common. [...] And this is a key success factor for transfer because the
employees need to build a network in [headquarters]. (A-17)
5.1.5 Further Considerations
Transferring knowledge to headquarters is of key concern to the Asian subsidiaries,
given that “30% of the work we do is finding technologies. 70% of the work we do
is transferring to [headquarters]” (A-12). While the Silicon Valley subsidiary takes
projects to higher levels of maturity to enable an easier handover to series devel-
opment, this is not possible at the Asian subsidiaries because “we don’t have the
resources here” (A-17). The Silicon Valley subsidiary “is much bigger. They have a
huge budget. They are their own department with a bunch of people. They have a
very di↵erent standing and so they go in the direction of series development” (A-17).
As the Asian subsidiaries cannot prepare projects to higher levels of maturity to
ease transfer, these subsidiaries employ other means. In particular, they “speak
to [headquarters] in a really early phase” (A-12), to avoid doing “anything without
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ensuring [headquarters] is interested because this raises the chance of successfully
transferring projects to them” (A-14). Furthermore, securing early support from a
pre-development business unit provides the subsidiaries with vital resources needed
for developing POCs (A-16). Indeed, the number of projects conducted in collab-
oration with a headquarters business unit has recently become a measured Key
Performance Indicator (A-13), signifying the importance of securing buy-in from
headquarters before starting a project.
A further consideration that comes with having a global network of corporate in-
novation subsidiaries is the concept of transparency across this network. Indeed,
“knowledge management is a very important topic” (A-17), as demonstrated by the
following concern: “If [Company A] only knew what [Company A] knows” (A-13).
Not only is transparency important for spreading knowledge across the organisation,
but also “to ensure we are not doing things twice. We need to have more exchanges
with one another. ‘Is Korea already doing this? Then we don’t have to.’” (A-17).
This is particularly complicated given the “distance and time zones” (A-16) between
Asia and Silicon Valley. As a result, the Silicon Valley subsidiary is “pretty separate”
(A-16) from the others. While the heads of the three Asian subsidiaries have regular
meetings to discuss their projects and avoid duplication of e↵ort (A-16), on a global
scale the company instead attempts to improve transparency by having a database
on which information and projects can be deposited (A-13). However, “this database
is only as good as what people feed into it” (A-17) and is often considered “nothing,
but a rubbish bin” (A-13). Instead of simply relying on the database, “we also need
direct communication” (A-17).
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5.2 Case B
5.2.1 Background
Company B’s global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries is large, far-reaching,
and decentralised (B-17, B-18). The company has around 60 such subsidiaries
around the world, also referred to as “labs or hubs” (B-17), with “main hot-spots”
(B-18) in Silicon Valley, Beijing, Tel Aviv, and Berlin (B-17, B-18). These key loca-
tions (besides the Silicon Valley subsidiary) constitute the main focus of this section,
with reference being made to the network as a whole where relevant. While Com-
pany A has centralised the organisation of their corporate innovation subsidiaries
by having them all report to the same department at headquarters (as previously
discussed), at Company B “the organisation is very hierarchical and di↵erent parts
don’t necessarily talk to each other, so everybody has their own lab. Everyone is
trying to do their own thing” (B-15).
Table 5.2 provides a comparative overview of the Company B subsidiaries located
in these hot-spots. As can be seen, the subsidiaries not located in Silicon Valley are
much younger and somewhat smaller than their Californian counterpart. Further-
more, where the Silicon Valley team develops projects to higher levels of maturity
(approaching series development), the other subsidiaries focus on earlier stage POCs.
In addition, a key concern of the Beijing subsidiary involves homologation.
Location Year est. # Employees Scope
Silicon Valley 1995 300 Tech. scouting; POC;
prototyping; ready for
series development
Beijing 2015 32 Tech. scouting; POC;
homologation
Tel Aviv 2017 25 Tech. scouting; POC
Berlin 2018 150 Tech. scouting; POC;
software development
Table 5.2: Comparative overview of Company B innovation subsidiaries
5.2.2 Internal Embeddedness
Like the Silicon Valley subsidiary, the other hot-spot subsidiaries depicted in Table
5.2 are tied to the designated unit at headquarters that facilitates the collabora-
tion between headquarters business units and the subsidiaries. These designated
bridge-builders know “what [the subsidiaries] are working on and can connect us
to the relevant technical partners [at headquarters]” (B-11), thus strengthening the
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subsidiaries’ internal embeddedness. However, besides the hot-spot subsidiaries,
Company B has a network of about 60 corporate innovation subsidiaries worldwide
(B-17, B-18). These belong to a variety of departments and are thus not connected
to the centralised bridge-builder unit at headquarters in Germany (B-17, B-18).
These subsidiaries’ internal embeddedness is limited to the direct contact they have
with their founding department, limiting the breadth of potential recipients of their
knowledge.
5.2.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
To engage with its external environment, the Beijing subsidiary publishes “problem
statements” (B-16) provided by headquarters business units, for which local start-
ups “can openly apply” (B-16) with a solution. The subsidiary then meets with a
shortlist of start-ups to decide on potential further collaboration. This is an e cient
means for headquarters to find start-ups in Beijing.
The Beijing subsidiary’s main focus is “In China, for China” (B-14), resulting in the
subsidiary not having expats: “We [the Beijing subsidiary] are focussed on China
knowledge. So, we don’t need expats, we need China experts” (B-16). Furthermore,
similar to Case A, the subsidiary often transfers projects to Company B’s Beijing
R&D centre, rather than to headquarters in Germany (B-14, B-16), thus allowing
the subsidiary to “realise our projects to series production in China” (B-14). As
demonstrated, the Beijing subsidiary heavily emphasises homologation, thus setting
it apart from Company B’s other corporate innovation subsidiaries.
Rather than focussing on engaging with its external environment, the Berlin sub-
sidiary is positioned as a core part of headquarters’ R&D department and con-
centrates on conducting software development (B-12). The subsidiary was set up
after Company B struggled to conduct “software-heavy stu↵” (B-12) at headquar-
ters, given the di culties of attracting global software talent to headquarters’ non-
lucrative location. Instead, the company wanted a separate space in a global city,
where software developers could be more “radical and fast” (B-12).
5.2.4 Actor Relationship
As with the Silicon Valley subsidiary, the relationship between headquarters and
Company B’s other corporate innovation subsidiaries is characterised by a “clash of
cultures, a clash of centuries” (B-12). On the one hand, this manifests in a “power
struggle” (B-16) between the subsidiaries and headquarters because headquarters
does not “want to give up some decision powers” (B-16) about which projects to
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pursue, thus limiting the subsidiaries’ autonomy. On the other hand, di↵erences in
agility and speed hinder knowledge transfer:
We [the Berlin subsidiary] have proven capability of developing a new
software product from A to Z in six weeks, with high customer value, but
the product never made it to the customer because the processes in [head-
quarters] are not geared towards this. They are too slow and convoluted
to make fast roll-out happen. (B-12)
Furthermore, similar to Company A’s subsidiaries in Asia, Company B’s Beijing
subsidiary reported not just clashes of organisational culture, but of national culture
as well: “A big problem is really the language and the distance” (B-14). As a result,
“we tried several times to transfer projects to [headquarters], but it did not work
well” (B-14) because “[headquarters] is reluctant to work with foreign start-ups, [...]
[as] there are many problems with communication” (B-14). Instead:
We can just transfer prototypes to the China R&D centre. This often
works better anyways because of our focus of ‘In China, for China’. Many
of our solutions are adapted to the local Chinese market so there is no
point transferring to [headquarters] first and then back to China. We can
just handle it in China. (B-14)
Not only is there a language barrier between Chinese start-ups and headquarters,
but also between the Chinese employees at the subsidiary and headquarters:
At [Company B], even as an international company, a lot of documents
are still in [headquarters’ local language], like meeting documents and the
concept book. So, the language barrier is not to be neglected. This is also
something which brings di culties in the daily communication. [...] A
lot of colleagues learn [headquarters’ local language] because otherwise,
you cannot communicate. (B-16)
5.2.5 Further Considerations
Di culties in transferring projects often result from headquarters being “approached
by many di↵erent innovation o ces” (B-14), but only being able to pick one o↵er.
Furthermore, a start-up complained to Company B that “multiple labs from [Com-
pany B] had approached them. [The start-up] told us [headquarters] to better agree
on, and coordinate our e↵orts” (B-18). This points to a lack of transparency and
duplication of e↵ort within the global network of the 60 Company B corporate
innovation subsidiaries, which can appear unprofessional and result in missed op-
portunities with potential external partners. A lack of transparency in this network
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is further evident as “most of [the subsidiaries] don’t know each other and don’t know
what others do” (B-18). For instance, when asked how the Beijing subsidiary di↵ers
from Company B’s other innovation subsidiaries, the response was the following: “I
think there are not so many innovation o ces around the world” (B-16).
To address these issues, Company B established a team on a high strategic level in
2017 with the aim of obtaining “an overview of all the hubs and labs in the digital
area that exist somewhere within [Company B] around the world” (B-18). The goal is
“to learn about what labs and hubs exist and to build up a governance structure and
synergy between them to avoid duplicated e↵orts and to encourage the exchange of
knowledge and resources” (B-18). This team collated a list of 60 corporate innovation
subsidiaries, split into four categories: (1) start-up incubators; (2) incubators that
can quickly develop ideas; (3) subsidiaries that are close to headquarters business
units, but fairly independent; and (4) extended workbenches that can implement
headquarters’ ideas by being more agile and skilled at software development (B-18).
Given that this unit was only founded in 2017, “so far the exchange between hubs is
not huge” (B-18), but synergies are expected to improve in future (B-18).
There is high volatility in the number of corporate innovation subsidiaries at Com-
pany B because many are opened and closed each year (B-18). Reportedly, “some
hubs are founded purely because there is budget left over and the team [at headquar-
ters] wants to do something innovative” (B-18). This points to a concept introduced
earlier in Section 4.1.7: innovation theatre, i.e., establishing a corporate innovation
subsidiary not for the purpose of actually gaining technological value, but to instead
appear innovative.
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5.3 Case C
5.3.1 Background
Company C has a total of four corporate innovation subsidiaries, located in Silicon
Valley, Tel Aviv, Paris, and Seoul (C-2). While the Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv, and
Seoul subsidiaries’ purpose is to develop technical POCs and prototypes, the Paris
subsidiary focusses more on strategy and business models around future mobility
(C-1, C-6). All subsidiaries are part of the open innovation department at Company
C headquarters and thus have certain synergies and collaborative e↵orts between
them (C-1). Table 5.3 provides a comparative overview of the four subsidiaries.
Location Year est. # Employees Scope
Silicon Valley 2011 70 Tech. scouting; POC;
prototyping
Tel Aviv 2016 4 Tech. scouting; POC;
prototyping (cyber
security and EV focus)
Paris 2016 160 Future mobility strategy
and business models
Seoul 2017 7 Tech. scouting; POC
Table 5.3: Comparative overview of Company C innovation subsidiaries
5.3.2 Internal Embeddedness
Company C headquarters is located in France, far away from Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv,
and Seoul. Thus, internal embeddedness of these subsidiaries is limited to having
expats and conducting frequent business trips. Uniquely, the Paris subsidiary is
“close to headquarters” (C-1), and so “headquarters is constantly checking it out.
It is not like Silicon Valley, which is very far and [headquarters] come there once a
year. But for them [in Paris] they constantly have people coming from headquarters,
so it is a di↵erent spirit” (C-1).
Indeed, the founders of the Paris subsidiary are both employees of Company C
headquarters, who often “go around to di↵erent departments at [headquarters] and
explain to the employees how they can benefit from [the subsidiary]. We explain to
them that they have a place where they can go out of the company to try new ideas”
(C-6). Thus, the Paris subsidiary uniquely manages its internal embeddedness by
having its founders actively self-promote at headquarters. As a result, the subsidiary
“always works with the experts of the company” (C-6) and ideas for projects are
“generally created together [with headquarters]” (C-6).
121
5.3.3 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
Each Company C corporate innovation subsidiary was founded to “leverage the
ecosystem” (C-1) in its respective location. While the focus in Silicon Valley lies
on “connected cars and autonomous driving” (C-1), the Tel Aviv subsidiary empha-
sises “electric vehicles and cyber security” (C-1). The Seoul subsidiary aims to allow
Company C to tap into the IT-focussed innovation ecosystem, with an emphasis on
start-ups (C-6). Similarly, the aim of establishing the Paris subsidiary was to “link
[Company C] to partners with di↵erent cultures in the ecosystem; an ecosystem it
didn’t know before” (C-6). The value of having a presence in Paris is the actors in
this region: “We were interested in not just start-ups, but also other players, such as
think-tanks, universities, researchers, and other corporates [...] that will determine
the future of mobility” (C-6). As demonstrated, engaging with its external environ-
ment through forming partnerships is a core purpose of the Paris subsidiary.
However, collaborating with start-ups is not always compatible with headquarters,
given that “the decision-making process within the company is too heavy and too
long for the start-ups” (C-6). To counteract these heavy processes, an interviewee
at the Paris subsidiary supports the view that: “It is so important to co-innovate and
integrate the business units [at headquarters] into the projects with the start-ups—all
together” (C-6). In other words, the subsidiary secures the support of headquarters
business units before engaging in collaboration with start-ups, to ensure the project
will eventually find a home within the company.
5.3.4 Further Considerations
The Paris subsidiary’s governance system is unique. Rather than merely working
with players in its external environment, the subsidiary thought: “If we take all
those players and we put them all in one place and link them with a common subject
and a common passion, we could create value” (C-6). As a result, the subsidiary
created a co-working space in which external players (mainly start-ups) can move
into, rent desks, and become “partners” (C-6) of Company C. Today, the subsidiary
has 30 partners, each with “their own activity, their own customers, their own mar-
ket, and mission” (C-6), but all centred around the theme of the future of mobility.
To flatten the hierarchy and encourage more trust between partners at the co-
working space, the Paris subsidiary introduced a co-governance system, in which “the
decisions are made by the community, not by [Company C]” (C-6). Each partner,
“no matter how big or small” (C-6), gets one vote in management decisions made at
the subsidiary. This approach is unique amongst all automotive cases in this study.
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5.4 Cross-Case Analysis
This chapter presented findings from Phase 2 of the overall study, i.e., from three
automotive companies’ global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries. Given
the aim of this chapter to determine if notable di↵erences exist between subsidiaries
in di↵erent locations and to understand how having a broad network of corporate
innovation subsidiaries can influence the knowledge transfer process within the en-
tire network, the above sections focus on dimensions in which the subsidiaries di↵er
from the Silicon Valley subsidiaries, in particular: internal embeddedness; exter-
nal embeddedness and knowledge sourcing; actor relationship; as well as further
considerations outside of the initial conceptual framework. The following sections
present a cross-case analysis of each dimension, culminating in a refinement of the
conceptual framework. A summary table of the data is provided in Appendix F.
5.4.1 Internal Embeddedness
As demonstrated, where the Silicon Valley subsidiaries of Companies A, B, and C all
rely heavily on expats for providing a network within the respective headquarters,
the subsidiaries in Asia of companies A and B do not. Instead, the Asian subsidiaries
highlight the importance of hiring locally, given the large di↵erences between the
local Asian markets and customer preferences, and the company headquarters’ mar-
kets and customers in Germany. Company C’s network of subsidiaries conversely
discusses a similar expat rotation programme as its Silicon Valley counterpart, with-
out mentioning homologation-focussed activities.
5.4.2 External Embeddedness and Knowledge Sourcing
The key di↵erentiating factor concerning external embeddedness of corporate inno-
vation subsidiaries in other locations is the concept of homologation, i.e., adapting
technologies to the local market. While the American market is fairly similar to all
three companies’ headquarters in Europe and the Silicon Valley subsidiaries thus do
not concentrate on adapting technologies to the American market, the subsidiaries
of Companies A and B in Asia reported homologation as one of their key tasks.
Indeed, both companies have R&D centres located in Beijing, to which the com-
panies’ Chinese corporate innovation subsidiaries often transfer projects, instead of
targeting business units at headquarters in Germany.
5.4.3 Actor Relationship
Similar to the Silicon Valley subsidiaries, issues like the NIH syndrome and re-
sulting adversities were still mentioned as driving factors a↵ecting the relationship
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between the subsidiaries and headquarters. However, in contrast to the Silicon Val-
ley cases, more emphasis was placed on di↵erences in national culture and language.
For instance, challenges of headquarters collaborating with foreign (non-English
speaking) subsidiaries were reported—a challenge that did not seem to be an issue
with American start-ups, as English tends to be the common denominator across
the world. Furthermore, headquarters’ employees not understanding local market
preferences of their global subsidiaries and key documents not being translated to
English were mentioned as factors inhibiting the relationship between headquarters
and subsidiaries.
5.4.4 Further Considerations
Analysis of case studies from Phase 2 suggests that, instead of thinking solely about
individual corporate innovation subsidiaries and their dyadic transfer of knowledge
to headquarters, one must consider a company’s entire network of such subsidiaries
holistically, as the activities and structures of one subsidiary a↵ect those of the oth-
ers. In particular, findings from this phase suggests that the conceptual framework
needs to be extended significantly to include the entire network of subsidiaries, as
subsidiaries transfer knowledge between each other, as well as between themselves
and headquarters. While at the moment the companies’ respective headquarters
are still located centrally in this global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries,
future trends of decentralisation of R&D and learning at the periphery of the or-
ganisation (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Hurtado-Torres et al., 2018; Singh, 2007;
Wolfram et al., 2018) may well reshu✏e the layout of the network.
Thus, a key aspect emerging from the data of Phase 2 is the concept of trans-
parency: coordinating synergies between, and an overview of, the activities of the
global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries. This is particularly challenging
at Company B, given the vast number of 60 subsidiaries that are not centrally incor-
porated into a single unit at headquarters. Repeated comments about duplication
of e↵ort across subsidiaries elucidate the significance of having a system of manag-
ing oversight across the network. At Company A, this is done through a database,
though this has reportedly not been highly e↵ective. However, given the small num-
ber of subsidiaries at Company A, personal exchanges appear to su ciently inform
each subsidiary of the others’ activities. On the other hand, Company B has recently
established a designated team in charge of collating information on, and facilitating
communication between, all corporate innovation subsidiaries across the company,
given the currently chaotic network of 60 such subsidiaries.
Chapter 5. Phase 2: Case Studies from Other Clusters 124
These considerations relate closely to the literature on global innovation (i.e., man-
ufacturing, engineering, and R&D) networks, reviewed in Section 2.2. In particular,
the complexity of the case companies’ networks’ configuration calls for high levels of
coordination across these networks, and certain capabilities required to manage the
successful sharing of knowledge within the networks. These topics will be discussed
in more detail in the following chapter.
A further unique feature exhibited by Company C’s Paris subsidiary is the concept
of creating a co-working space with a co-governance system at the subsidiary. By
incorporating start-ups into the subsidiary as partners with co-decision making abil-
ities, the subsidiary is able to improve its relations to the external environment and
build more trust with its partners.
5.4.5 Refinement of the Conceptual Framework
As discussed in Chapter 3, the case study data was analysed following the Gioia
method and resulted in a code tree that depicts the relation between the list of
first-order codes and second-order categories. An example of this analysis proce-
dure from Phase 1 is shown in Appendix D. The analysis for Phase 2 followed the
same procedure.
Based on this analysis, this chapter takes the modified framework resulting from
Chapter 4 and makes additional changes, based on the discussed considerations of
understanding the subsidiaries’ local market and of requiring transparency through-
out the network of subsidiaries. As previously, these changes can be represented
as a modification to the additional layer of the framework, which is illustrated in
Figure 5.1. Combining both layers together results in a refined version of the over-
all conceptual framework, as shown in Figure 5.2. Again, much of the conceptual
framework has been moved to the background in this version, not because the con-
cepts no longer apply, but to highlight the additions to the framework.
The following chapter will conclude the study with a discussion of the implications
of the previously presented case study findings.
125
Figure 5.1: Additional layer to the conceptual framework
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Figure 5.2: Modified conceptual framework, based on Phase 2 of this study
Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings of the empirical research pre-
sented in this thesis, based on the following research question and corresponding
sub-questions: How is knowledge transferred from a corporate innovation subsidiary
located in an innovation cluster to its company headquarters?
1. What are the obstacles impeding the knowledge transfer from a corporate
innovation subsidiary located in an innovation cluster to its headquarters?
2. How are these obstacles managed in practice?
In order to answer these questions, the following research objectives were set:
1. Understanding what a corporate innovation subsidiary is and what it does;
2. Identifying critical obstacles to the knowledge transfer from a corporate inno-
vation subsidiary to its headquarters, as well as the measures that have been
put in place to facilitate the process;
3. Developing a framework that conceptualises the knowledge transfer process
from a corporate innovation subsidiary to its headquarters.
As shown in Figure 6.1 below, this research was structured into two phases: (1)
eight case studies of automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries located in Silicon
Valley (and their respective headquarters); and (2) further in-depth case studies of
the global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries of case Companies A, B,
and C. The data from these two phases presented throughout this thesis, as well
as the resulting versions of the conceptual framework, have clearly achieved the
above research objectives, as is evidenced in the following section, which provides
a summary of the findings and uses these to answer the above research questions.
Following the summary of research findings, this chapter discusses the contributions
to theory and practice.
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the research method, based on Yin (2003)
6.1 Summary of Findings
6.1.1 Phase 1: Case Studies from Silicon Valley
The in-depth case study data presented in Chapter 4 addresses the following di-
mensions of eight automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries located in Silicon
Valley: internal embeddedness; external embeddedness and knowledge sourcing; ac-
tor characteristics; actor relationship; and transfer content and mechanism (as well
as further considerations outside the initial conceptual framework).
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These case studies revealed key challenges faced in the transfer of knowledge from
the subsidiaries to their respective headquarters. In particular, the data emphasised
the di culty of balancing internal and external embeddedness, i.e., a trade-o↵ be-
tween subsidiary autonomy, which allows the subsidiary to engage more e↵ectively
with its external environment and thus source more knowledge, versus maintaining
close ties to headquarters, allowing the subsidiary to have a better overview for
which unit or person would be the most relevant contact for a particular project.
Furthermore, cultural di↵erences between the subsidiaries and their headquarters
are evident, resulting in adversity in the relationship between the two sides. The
cultural di↵erences seem to further result in di culties when attempting to collabo-
rate with start-ups, given the contrast in time-scales, agility, and entrepreneurialism
between large, global automotive OEMs and Silicon Valley start-ups.
There appears to be a dichotomy of expectations regarding the role of the sub-
sidiaries. Where the subsidiaries see themselves as focussing mainly on earlier stage
research and technology scouting, headquarters often uses the subsidiaries as an ex-
tended workbench for their series development work. This manifests, for instance,
in the struggle to transfer projects below a certain level of maturity, as well as in
the large proportion of pull projects, i.e., projects specifically demanded by head-
quarters series development. Disagreeing about the role of the subsidiary (often in-
advertently or even subconsciously) results in further adversities in the relationship
between subsidiary and headquarters, as well as a contradiction of the subsidiaries’
original exploratory purpose (not to mention the high cost of e↵ectively “outsourc-
ing” series development work to Silicon Valley).
The eight case companies implement various measures to address the above obsta-
cles to the knowledge transfer process, which can loosely be categorised into human
and structural measures. On the human side, the case companies commonly em-
ploy expat rotation programmes and have introduced designated knowledge transfer
personnel either at the subsidiary, at headquarters, or both. However, despite the
benefit of fostering the links between headquarters and the subsidiary, the common
practice of employing expats on rotation results in periodic knowledge loss when the
expats move back home. Furthermore, the case studies revealed the importance of
gaining support from headquarters’ top management to provide a top-down drive for
headquarters’ business units to accept projects from the subsidiaries. As discussed,
however, the support from top management often fails to trickle down into the rest
of the organisation, resulting in the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) syndrome prevailing
and preventing knowledge from being successfully transferred to headquarters.
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On the structural side, the autonomy trade-o↵ is commonly addressed through the
means of a dual-budget mechanism, in which part of the subsidiaries’ budget for
initial proofs of concept (POCs) is autonomous, but more complicated prototypes
have to be carried out with the financial support of a specific business unit at head-
quarters. This practice helps avoid the concept introduced as Death by PowerPoint
and the resulting Catch-22 cycle: to pitch for funding for a project, the subsidiary
requires a tangible POC to demonstrate its value, rather than merely delivering a
slide presentation, but this is di cult to achieve before having been allocated any
funding for that project. This idea relates to the concept of using replication and
templates as a basis for knowledge transfer, as discussed by Jensen and Szulanski
(2007) and Szulanski and Jensen (2004). A POC or working prototype serves as
a template of the knowledge to be transferred, enabling a more exact replication
of this knowledge at the recipient site than if the knowledge was transferred solely
through a slide presentation.
Across most cases, software projects are reportedly easier to transfer to headquar-
ters than hardware projects, particularly as it is cheaper and faster to develop a
POC, thus enabling a more flexible fit into the stringent vehicle development cycle
at headquarters. For hardware projects, timing of transfer needs to be carefully
considered to avoid delays in headquarters being able to integrate the project.
A key trend evidenced throughout Phase 1 of this thesis involves the subsidiaries
shifting ever closer to their headquarters’ series development department, despite
their original purpose being highly exploratory in nature. In other words, the sub-
sidiaries are moving away from technology scouting and early-stage POCs and to-
wards higher maturity projects that can be directly transferred to series development
at headquarters, saving time and resources by skipping the pre-development depart-
ment. As discussed, this trend may be explained by the focus on market success.
Exploratory projects that have a long time horizon are too far-removed from the
core scope of the organisation and can thus only be transferred to headquarters with
great di culty. Not being able to transfer immature projects, in turn, has driven
the subsidiaries to develop projects further, thereby moving closer and closer to
their headquarters’ series development department and losing sight of their original
purpose along the way.
While the idea that the shift towards series development improves market success
for the projects from the subsidiary appears at first glance to be positive and desir-
able, this trend brings problems of its own. As discussed, headquarters and the sub-
sidiaries often do not seem to agree on the latter’s role as the subsidiaries nonetheless
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continue to consider themselves as focussing on early-stage innovation. Furthermore,
while headquarters believes that time and resources are being saved by skipping the
pre-development department at headquarters, the resources are in e↵ect merely be-
ing relocated to Silicon Valley—a region that tends to have significantly higher
labour and rent costs in comparison to most automotive headquarters’ locations.
Findings from Phase 1 result in fundamental alterations of the conceptual framework
derived from the literature on knowledge transfer. Where the literature suggests a
linear broadcasting model of knowledge transfer (Battistella et al., 2016; Minbaeva,
2007; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009; Szulanski, 2000), the case study data reveals
collaboration between the subsidiaries (regarded initially as the knowledge source)
and headquarters (regarded initially as the knowledge recipient), in the form of joint
projects and the tendency for headquarters engineers to spend time at the subsidiary
for collaborative projects and vice versa. This suggests an imprecision in the broad-
casting model: knowledge transfer in this case is not linear, as indicated by the
one-way broadcasting arrow, but instead follows an iterative, non-linear path from
headquarters to subsidiary and back again.
The non-linearity of the knowledge transfer process is likely linked to another dis-
cussed factor of knowledge transfer: the corporate innovation subsidiaries moving
away from their original exploratory purpose, towards series development and, as
a result, taking projects to higher levels of maturity. Thus, the subsidiaries re-
quire closer collaboration with the recipient headquarters business unit, making the
knowledge transfer a more iterative, and less linear, process.
Similarly, the roles of the key actors in the broadcasting model, i.e., the knowledge
source and recipient, are more ambiguous than indicated in the literature. Instead
of being limited to the role of knowledge source, the subsidiaries often take on the
role of knowledge recipient in their collaborative e↵orts with local Silicon Valley
players and often act as platforms connecting various knowledge sources to various
knowledge recipients. Similarly, other stakeholders discussed throughout Phase 1,
such as start-ups, automotive Tier 1 suppliers, and headquarters, all often act as
both sources and recipients of knowledge, depending on the project and the situation.
These complexities revealed through the case studies indicate a fuzziness and ambi-
guity inherent to the context of knowledge transfer at automotive corporate innova-
tion subsidiaries in Silicon Valley. As illustrated in Figure 6.2 below, the revision of
the conceptual framework resulting from Phase 1 of this study reflects the discussed
non-linearity and ambiguity.
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Figure 6.2: Modified conceptual framework, based on Phase 1 of this study
6.1.2 Phase 2: Case Studies from Other Clusters
Chapter 5 provided an analysis of the data gathered in Phase 2 of this study, con-
cerning the corporate innovation subsidiaries of Companies A, B, and C in other
locations. The case companies’ global networks of corporate innovation subsidiaries
are analysed using most of the same key factors a↵ecting knowledge transfer as
used in Phase 1, i.e., internal embeddedness; external embeddedness and knowledge
sourcing; actor relationship; as well as further considerations outside of the concep-
tual framework. The aim of this phase is to validate findings from Phase 1 and
explore other factors that need to be taken into consideration when looking holisti-
cally at the whole network of corporate innovation subsidiaries, rather than just an
individual subsidiary and its dyadic knowledge transfer to headquarters.
A key obstacle impeding knowledge transfer revealed through the Phase 2 case
studies relates to di↵erences in national culture between the subsidiaries and their
headquarters. Many of the subsidiaries presented in Phase 2 are located in Asian
133
countries, such as China, Korea, or Japan, in which the cultural di↵erences between
the case companies’ European headquarters and the subsidiaries’ external environ-
ment tend to be larger than is the case for their Silicon Valley based counterparts,
especially given English as the most common denominator language across the globe.
As a result, challenges in the relationship between the subsidiaries and their respec-
tive headquarters are often based not only on organisational cultural di↵erences (as
similarly evident in Phase 1), but also on national cultural and language di↵erences.
Related to this is the tendency of headquarters to struggle with understanding local
market preferences at the subsidiaries in Phase 2. As a result, homologation, i.e.,
adapting products to local market conditions, is often a key focus of the subsidiaries
investigated in this phase of the thesis. To enable homologation, the subsidiaries
employ fewer, if any, expats than their Silicon Valley counterparts. This, on the
other hand, can result in the subsidiaries not having a su ciently strong connection
to headquarters to successfully transfer knowledge across.
In addition to the issue of di↵erences in culture, the complexities and a lack of
transparency arising from having a wide global network of corporate innovation
subsidiaries constitute key themes emerging from the Phase 2 case studies. Indeed,
the findings from this phase suggest that one must consider a company’s entire
network of subsidiaries holistically, rather than individually, as the activities and
structures of one subsidiary a↵ect those of the others. The need for transparency,
i.e., maintaining synergies between, and an overview of the activities of, the global
network of corporate innovation subsidiaries, is particularly complex, given the often
convoluted nature of this network. This finding is incorporated into the conceptual
framework as shown in Figure 6.3 below. Note that, while, at the moment, company
headquarters are still located centrally in this global network of corporate innovation
subsidiaries, future trends of decentralisation of R&D and learning at the periph-
ery of the organisation (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Hurtado-Torres et al., 2018;
Singh, 2007; Wolfram et al., 2018) may reshu✏e the layout of the network.
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Figure 6.3: Modified conceptual framework, based on Phase 2 of this study
6.2 Contribution to Theory
As discussed in Chapter 2, this research is contextualised by the international busi-
ness literature, particularly the topics of internationalisation, transfer of knowledge,
and subsidiary-headquarters relations. Reviewing the existing research resulted in
the identification of a gap in the literature: a lack of a holistic approach to reverse,
intra-firm knowledge transfer. To address this gap, a conceptual framework was
derived from the literature and applied throughout this work.
Multiple challenges of knowledge transfer predicted by the conceptual framework
based on the broadcasting model have been confirmed through the in-depth case
studies in this work. For instance, the trade-o↵ between subsidiary autonomy and
integration into the organisation is clearly evident, as predicted by Ghoshal and
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Bartlett (1995), who suggest that, while autonomy is important: “In the absence of
such an integration process, decentralised entrepreneurship may lead to some tempo-
rary performance improvement as existing slack is harnessed, but long-term devel-
opment of new capabilities or businesses is seriously impeded” (p.148).
Furthermore, this study reflects the implementation of certain measures to help
mitigate the challenges of knowledge transfer. For instance, the existing literature
suggests that high levels of trust, communication, and coordination, i.e., corporate
socialisation, help alleviate adversity in the relationship between actors of knowl-
edge transfer (Bjo¨rkman et al., 2004). One method of achieving this involves the
transfer of people between the knowledge source and the recipient, which Harzing
et al. (2016), Inkpen and Tsang (2005), and Szulanski (2000) suggest increases trust,
reduces loss of information, and thus facilitates the implementation of transferred
knowledge. Similarly, Vereecke et al. (2006) suggest that higher levels of people flow
contribute to knowledge sharing in international manufacturing networks (IMN).
Looking more closely at the literature on global innovation (i.e., manufacturing, en-
gineering, and R&D) networks, multiple aspects discussed by the reviewed studies
are relevant to the data presented in Phase 2 of this thesis. For instance, con-
sidering the configuration of the networks of corporate innovation subsidiaries at
case Companies A, B, and C, it is clear that these networks follow an autonomous,
rather than integrated configuration, as defined by Zhang et al. (2008) in a study
on Global Engineering Networks (GEN). In other words, the networks are char-
acterised by dispersed and independent engineering centres, informal competitive
mechanisms, strategic governance, and customised support systems. This makes
knowledge management within and across the network highly complex. Further-
more, given that the studied networks are characterised as having e↵ective, rather
than e cient, performance (quick, agile, focussed on customer-driven innovation)
(Zhang et al., 2008), they can be mapped onto the quadrant labelled GEN II in
the framework shown in Figure 2.1. Indeed, as Zhang et al. (2008) suggest, Centres
of Excellence (COEs), a term commonly used to characterise subsidiaries similar in
nature to those studied in this thesis, fit in the autonomous configuration, e↵ective
performance quadrant (GEN II) of the GEN framework.
Furthermore, looking at various typologies of international R&D networks (Archibugi
and Michie, 1995; Behrman and Fischer, 1980; Dunning and Narula, 1995; Ron-
stadt, 1978), the configuration of the networks of corporate innovation subsidiaries
of case Companies A, B, and C can be characterised as having a world market ori-
entation (Behrman and Fischer, 1980), following the purposes of global generation
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of technology and asset-seeking R&D (Archibugi and Michie, 1995; Dunning and
Narula, 1995), and consisting of corporate technology units established for long-
term, exploratory purposes (Ronstadt, 1978). Following the typology developed by
Gassmann and von Zedtwitz (1999), the networks studied in Phase 2 follow an R&D
hub model, rather than an integrated R&D network model, as R&D activities are
spread across di↵erent locations but are controlled and coordinated by headquarters,
rather than there not being a distinct centre. Despite Case B having little oversight
or control over its network of 60 global corporate innovation subsidiaries, the aim is
nonetheless to maintain coordination centrally at headquarters.
Given the discussed considerations of the networks’ configurations, the question
remains of how to best manage knowledge transfer across these highly complex net-
works. While Sza´sz et al. (2019) suggest that having a culture of knowledge sharing
throughout the organisation, as well as introducing incentive systems for knowl-
edge sharing and improved interaction between humans across the network improve
knowledge sharing, these measures are, as of yet, lacking at the studied automo-
tive companies. While the subsidiaries are nonetheless classified as net knowledge
senders (Sza´sz et al., 2019), the knowledge is not implemented successfully at the
recipient (headquarters), possibly given the lack of knowledge sharing culture, in-
centives, and human interaction.
Digging deeper into the work by Shi and Gregory (1998), it becomes clear that the
authors’ statement that: “As a whole system, the nodes still play a transformation
role in the network, but the total configuration can generate more additional func-
tionality for both corporation and its factories” (p.209), while 20 years old, is no
less relevant today. In particular, the authors’ suggestion for network capabilities
derived from the network’s coordination are particularly relevant to the case studies
presented in Chapter 5. Indeed, thriftiness ability, i.e. the ability to improve e -
ciency through networking, is suggested to reduce duplication of e↵ort throughout
the network. Furthermore, learning ability relates to the sharing and integration of
knowledge between nodes in the network. Both are of high importance when try-
ing to achieve knowledge transfer in networks of corporate innovation subsidiaries.
Nonetheless, these capabilities appear to be lacking in the studied cases.
The analysis presented in this study clearly demonstrates that knowledge transfer
persists to pose a challenge to be taken seriously if value is to be gained from cor-
porate innovation subsidiaries, despite some subsidiaries having more than 20 years
experience and despite all subsidiaries implementing measures to address the prob-
lem. Indeed, considering reverse intra-firm knowledge transfer holistically through-
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out Phases 1 and 2 has alluded to deeper complexities of the research context that
remain unaddressed by the existing literature:
• The subsidiaries are moving away from their original exploratory purpose, to-
wards taking projects to higher levels of maturity and collaborating more with
their headquarters’ series development department. As a result, the knowl-
edge transfer process between the subsidiaries and headquarters is not linear
as previously suggested by the broadcasting model, but iterative;
• The roles of the actors in the framework are less clear-cut than suggested in
the literature, but are instead ambiguous and variable;
• In practice, one must often consider a company’s whole network of corporate
innovation subsidiaries and the synergies between actors, rather than examin-
ing subsidiaries in isolation from one another.
As demonstrated, this study makes two main theoretical contributions. Firstly, it
contributes to the literature on international business, particularly multinational
subsidiaries and knowledge transfer, by developing a conceptual framework for the
knowledge transfer from corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clus-
ters to their respective headquarters. This framework is refined through multiple
phases of in-depth case studies, thus adding to the literature on obstacles to intra-
firm knowledge transfer and how to manage them. Furthermore, the conceptual
framework holistically integrates multiple factors a↵ecting knowledge transfer, as
well as the interactions between them, thereby addressing a key gap in the existing
literature. Secondly, this study contributes to the literature on global innovation
(i.e., manufacturing, engineering, and R&D) networks, by considering not just the
dyadic relationship between a single corporate innovation subsidiary and its head-
quarters, but by also pointing out the challenges that arise when trying to manage
knowledge transfer across a global network of such subsidiaries, for instance man-
aging the transparency across the network to avoid duplication of e↵ort.
6.3 Contribution to Practice
The findings from this study have three main implications for practitioners. Firstly,
at a high level, this research draws attention to the practice of setting up a corpo-
rate innovation subsidiary in an innovation cluster such as Silicon Valley, Beijing, Tel
Aviv, or elsewhere, for the purposes of staying abreast of new technological devel-
opments. This, in and of itself, constitutes a contribution to practice, as companies
may not be aware of how to best access prominent innovation clusters.
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Secondly, for those companies that already have a corporate innovation subsidiary in
Silicon Valley or elsewhere, this work is highly relevant, as practitioners throughout
this study seem to agree that transferring knowledge to headquarters is a core chal-
lenge faced by corporate innovation subsidiaries around the globe. Thus, developing
a conceptual framework that demonstrates di↵erent obstacles to knowledge trans-
fer, and how these obstacles are managed in practice by automotive case studies,
provides practitioners from any industry with a valuable benchmark for the types
of issues they ought to be aware of and how they might address them.
Finally, reconciling various aspects of the knowledge transfer literature into an in-
tegrative conceptual framework based on the commonly-used broadcasting model,
and modifying this framework through iterations resulting from the two phases
in this work, provides practitioners with an understanding about the complexities
involved in the knowledge transfer process. Indeed, this thesis highlights that at-
tempts at managing the obstacles to knowledge transfer often do not su ce and the
struggle thus persists. Instead, this study emphasises a deeper, underlying cause
of the friction between headquarters and corporate innovation subsidiaries. While
this implies that the challenges are much more di cult to manage than previously
suggested (there appears to be a fundamental contradiction, rather than a superfi-
cial disagreement), having an awareness of the severity of the problem is vital for
practitioners in order to avoid attempting to solve seemingly superficial problems
through similarly superficial measures. While this is by no means an easy feat, and
the purpose of this thesis is not to provide practitioners with a toolkit for achieving
this goal, this thesis does provide an awareness for where to best concentrate and
deploy resources.
6.4 Limitations
This study bears the usual limitations of case study research. First and foremost,
the case studies conducted in this research stem from a single industry, the auto-
motive industry. This points to a limitation of the study’s external validity, i.e., its
generalisability (Yin, 2003), given that it does not address similar issues in other
contexts. The contemporary automotive industry has been characterised as highly
mature and incumbent (Diehlmann and Ha¨cker, 2013; Holweg and Oliver, 2016),
which suggests that large automotive manufacturers are more prone to be resistant
to change and radical innovation than companies in other, more agile industries.
While the limitations of conducting in-depth case studies are clear, the resulting
benefits must also be noted. As suggested by Gioia et al. (2010):
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Studies cannot be simultaneously simple, accurate, and general; rather,
researchers must choose which one or two of the three to emphasise. A
case study provides the benefit of accurate observation and relative con-
ceptual simplicity, although it trades o↵ some degree of generalisability.
(p.37) (See also Thorngate (1976).)
Furthermore, despite the number of cases researched (eight), the number of inter-
views conducted (79), and the triangulation of interview data from both the perspec-
tives of the various subsidiaries and their respective headquarters, this study lacks
data from di↵erent levels of the organisational hierarchy. The majority of intervie-
wees hold managerial positions, either at a subsidiary or at headquarters. While
these interviewees are able to provide a high level overview of activities concerning
knowledge transfer, interview data from other levels of the organisational hierarchy
would have provided valuable insight into more operational aspects of the research
context—a possible avenue for further research.
6.5 Future Research Directions
The discussed limitations call for further future research. For instance, certain
hypotheses could be developed based on the framework and findings developed
throughout this thesis, which would provide the basis for a deductive study in
the form of a large-scale survey. Such an endeavour addresses the limited gener-
alisability of this study, as it would allow sector boundaries to be crossed and the
context-specificity of the framework to be reduced.
Given the high levels of interest expressed by practitioners involved in this study,
future research could explore this research context from other angles. For instance,
a topic often touched upon by interviewees involves the e cacy of corporate inno-
vation subsidiaries and the value that they can deliver to the organisation. While
this is a highly complex question, it is also an important one, as corporate innova-
tion subsidiaries’ value can be manifold. On the most obvious level, they provide
headquarters with new technologies that can be incorporated into the organisa-
tion’s products and thus bring market value. However, given the often exploratory
nature of many such subsidiaries, and their focus on early-stage technologies, many
launched projects may never end up on the market. This does not mean that the
subsidiary is not delivering value. Indeed, as suggested by a practitioner involved in
this study: “Perhaps the greatest value provided by an outpost is their contribution
in changing mindsets at di↵erent levels in the mother organisation”.
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Furthermore, a concept introduced in Phase 1 of this study, innovation theatre,
points at another possible type of value provided by corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries. As discussed, innovation theatre involves large companies establishing
a presence in an innovation cluster not for the purpose of actually gaining techno-
logical value from that region, but to instead appear innovative, new, and prepared
for the future. Thus, the mere existence of a corporate innovation subsidiary may
benefit the organisation by raising the image (and possibly shareholder value) of
the company. These considerations of value and e cacy constitute a complex, yet
fruitful potential topic for further investigation.
An additional avenue for future research in the context of corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries located in an innovation cluster involves the location choice for setting up
such a subsidiary. The reasons for choosing Silicon Valley (or Beijing, Shanghai,
Tel Aviv, Berlin, etc.) as a location were discussed in detail by interviewees and
are illustrated in the case studies in Phases 1 and 2 of this work. However, there
appears to be a threshold involved, determining at which point a company might
merely send a representative to an innovation cluster periodically, or instead decides
to fully commit through the establishment of a subsidiary. This research avenue
would suggest a more regional approach, including literature on Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI), regional cluster theory, innovation policy, and other areas.
Throughout this thesis, it has become evident that the multinational corporations
under investigation struggle with knowledge transfer despite many years of experi-
ence and despite measures in place to help address the issue. This suggests that
perhaps there are underlying complexities at work that are not fully construed by
the broadcasting model and the knowledge transfer literature. A further theoretical
lens through which to view knowledge transfer may be the theory of institutional
logics, which suggests that corporations are subject to certain values, norms, sym-
bols, and beliefs that make the corporations what they are (Thornton and Ocasio,
2008). A corporation’s institutional logic provides it with organising principles and
a common purpose, thereby (often subconsciously) influencing employee behaviour
and judgement (Greenwood et al., 2011; Ngoye et al., 2019; Pache and Santos, 2010,
2013; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012). However, while early litera-
ture in the field suggests that organisations are characterised by a single logic, later
work argues instead that multiple, often competing logics, can exist simultaneously
within a single organisation, often in specialised units or spaces, with each unit or
space adhering to a distinct logic (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Pache and Santos,
2010, 2013; Perkmann et al., 2019; Raynard, 2016; Reay and Hinings, 2009).
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Corporations that comprise multiple, potentially incompatible institutional logics
are known as hybrid organisations (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Pache and Santos,
2013). Managing these competing institutional logics “is challenging for organi-
sations because it is likely to trigger internal tensions that may generate conflicts
among organisation members, who are ultimately the ones who enact institutional
logics” (Battilana and Dorado, 2010, p.1420). In hybrid organisations, one logic of-
ten dominates while the other struggles to have an impact (Baba and Sasaki, 2016;
Besharov and Smith, 2014; Ramus et al., 2017). This may result in actors on the
side of the more peripheral logic not being heard or included, especially as “mutual
adjustment [of competing institutional logics] is only evident when the logic held by
powerful actors is not threatened” (Currie and Spyridonidis, 2016, p.93).
Thus, perhaps the automotive corporations discussed in this study comprise hy-
brid organisations with competing institutional logics on the side of the corporate
innovation subsidiaries, versus the side of their headquarters. These competing in-
stitutional logics consequently result in underlying tension between the two sides,
preventing knowledge from being transferred between them. Taking a novel theo-
retical lens to knowledge transfer would make for an interesting avenue for future
research.
6.6 Conclusion
This study set out to explore the context of automotive corporate innovation sub-
sidiaries located in Silicon Valley (and other locations) by answering the question
of: How is knowledge transferred from a corporate innovation subsidiary located in
an innovation cluster to its company headquarters? The key research objective was
to develop a framework that conceptualises the knowledge transfer process from the
innovation subsidiary to the parent company’s headquarters, including a discussion
of the obstacles to knowledge transfer, as well as how these obstacles are managed
in practice. The study set out to achieve its objectives in two phases: (1) eight
in-depth case studies of automotive corporate innovation subsidiaries located in Sil-
icon Valley; and (2) further in-depth case studies of the global network of corporate
innovation subsidiaries of case Companies A, B, and C.
By integrating the literature on knowledge transfer into a conceptual framework
based on the commonly-used broadcasting model, and modifying this framework
using the findings from the case studies in Phases 1 and 2, this thesis contributes
to the literature on international business, particularly the topics of internationali-
sation, transfer of knowledge, and subsidiary-headquarters relations. Furthermore,
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by considering not only the dyadic relationship and knowledge transfer between a
single corporate innovation subsidiary and its headquarters, but by also discussing
the challenges that arise when trying to manage knowledge transfer across a global
network of such subsidiaries, this study contributes to the literature on global in-
novation (i.e., manufacturing, engineering, and R&D) networks. It is the hope that
this study will stimulate future discussion on the research context to help advance
our understanding of corporate innovation subsidiaries located in innovation clusters
and how these subsidiaries can successfully transfer knowledge to their respective
headquarters.
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Appendix A
Case Study Protocol
The following line of questioning was used during interviews with employees of
the corporate innovation subsidiaries and of headquarters, respectively. Note that,
instead of the more academic term corporate innovation subsidiary, the term inno-
vation outpost, used more widely in industry, was used throughout the interviews in
keeping with the preferred terminology of the interviewees.
Interviews with Employees of Subsidiaries
• Introduction to interviewee’s role, position, division, background (expat or
local hire, time spent at outpost, etc.)
• When was the outpost established? Why here?
• How many people work at the outpost?
• How is the outpost sta↵ed? Expats vs. local hires?
• What topic areas does the outpost cover?
• What day-to-day activities are carried out at the outpost?
• What facilities does the outpost have?
• Who, if anyone, does the outpost collaborate with in its local environment?
Start-ups, universities, competitors, Tier 1 suppliers, large IT companies ...?
• Can you tell me about the evolution of the outpost? How has it changed since
it was established? In size, purpose, who it works with, etc.?
• Can you tell me about an example of a project that was successfully transferred
to headquarters?
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• How are projects usually transferred to headquarters? Is there a standard
process? Who takes responsibility for the transfer? At what level of maturity
does transfer usually occur?
• Can you tell me about how the outpost communicates with people at head-
quarters?
• How does the outpost fit into the wider organisation? Is it part of R&D,
engineering, IT...?
• Who at headquarters does the outpost report to?
• What budget mechanism does the outpost employ?
• Who has the power/responsibility to make decisions about what projects are
followed?
• Who drives the projects? Are projects usually demanded (“pulled”) from
headquarters or are they suggested (“pushed”) by the outpost?
• How does the company’s top management level (C-suite) engage with the
outpost?
• What are some of the main challenges of working at an innovation outpost?
How are these tackled?
• Open discussion
• Other suggested interview partners?
Interviews with Employees of Headquarters
• Introduction to interviewee’s role, position, division, background
• How has the interviewee been involved with the Silicon Valley innovation out-
post? (If applicable, does the interviewee also have experience working with
the company’s innovation outposts in other locations? If so, what are the
di↵erences and similarities between the Silicon Valley outpost and the other
subsidiaries?)
• What, in their eyes, is the main purpose of the outpost(s)?
• How are projects transferred from the outpost(s) to business units at head-
quarters? Can we discuss specific examples of successful or not successful
ones? Have any ended up in the vehicle?
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• What is the balance and di↵erences between push vs. pull projects (projects
driven by the outpost vs. projects driven by headquarters)?
• At what level of maturity do projects normally get transferred?
• Does the transfer process di↵er for collaborative projects with start-ups in
comparison to projects developed internally by the outpost?
• How/when does a Tier 1 supplier get involved in collaborations with start-ups?
Is it the supplier’s headquarters or the supplier’s (Silicon Valley) outpost?
• What are some of the major challenges in working with the outpost?
• How could the transfer of projects be improved?
• Does the outpost work with any other business units at headquarters besides
that of the interviewee?
• Has the outpost always worked with the same business units at headquarters,
i.e., has the organisational fit of the outpost changed?
• Depending on how long the interviewee has been with the company, what was
the original purpose of the outpost and have there been any major changes in
the outpost’s evolution? In size, purpose, who it works with, etc.?
• Open discussion
• Other suggested interview partners?
Appendix B
Overview of Interviews
Case
company
Interview
ID
Subsidiary
location
Role of interviewee Subsidiary or
HQ?
Medium Duration
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
A
A-1 Silicon Valley Former head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 30min
A-2 Silicon Valley Former head of subsidiary, now CVC team Both (expat) Telephone 30min
A-3 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 30min
A-4 Silicon Valley Three senior engineers Subsidiary Telephone 45min
A-5 Silicon Valley Senior engineer Both (expat) Face-to-face 90min
A-6 Silicon Valley Former head of subsidiary, now CVC team Both (expat) Face-to-face 40min
A-7 Silicon Valley Two senior engineers Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
A-8 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
A-9 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
A-10 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Face-to-face 30min
A-11 None (HQ) VP, Digital Strategy HQ Telephone 30min
A-12 Seoul Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 60min
A-13 Tokyo Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 50min
A-14 Shanghai Head of open innovation Subsidiary Telephone 40min
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163A-15 Shanghai Head of open innovation Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
A-16 Seoul Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Face-to-face 60min
A-17 Tokyo Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Face-to-face 80min
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
B
B-1 Silicon Valley Business innovation Both (expat) Telephone 30min
B-2 Silicon Valley Head of business innovation Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-3 Silicon Valley Head of business innovation Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
B-4 Silicon Valley Head of business innovation Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-5 None (HQ) Manager at HQ business innovation HQ Telephone 30min
B-6 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
B-7 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
B-8 None (HQ) Product manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
B-9 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
B-10 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
B-11 Tel Aviv Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Telephone 60min
B-12 Berlin CFO of subsidiary Subsidiary Telephone 45min
B-13 Berlin Product manager Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-14 Beijing Innovation manager Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-15 Bremen Quality control Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-16 Beijing Innovation manager Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
B-17 Bremen Founder Subsidiary Telephone 30min
B-18 None (HQ) Two members of corporate strategy HQ Telephone 40min
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
C
C-1 Silicon Valley Manager, open innovation Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
C-2 Silicon Valley Manager, open innovation Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
C-3 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 60min
C-4 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 45min
C-5 None (HQ) Two Managers at HQ R&D HQ Face-to-face 60min
C-6 Paris Founder Both (expat) Telephone 60min
C
o
m
p
.
D
D-1 Silicon Valley Three product managers Both (expat) Face-to-face 60min
D-2 Silicon Valley Head of operations Both (expat) Telephone 60min
D-3 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Both (expat) Telephone 30min
D-4 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
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p
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en
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C
o
m
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D
D-5 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
D-6 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
D-7 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
D-8 Silicon Valley Head of operations Both (expat) Telephone 30min
D-9 None (HQ) Manager at HQ business innovation HQ Telephone 45min
C
o
m
p
.
E
E-1 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Telephone 30min
E-2 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Telephone 30min
E-3 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Face-to-face 90min
E-4 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
F
F-1 Silicon Valley Senior manager Subsidiary F1 Face-to-face 60min
F-2 Silicon Valley Senior manager Subsidiary F1 Telephone 30min
F-3 Silicon Valley Manager Subsidiary F2 Telephone 30min
F-4 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary F2 Face-to-face 30min
F-5 Silicon Valley Senior engineer Subsidiary F2 Telephone 30min
F-6 Silicon Valley Manager Subsidiary F2 Telephone 30min
F-7 None (HQ) Two Managers at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 60min
F-8 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 45min
C
o
m
p
.
G
G-1 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
G-2 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Face-to-face 60min
G-3 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Telephone 30min
G-4 Silicon Valley Communications lead Subsidiary Telephone 45min
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
H
H-1 Silicon Valley Communications lead Subsidiary Telephone 30min
H-2 Silicon Valley Head of subsidiary Subsidiary Face-to-face 80min
H-3 Silicon Valley R&D engineer Subsidiary Telephone 30min
H-4 Silicon Valley Programme manager Subsidiary Telephone 30min
H-5 Silicon Valley Manager, open innovation Subsidiary Telephone 30min
H-6 None (HQ) Manager at HQ R&D HQ Face-to-face 60min
O
t
h
e
r
N/A N/A Silicon Valley innovation outpost expert N/A Face-to-face 90min
N/A N/A Silicon Valley innovation outpost expert N/A Face-to-face 60min
N/A Silicon Valley Two co-heads of Tier 1 supplier subsidiary Both (expats) Face-to-face 45min
N/A Silicon Valley Head of Tier 1 supplier subsidiary Both (expat) Face-to-face 50min
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O
t
h
e
r
N/A Silicon Valley Head of Tier 1 supplier subsidiary Both (expat) Face-to-face 50min
N/A N/A Silicon Valley innovation outpost expert N/A Telephone 45min
N/A N/A Silicon Valley innovation outpost expert N/A Face-to-face 45min
TOTAL: 79
Appendix C
Examples of Coding Procedure
Interview D2
166
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Interview E3
Appendix D
Illustration of Data Analysis Procedure
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Appendix E
Summary Table of Phase 1 Case Studies
See below for a summary table of the cross-case analysis of Phase 1 of this study
(i.e., case studies of automotive corporate innovation subsidiary located in Silicon
Valley). Note that an empty cell in the table does not indicate the absence of
this particular category from a case, but merely a lack of conclusive data about it.
Instead, absence of a category from a case is explicitly stated in the table.
171
A
p
p
en
d
ix
E
.
S
u
m
m
ary
T
ab
le
of
P
h
ase
1
C
ase
S
tu
d
ies
172
Case A Case B Case C Case D
Internal embeddedness
Expats Expats as network in HQ Expats as network in HQ Expats as network in HQ Subsidiary consciously re-
ducing number of expats
KT personnel Designated KT personnel
at HQ fosters the network
Designated KT personnel
at both HQ and subsidiary
fosters the network
Newly introduced desig-
nated KT personnel at
subsidiary fosters the net-
work
Designated KT personnel
at HQ fosters the network
Autonomy Dual-budget system; Lim-
ited subsidiary autonomy
(requires buy-in from HQ)
Dual-budget system; Lim-
ited subsidiary autonomy
(mainly conducts projects
requested specifically by
HQ); Lab-B is separate le-
gal entity for more auton-
omy
Autonomous budget; High
subsidiary autonomy, but
too fast for HQ as a result;
subsidiary gets buy-in from
HQ before starting project
Dual-budget system; Lim-
ited subsidiary autonomy
(requires buy-in from HQ)
External embeddedness
and knowledge sourcing
Local hiring Aim of o ce is to learn
from local hires and indus-
tries
Aim of o ce is to learn
from local hires
Start-ups Cultural di↵erences be-
tween HQ and start-ups
hinder the collaboration so
link is established to Tier
1 suppliers
Cultural di↵erences be-
tween HQ and start-ups
hinder the collaboration so
link is established to Tier 1
suppliers; Not demanding
exclusivity from start-ups
Start-up technology must
fit into larger system so
link is established to Tier
1 suppliers
Start-up technology must
fit into larger system so
link is established to Tier
1 suppliers
Accelerator partner No partnership with accel-
erator
No partnership with accel-
erator
No partnership with accel-
erator
No partnership with accel-
erator
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Case E Case F (F1 & F2) Case G Case H
Internal embeddedness
Expats No expats at this sub-
sidiary
Expats from both sub-
sidiaries as network in HQ
Expats as network in HQ;
Co-leadership approach
improves both internal and
external embeddedness
Expats as network in HQ
KT personnel No designated knowledge
transfer personnel
No designated knowledge
transfer personnel
No designated knowledge
transfer personnel
Designated KT personnel
at HQ fosters the network
Autonomy F1 dual-budget system and
limited subsidiary auton-
omy (requires buy-in from
HQ); F2 has autonomous
budget and is separate le-
gal entity for high level of
autonomy
Dual-budget system; Lim-
ited subsidiary autonomy
(mainly conducts projects
requested specifically by
HQ)
Separate legal entity,
but nonetheless limited
autonomy because of
dual-budget system
External embeddedness
and knowledge sourcing
Local hiring All employees are local
hires
Aim of o ce is to learn
from local hires
Aim of o ce is to learn
from local hires
Start-ups Cultural di↵erences be-
tween HQ and start-ups
hinder the collaboration so
link is established to Tier
1 suppliers
F1 struggles to work with
start-ups because of lack
of autonomy; F2 mainly
works with start-ups by in-
vesting equity
Start-up technology must
fit into larger system so
link is established to Tier
1 suppliers
Providing collaborative
workspace for start-ups;
not demanding exclusivity
from start-ups
Accelerator partner Partnership with accelera-
tor to find more start-ups
to work with
No partnership with accel-
erator
Partnership with accelera-
tor to find more start-ups
to work with
No partnership with accel-
erator
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Case A Case B Case C Case D
Actor characteristics
Top mgmt. support Has recently been improv-
ing through executives vis-
iting subsidiary; HQ is
busy and slow by definition
Has recently been improv-
ing through executives vis-
iting subsidiary
Has recently been improv-
ing through executives vis-
iting subsidiary
Has recently been improv-
ing through executives vis-
iting subsidiary
Actor relationship
Adversity Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; HQ employees envi-
ous of subsidiary; one-
sided relationship because
subsidiary is loyal to organ-
isation despite HQ having
decision-power
Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; misunderstanding by
HQ about the way of work-
ing of the subsidiary
Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; frustrations because of
di↵erences in culture and
speed
Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; expats are not enough
to ease NIH and transfer
issues, so structures need
to be put in place; lack of
trust by HQ to subsidiary;
envy, competition, threat,
resentment from HQ to
subsidiary
Culture HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up, this
results in friction and in-
congruities
HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up, this
results in friction and in-
congruities
HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up, this
results in friction and in-
congruities
HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up, this
results in friction and in-
congruities
Transfer cont. & mech.
Death by PPT Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Transfer timing Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap
Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap; knowl-
edge transfer must be two-
ways instead of just linear
to ensure timing is correct
Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap
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Case E Case F (F1 & F2) Case G Case H
Actor characteristics
Top mgmt. support Has recently been improv-
ing through executives vis-
iting subsidiary; HQ is
busy and slow by definition
F1 has little support from
top management because
visiting executives end up
being tourists; F2 has
top management support
through direct links to
board and dual mgmt. role
of subsidiary head
High management support
because of direct links to
executives, but subsidiary
projects outside scope of
HQ so knowledge transfer
is still di cult
Good support from top
management in driving
projects
Actor relationship
Adversity Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ
Frustrations because HQ is
slow and does not imple-
ment projects
Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; HQ dismisses sub-
sidiary because of added
work; need to transfer
projects at exactly right
level of maturity
Strong NIH syndrome at
HQ; HQ sees subsidiary as
threat
Culture HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up,
this results in friction and
incongruities; Subsidiary
provides mentors from HQ
for start-ups as bridge
HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiaries are like start-ups,
this results in friction and
incongruities
Subsidiary loyalty swings
from start-up to HQ at
point of production
HQ is bureaucratic, sub-
sidiary is like start-up,
this results in friction and
incongruities; Subsidiary
provides mentors from HQ
for start-ups as bridge
Transfer cont. & mech.
Death by PPT Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Subsidiary needs to de-
velop POC rather than
present PPT to HQ
Transfer timing Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap
Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap
Timing of transfer must fit
with HQ roadmap
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Case A Case B Case C Case D
Mechanisms Expats, business trips,
calls, newsletter, company
innovation fair day
Expats, calls, newsletter Constant communication Business trips, calls,
newsletter, company
innovation fair day
Further considerations
Closer to series Subsidiary purpose is mov-
ing from exploratory na-
ture towards series dev.;
Subsidiary secures early
buy-in from HQ before
starting a project
Most projects are re-
quested by HQ series
dev. and the subsidiary is
moving closer as a result
HQ thinks the subsidiary is
closer to series dev. than
it actually is (see di↵ering
expectations below)
Subsidiary purpose is mov-
ing from exploratory na-
ture towards series dev.
Expectation dichotomy Subsidiary used as ex-
tended workbench for out-
sourcing series dev. work;
Innovation theatre
Subsidiary wants to make
whole company better at
innovation; HQ sees sub-
sidiary as extended work-
bench for series dev.
Unrealistic expectations by
HQ about what subsidiary
can do because subsidiary
demonstrates prototypes
without mentioning limi-
tations of the prototpyes;
Subsidiary has introduced
a failure KPI, but this is
not well understood by
HQ because of a contrast
in culture
KT non-linear More collaboration with
HQ results in iterative KT
process
Most projects requested by
HQ series dev., so KT pro-
cess is iterative
Knowledge transfer must
be two-ways instead of just
linear to ensure timing is
correct
Most projects requested by
HQ series dev., so KT pro-
cess is iterative
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Case E Case F (F1 & F2) Case G Case H
Mechanisms Business trips, calls,
newsletter
Expats, calls, reports,
company innovation fair
day
Co-leadership approach,
business trips, calls
Expats, business trips,
calls, newsletter
Further considerations
Closer to series Most projects are re-
quested by HQ series
development and the sub-
sidiary is moving closer to
series development as a
result
Most projects are re-
quested by HQ series
development and the sub-
sidiary is moving closer to
series development as a
result
Subsidiary purpose is mov-
ing from exploratory na-
ture towards series dev.
Expectation dichotomy Talent circulation between
research and series dev. at
HQ is reducing expectation
dichotomy
Subsidiaries see themselves
as being focussed on re-
search, while headquar-
ters series dev. requests
projects of subsidiaries, re-
sulting in mismatch in
expectations about sub-
sidiaries’ role
F2 became separate legal
entity to be more like start-
up, but still has to target
series dev. for KT
KT non-linear Most projects at F1 re-
quested by HQ series dev.,
so KT process is iterative
Most projects requested by
HQ series dev. and most
projects done in conjunc-
tion with HQ, so KT pro-
cess is iterative
Improve transfer success
by sending HQ series dev.
people to subsidiary for
short stays (train more
catchers), making the
knowledge transfer process
less linear
Appendix F
Summary Table of Phase 2 Case Studies
See below for a summary table of the cross-case analysis of Phase 2 of this study
(i.e., the global network of corporate innovation subsidiaries of case Companies A,
B, and C). Note that an empty cell in the table does not indicate the absence of
this particular category from a case, but merely a lack of conclusive data about it.
Instead, absence of a category from a case is explicitly stated in the table.
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Case A Case B Case C
Internal embeddedness
Expats No expats at Asian subsidiaries,
given focus on homologation
No expats at Asian subsidiary, given
focus on homologation
Expats as network in HQ; Paris sub-
sidiary physically close to HQ so
more interaction
KT personnel Designated KT personnel at HQ fos-
ters the network
Designated KT personnel at HQ fos-
ters the network
No designated knowledge transfer
personnel
External embeddedness
and knowledge sourcing
Homologation Mainly local hiring; transfer
projects directly to R&D centre in
China
Mainly local hiring in China; trans-
fer projects directly to R&D centre
in China
Homologation not mentioned
Actor relationship
Adversity NIH syndrome at HQ NIH syndrome and power struggle
at HQ
Culture Di↵erences in national culture and
language cause misunderstandings;
HQ doesn’t understand the local
market
Di↵erences in national culture and
language cause misunderstandings;
HQ doesn’t translate key documents
into English
Heavy-weight processes at HQ hin-
der subsidiaries’ collaboration with
start-ups
Further considerations
Transparency Having transparency across the net-
work of subsidiaries is key to spread
knowledge and avoid duplicated ef-
forts; database introduced to help
with this, but e↵ectiveness is limited
Having transparency across the net-
work of subsidiaries is key to spread
knowledge and avoid duplicated ef-
forts; 60 subsidiaries with little com-
munication between them
Transparency not mentioned
Other Other subsidiaries conduct projects
to lower maturity than Silicon Val-
ley subsidiary
Innovation theatre (subsidiaries es-
tablished just for the purpose of ap-
pearing innovative)
Co-working space and co-
governance of subsidiary with
external partners
